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THE SILK ROAD AND BUSINESS COMMUNICATIONS
IN THE ANCIENT EAST

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Abstract

In the modern world, which is striving for globalization and an increase in the number of means of communication, many researchers return to the history of the Great Silk Road as a means of transcontinental communication of peoples, countries, and economies. Since the end of the XX and at the beginning of the XXI century, new projects have been developed to "restoration" this path with the help of modern means and methods, in the context of understanding the new international economy. The relevance of the research is due to the need to turn to the beginning of the formation of this path, to its origins and understand how intercultural business communications were built in ancient times. The purpose of this study is to consider the process of establishing business ties between Ancient East countries. To determine the role of the participating countries, a historical and geographical approach was used. The chronological method is the leading research method of this problem, which allows us to trace the relationship between the causes and consequences of certain actions aimed at the construction and participation of countries in trade; the comparative, retrospective and analytical methods are also involved. These methods allow us to comprehensively consider how business ties were formed in the Ancient East. The article examines which peoples and empires were involved in the development of this ancient way, reveals what goals and methods were, and how the Great Silk Road influenced their development, both economically, culturally, and politically. In addition, the article reveals the role and participation of the peoples of modern Kazakhstan in the implementation of international trade in the Ancient East, and what prospects open up due to the development of new projects to restore this international communication. The study shows a comprehensive and chronological view of the formation of business communication in several countries involved in business relations in the region.

Key words: *The Great Silk Road, business relations, Kazakhstan, the Ancient East, transnational trade*

Introduction

In recent years, modern economic trends require not only the development of new concepts but are increasingly turning to the experience of past generations. However, the study of global socio-economic relationships most often takes place on the materials of the history of modern times. The history of the economy of more ancient epochs remains the prerogative of national-oriented approaches. As a

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result, many phenomena of the early history of the world economy remain without deep analysis or are analysed rather one-sidedly (Latov, 2010: 131). One of such phenomena is the Great Silk Road, a system of caravan trade routes that connected the countries of Eurasia into a relatively unified economic system from the II century BC to the XV century. The Great Silk Road is a landmark familiar to many from history, tourists come to the most famous places of this path, but this object is not only a kind of historical heritage for modern researchers but also a subject for inspiration in the implementation of new economic projects. The legendary highway of the Middle Ages – the Great Silk Road – is the subject of both modern historical and economic and cultural studies, the 1500-year history of the route is a world cultural and economic miracle (Zhylankozova, 2018: 549). Thanks to the Great Silk Road, the East and the West met: routes were laid, infrastructure was provided, using primitive transport, it was possible to unite the Eurasian continent, establishing trade exchange between the West and the East. But this through route connected all the great civilizations of the Old World – China, India, the Middle East and the Middle East, and Europe. One of the branches of the famous trade route passed through the regions of Kazakhstan, so the article will pay attention, among others, to the role of the peoples of modern Kazakhstan in trade. Currently, logistics, international trade and tourism are the main factors of integration of these countries (Raimbekov et al., 2018: 128-129).

Thus, the purpose of the study is to analyse the emergence and development of the Great Silk Road in the context of business ties in the region. The object of the research is the historical and economic processes of the formation of business relations of the Great Silk Road in the Ancient East. The chronological framework of the study is because many intercultural ties were laid during the Ancient East, which later either continued to develop or fell into decline.

The history of the Great Silk Road has been studied for more than one decade, archaeologists have been involved in the study of this phenomenon, whose research allows us to imagine the appearance of those societies that allowed trade to exist and develop (Nazarov & Korableva, 2018: 121-122). The role of the Great Silk Road in the economies of participants in this trade, as well as in the transnational trade, has long magnetized researchers of various periods, regions, and branches of science. There are some large and complex studies in the literature concerning the entire period of the existence of this path, for example, a book by Professor Valerie Hansen of Yale University is one of the best works on this topic (Hansen, 2015). Many works reveal the participation of the Greeks and Romans in the formation and development of the region, thanks to which the stereotype was destroyed of the strong role of Western peoples in the formation and development of this path (Speidel & von Reden, 2020: 703-704). Each country that participated in trade along this ancient route explores its contribution, for example, China is actively engaged in the history of the creation of the Great Silk Road, which owns the primacy in construction and the initiative to create it, although the prerequisites and the first caravan routes existed as early as the 3rd millennium BC in the region (Mamleeva, 1999: 189). Many studies involve attempts to restore this path using modern methods and modern approaches in international trade (Li & Huang, 2019: 3131). Recent studies analyse the potential

for the return of trade and business ties along the "old" path, analyse the prospects and opportunities for each participating country and the whole region (Raimbekov et al. 2018: 133). At the same time, researchers try to take a new look at the economic and cultural relations that were formed in the ancient period and how they have been developing in recent decades (Kushanova, 2020: 9). The recent initiatives of the leading regional countries, for example, the People's Republic of China, forces other countries to turn their eyes to the economic and business history of Central Asia, thus, the relevance of the article is due to the need for a deep and comprehensive analysis of business ties along the Great Silk Road, the issue of their formation and development. Based on all the above, the novelty of this article is due to the fact that it attempts a comprehensive analysis of the tasks and problems of establishing business and economic ties in a specific period, involving the experience of various regions that participated in these trade relations.

Materials and Methods

The importance of the Great Silk Road was not only in ensuring trade and economic ties, thanks to which cultural, scientific and diplomatic contacts were established. The path that originally appeared as a commercial one very soon became the most important factor in the technical, scientific and spiritual progress of mankind, there was a cultural rapprochement and the establishment of ties between representatives of different tribes and peoples. The study of such an ancient period in the sense of economic and business communications can be successful when using numerous theoretical methods and interdisciplinary approaches. The study uses the historical and geographical approach, which allows us to take into account the peculiarities of the region not only in the natural and climatic context, but also in the historical and political because the lifelines of existing empires were constantly changing, one empire was dying, and a new state appeared in its place, which naturally influenced the methods and goals of trade operations in the East. For the implementation of research tasks, theoretical methods were used in this way such as analysis, synthesis, and systematisation of information. In addition, a problematic method was used to identify the main features of trade routes in ancient times, as well as those of trade and business ties in this region. The comparative method will allow us to assess how strongly business ties developed in the period of antiquity, at what stage they were during the Middle Ages and what connections have been preserved to this day. Naturally, it is not about classical, caravan trade at the present stage, but old business ties transformed into a network of modern economic systems.

The retrospective method is an important one to study business communications in ancient times, that is, a method to study historical processes from the current state through a consistent return reconstruction of events and phenomena to the past. For example, this method allows us to note the peculiarities of the business culture of each of the peoples, we know that the Chinese differ in many features in conducting business negotiations and communications, so we can trace whether such features were inherent in this side since ancient times, or at what stage they were formed, how they influenced the conduct of trade in ancient times. Thus, it

is possible to trace the features of business communications for each party interested in trading.

The research was carried out in 3 stages, each of them used a historical and geographical approach, but different methods were used to achieve the necessary results and draw conclusions: at the first stage, a chronological sequence of the formation and development of trade routes was built, coinciding with the route of the Great Silk Road in ancient times. Within the same stage, the main actors, participants of trade were identified, during which period a particular people dominated; the second stage included an analysis of the features of the formation and functioning of trade and business ties, the analysis included the features of geographical and political factors; the third stage was to assess the prospects for restoring the Great Silk Road within the modern global economy and within the geopolitical interests of Asian countries, especially China and post-Soviet countries, for example, Kazakhstan. Thus, a step-by-step study using various methods allowed us to analyse the materials, build a chronological and problematic model of the development of business relations in the Ancient East in the region covering the Great Silk Road.

Results and Discussion

The Great Silk Road has more than one thousand years of its existence. Of course, none of his contemporaries called it using its well-known name at that time, the path received its name in 1877 from Ferdinand von Richthofen, who described the network of caravan routes in this way. For residents, it was just a trade route, or rather a fairly extensive network of trade communications. References to trade along the route that corresponds to the Silk Road can be found even in the Elamites who held trade between Mesopotamia and the cultural centres of the Indus Valley in the IV - III thousand BC and created an extensive network of communications in the Middle East with a system of nodal proto-urban and early urban centres (Mamleeva, 1999: 121). The routes were used by immigrants who migrated for better living conditions, local trade relations were probably established, but trade along the Asia-Europe route did not yet play a significant role.

Numismatics clearly proves the predominant role of Persia in trade on the Silk Road. The Royal Road, created under the Achaemenids (500-330 BC), was probably the main artery of trade at that time. The most important role was played by the Iranian people, known as the Sogdians, who lived in the city-states located on the territory of modern Uzbekistan and Tajikistan, and which approximately between 500 and 1000 years the routes of the Great Silk Road (Andrea, 2014: 111). The situation changed closer to our era with Alexander the Great's campaigns to the East. According to the original plan, the campaigns were supposed to secure the predominance of the free spirit of the Greeks over the slave psychology of the Asians. In reality, the policy of the young commander was very different from the original goals. The creation of a huge state that united the peoples of both western and eastern socio-cultural types within its borders was almost the only attempt in history to reconcile the West and the East as two different ways of life and worldviews. Even if the short experience of the neighbourhood of different peoples within a single political system, from the Balkans and Egypt to Central Asia and

Northern India, could not but affect the genesis of trade relations between the remote regions of the empire. During the time of Alexander and under his successors, trade received a powerful boost in the Hellenistic and Greco-Bactrian states (Mamleeva, 1999: 58-59). The old ties of Eastern societies revived, new caravan routes with Europe appeared, thus, the creation of the Macedonian empire is reflected in the fate of the Great Silk Road.

The inhabitants of the historical region called Sogdiana, known as one of the oldest centres of civilization, located around the famous city of Samarkand, known since 329 BC as Marakand, on the territory of modern Uzbekistan, are particularly distinguished among the numerous creators of the culture of the Great Silk Road. China considers itself the creator and the main actor of trade along this path, however, as we managed to find out, all the peoples who lived nearby took part in the trade, who can now consider themselves citizens of India, Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan and other eastern countries. However, China quickly realized the benefits of creating fortified and secure trade routes to invite foreign goods, so the government that controlled this route created favourable and safe conditions for trade, having considerable authority during the existence of this state (Wang, 2019: 17). It is proved that two external trade routes, land and sea, had a very important impact on the economy of the empire from the Han Dynasty to the Yuan Dynasty. Thus, from that moment the path became officially trans-Eurasian since it united only the peoples of the East in early times. Modern researchers have long moved away from the Eurocentric point of view on the purpose of a trade route, first Greece, and then the Roman Empire was the main partner of the east for a long time. Thanks to numerous studies, it became clear that the east traded within itself, large and small eastern states traded among themselves, however, goods from Europe were often found on its paths. Thanks to the impulse, the development and flourishing began of such cities as Bukhara, Samarkand, Merv, Stary Urgench and Khiva, which became known as the cultural centers of their time. Trade, crafts, social and political life, cultural ties and centres of knowledge flourished here. Such economic and cultural centres began to be called centres of communication, continuing the ancient tradition of the Great Silk Road, connecting various countries of the vast Muslim East, West and East, North and South. Historians and travellers of that time wrote various works in Arabic, Persian and Turkic languages, colourfully describing the cultural life of scientists, poets, writers and various cultural figures in the cities of Central Asia (Kushanova, 2020: 8). Up to the XIV century, the Great Silk Road retained its importance in the development of socio-cultural, political and economic ties. But it lost its position with the development of sea trade routes (Zhylankozova, 2018: 553). In this section, we would like to draw attention to the functional peculiarities of the path in ancient times, answer questions about the goals and scope, reveal the name and functions that this path performed in ancient times.

Let us start with the most important thing – with the name. As already noted, the Silk Road was not accidental, indeed, silk was often sold on the way from China to Europe. Researchers found silk in earlier times, so this material has a fairly long import history. However, since it was a network of branched trade routes, each direction could get a special name. In parallel with the silk road, there were a "lapis

lazuli" and a "jade" road in ancient times. Khotan jade has played an important role in the culture of China since the Neolithic period and was used mainly to manufacture ritual and magical objects (Mamleeva, 1999: 145). Thus, the path served for religious and spiritual needs of the population living along this road. Researchers note that it was often necessary to pay either with grain, which was easily damaged or with skeins of silk due to the lack of a bronze coin (Hansen, 2015: 47-49).

Thus, for some time, silk was not so much the main imported commodity, which determined the appearance of the road itself, but was also a kind of monetary equivalent. The natural factor was an important factor that influenced the intensity of trade relations influenced by dried-up rivers and reservoirs, and climate change. We can call the Great Migration of peoples in the 4-5 centuries AD the most famous climatic change that affected the political map and the migration of the population. The conflict between the Romans and the Parthians can be cited as an example of a geopolitical change in routes. Merchants from the Roman Empire tried to avoid crossing the territory of the Parthians, enemies of Rome, and therefore instead chose routes to the north, across the Caucasus region and the Caspian Sea. The peculiarity of this path was that in fact, it was not a certain trampled and noticeable path for years, along which crowds of merchants, pilgrims, travellers and so on walked. Rather, it was an extensive network of routes, however, two main routes can be distinguished connecting East and West: - the southern road-from the north of China through Central Asia to Northern India and the Middle East; - the northern road-from the north of China through the Pamirs and the Aral Sea to the Lower Volga and the Black Sea basin (Graf, 2018: 447). The presence of business and trade ties in the region contributed to building cities, and, thus, the emergence of proto-state entities. The ancient city of Merv is a striking example of a city that owed its appearance to trade and was the largest city on the Silk Road due to its ancient traditions and geographical convenience of connecting caravan routes in different directions. In addition to the local religion of the Zoroastrian temples, Merv was a pillar of the Buddhist and Byzantine Christian of India. The city flourished at the same time when trade flourished along the caravan route (Kushanova, 2020: 9). According to many researchers, it was thanks to the spread of spiritual values, scientific and technological knowledge, religions and cultures that large trading cities appeared along all its routes (Voevoda, 2010: 69-70).

Along the way, it was necessary to ensure safety and a place of rest, often, depending on the beliefs spread in the region where a particular route took place, religious buildings were built. For traders, pilgrims, missionaries, soldiers, diplomats and others who either left the hinterland of China or returned to it, the Buddhist cave complex and its associated monasteries outside Dunhuang were places of rest, and for those who accepted the Law of the Buddha, cave sanctuaries were a source of spiritual comfort, as they either prayed for a safe journey or offered prayers of gratitude for their safe return (Andrea, 2014: 118). Thus, we can note another function that the Silk Road began to perform – the recreational one, which resulted in the tourist function. It should also be noted that there was also a sea route in addition to the well-known land Silk Road. India played an important role in the sea route, more and more goods were delivered to the West by sea, and not by land. The main sea routes of the Silk

Road passed between Indian ports, and those of the Middle East, on the Arabian Sea and the Red Sea. From the Middle East, goods were delivered by land to the Mediterranean Sea, and then to Europe. From India, goods went to Southeast Asia, the East Indies and China and back (Mishra, 2020: 37).

In the Ancient East, business relations represented a completely different type of communication. Initially, of course, there were no embassies or delegations that would perform the function of intermediaries in the communication of the authorities of two or more states. The variety of commercial activities was also limited due to the insignificance of the delegations – for example, two envoys were sent to Sogdiana in 52 BC, accompanied by ten representatives of the nobility, and only the delegations could be more than 1000 people in exceptional cases. Starting from the earliest time, it is not possible to draw a clear line between official trade, which was carried out by special envoys who brought gifts and returned with gifts in return for their ruler, and private commercial operations (Hansen, 2015: 23).

Thus, business connections were diverse, most of them were represented by private merchants. When states, for example, China, were going through a period of centralisation, attempts were often made to introduce control over the flow of merchants. During the reign of the Wei Dynasty in the III century AD the influx of foreign merchants to the capital forced the administration to take some measures. Each merchant was required to obtain a passport-permit, which indicated the name, the country from where the merchant came, the destination, the goods being transported, as well as a list of accompanying persons. It is well known that the communities of tribes and peoples living along the Silk Road specialised mainly in agricultural production, and not in commerce, as should be assumed, that is, the vast majority of the population were farmers and were not engaged in trade. Trade became necessary during periods of migration and wars. Due to migration processes, cultures interacted, population flows transferred beliefs. Thus, Buddhism, Zoroastrianism and many other Eastern beliefs and religions were spread by the population living along the Silk Road (Nazarov & Korableva, 2018: 128). The large length of the route and the intensive trade turnover of that time allow us to assume the presence of intermediate caravanserais with provisions and restrooms (hujras) for caravans, domes over reservoirs (sardoba), fodder for camels, horses, mules and donkeys. In such places, a merchant could sell or change his goods, get the necessary information for himself, hire translators and local nomadic pastoralists who, over the many years of servicing caravans, learned to professionally perform the functions of guides and food suppliers (Koltsov et al., 2015: 31). People of many professions worked for the maintenance of trade caravans – translators, money changers, camel drivers, caravan guards, tax collectors and others.

The Silk Road contributed to the development of not only trade itself but also many institutions of the "rules of the game" of the market economy, an international division of labour arose (Latov, 2010: 139). It is quite obvious that the system of the Silk Road was the result of centuries of accumulated experience of exchange and trade contacts between representatives of settled and pastoral peoples, along its entire length from west to east. The peoples of the steppe spaces of Eurasia, undoubtedly, took part in this, since one of the trade routes from Ferghana

led to the Urals and the Volga region through the Kazakh steppes in the period no later than the II millennium BC (Mamleeva, 1999: 75). Thus, it is worth noting the influence of both the above-mentioned peoples, such as the Sogdians, Chinese, Persians and the peoples living in the steppes of modern Kazakhstan. Settlements developed intensively along the caravan route, there was a rapid formation and development of crafts in the Turkic peoples, various technologies for the production of goods were developed, trade turnover increased, trade relations developed. Trade routes across the territory of Kazakhstan contributed to the creation and development of such trade hubs as Ispidzhab (Sairam), Farab (Otrar) and Khurlug (Shymkent), Yasy (Turkestan), etc. The city culture was formed, trade and business international socio-economic and political relations were actively established. It is important to note that the cultural foundations were also formed for the development of the peoples inhabiting the territory of Kazakhstan.

Every nation that participated in trade and relations along the Great Silk Road made a certain and significant contribution. the expansion of the habitat is the main value that the Kazakh people and their ancestors brought to the world civilisation, thanks to the nomadic lifestyle of many tribes, the development of desert and semi-desert lands took place. Some researchers and historians note the contribution of nomadic tribes as those who accelerated the movement of history, for example, as A. Weber wrote, their migration processes caused the formation of new civilizations. The early Turks, and then their descendants, played the role of a leading link between the West and the East, the Great Silk Road, and other communication routes, and they were the reason for their communication (Tursynbayeva et al., 2015: 33). Therefore, the point of view is not without prejudice that represents ancient trade in the form of only dependent and hostile relations of foreign merchants with local authorities. The main meaning of the Silk Road is the beginning of the end of the perception of a foreigner in the usual guise of an enemy and invader, and the birth of a new image – a foreign merchant. He continued to be the same "stranger", "gentile" and "alien", but communication with whom could promise no fewer benefits.

Involved in the global orbit of the search for a universal model of multinational and multi-confessional interaction, Kazakhstan has today become the author of its model of a tolerant and harmonious society recognised in the world community, and the country has laid the foundation for further improvement of public relations based on civil peace and harmony (Baltabayeva & Rizakhojayeva, 2018: 98-99).

As noted earlier, interest increased in this ancient trade route at the end of the XX century. The initiator was the People's Republic of China, which for several decades has been developing projects to restore these paths within the framework of modern economic and international trends. In 2013, China officially introduced the "Belt and Road" concept, in which the Silk Road economic belt and the maritime Silk Road are considered as important areas for external exchanges, economic development and opening up a new situation. This is not only the embodiment of China's economic development in a new era, but also the embodiment of its new needs and aspirations for economic development (Wang, 2019: 17). The Silk Road was the point of interaction of the Turkic people. Since a significant part of the Great Silk Road ran through Central Asia, the prestige of Eastern culture was very high at that

time. As the only trade route, the Silk Road was a great achievement of world civilization. At present, modern infrastructures, railways and highways are being built in the footsteps of the Great Silk Road. Today, the political strategy of Kazakhstan and the acquisition of a special cultural position create the prospect of restoring the Great Silk Road (Tursynbayeva et al., 2015: 35). Through the efforts of many countries of the world, it was decided to revive the Great Silk Road to a new life. More and more people show a keen interest in the history of this ancient transnational trade route, unique monuments of ancient architecture, untouched spiritual values. The Silk Road had a huge impact on the political, economic and cultural structure of the countries across which it passed. The most important ethnic processes, active interaction of cultures took place here, large-scale trade operations were carried out, diplomatic treaties and military alliances were concluded. The peoples of this region play an outstanding role in the dissemination of alphabetic writing and world religions, many cultural and technical achievements in the countries of Inner Asia and the Far East (Kembayev, 2018: 41-42).

In May 1993, the European Commission organised a meeting of representatives of the Central Asian and Caucasian States, as well as the European Union, in Brussels. The purpose of the meeting was to consider the possibility of integration into the world economy of the newly independent states – the countries of Central Asia and the Caucasus. In 1998, UNESCO announced the launch of a ten-year project "Comprehensive study of the Silk Road-the path of dialogue". The project provides for a broad and comprehensive study of the history of civilizations, the establishment of close cultural contacts between the East and the West, and the improvement of relations between the numerous peoples inhabiting the Eurasian continent (Zhylankozova, 2018: 550-551). Thus, many participants of the ancient trade route are interested in restoring not only the memory and cultural, historical heritage, but also many business and economic ties (Kudabay, 2019: 57; 2020: 120).

Conclusions

After studying the necessary materials, building a chronological and problematic model of the functioning of business communications in the Ancient East, the following conclusions can be drawn.

The importance of creating a trade caravan route, which is now known as the "Great Silk Road", is difficult to underestimate, since this route has performed many functions, both of local and Eurasian significance for thousands of years of its existence. It is obvious that the Road played an important role in the development of international trade, international relations were strengthened. In addition, the Road played an important cultural and religious role, thanks to which not only beliefs and religious teachings, but also objects of worship were spread, pilgrims passed along its paths, and cultural ties were established between various cities and states. it is impossible to overemphasise the economic significance of the Road, thanks to which the world division of labour appeared, import-export relations developed, economic theories developed, money turnover became more complicated. All this influenced the economic thought that began to develop in medieval Europe and continues to develop today. The population living along the trade route was influenced by trade

trends, the geopolitical and climatic situation. As soon as trade flourished, settlements flourished and cities appeared. Then, the main function of the Road - trade was performed in the cities and their markets.

The role of the Silk Road cannot be underestimated in the dissemination of scientific knowledge. Thanks to this Road, there were scientists-travellers who described what they saw. Although there are rather stereotypical descriptions of foreigners and barbarians from the east in many works of scholars of antiquity, we can at least partially restore knowledge about the people of that period thanks to these works. There were also connections from the East – thanks to this route, many technical innovations got to Europe, the most breakthrough of which were gunpowder and paper.

It is also important to note that the business ties that were established in the Ancient East have huge development potential in the modern world. Naturally, many rulers predicted millennia of existence for their empires, but, as it turned out, many states have survived the trade route that provided not only the flow of certain objects and materials for centuries but also the spread of knowledge and culture, the establishment of business and economic ties, which can be restored in its modern form in the XXI century.

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THE NEED TO INTRODUCE A NEW SYSTEM OF GOVERNMENT IN KAZAKHSTAN BY THE RUSSIAN EMPIRE

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Abstract

The paper reviews the attitude of the Russian Empire to the management of the Kazakh steppe and the execution of the "Provisional Decree on the Governance of Steppe Regions" on the territory of the Orenburg region in 1868. Based on objective analysis and the use of archival materials, the need of the Kazakh steppe in new governance and the colonial essence of administrative reforms were identified. To study the matter in hand, historical sources from the State Archives of the Orenburg Region of the Russian Federation and the Central State Archives of the Republic of Kazakhstan were used. Through administrative reforms, the tsar of the Russian Empire decided to forcibly colonise the Kazakh lands. Through reforms, the tsarist government took measures that served as the basis for a predatory, colonial agrarian policy. The interests of local residents were not taken into account; moreover, the colonists intended to seize fertile lands and water resources, and push local residents into the desert, arid territory, giving their lands to Russian settlers and the Cossack army. It was an unreasonable policy that led to the destruction of the traditional way of using the pasture meadows, the free movement of Kazakhs to winter and summer meadows, which disrupted the nomadic lifestyle. The need for colonial development of the eastern territories, the importance of the Orenburg region for the implementation of political, strategic, tactical goals by the tsarist government, and the profit received from the colonisation of the Kazakh lands, all this required the Russian government to develop and strengthen the administrative system in Kazakhstan. The findings of the historical analysis indicated that the final consolidation of tsarism in the steppe helped to form a network of power relations at the local level with the help of military and administrative institutions, which, through powerful state structures, allowed Russian capital to redistribute income to the empire. In turn, the expanded capillary network of stable power relations at the local level allowed the administrative apparatus to extend the imperial legislation to the territory of Kazakhstan. The tsarist government concentrated administrative power in its hands, finally pushing the Kazakh people out of political power. As a result, the Kazakhs, like their neighbours, became victims of the colonial policy of the Russian Empire.

Key words: *West Kazakhstan, Orenburg region, administrative reforms, Russification, colonial policy*

Introduction

At the stage of development of a free civilisation, renewal and further increase of national spiritual wealth should be mentioned, recalling and analysing its history. One of key problems is an objective and multilateral scientific analysis of the religious policy pursued by tsarist Russia in Kazakhstan. The Russian Empire began to isolate

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the Kazakh people from political power and turn the Kazakh land into its colony in the 19th century. With the aim of conquering Central Asia and Kazakhstan, tsarist government began to develop its land, which was a solid base for solving economic and strategic tasks. This could only be achieved with the help of administrative reforms in the Kazakh steppe.

In the 1830s, Jangir Khan managed to win the sympathy of the imperial court and establish trusting relations with the Orenburg governor and the Orenburg border commission, which led to the non-interference of the Russian administration in the internal affairs of Bukey Horde and activities of the khan himself. With the support of the imperial government, Jangir Khan concentrated all power of the Bukey Horde in his hands. Administrative and judicial power was transferred from the competence of the clan leaders to the authorised representatives of the khan. As the highest authority, the khan reviewed the decisions of biys and tribal leaders on the basis of republican legislation. Despite the fact that all the khans of the Inner Horde, from Bukey Khan, his brother Shigai to his son Bukey Jangir, were diligent and reliable carriers of the tsarist policy, the khan's power in the Bukey Horde existed until 1845. After the death of Jangir Khan, the opinion prevailed about the inexpediency of appointing a new khan (Stevens, 2020: 1154, Gursoy, 2019: 138-139, Campbell, 2020: 106).

In the period from 1845 to 1859, the system of government of the nomads of the former Bukey Horde underwent significant reforms. Instead of 16 "administrative clans" on the territory of the Horde, two counties and five administrative units were formed under the control of the Astrakhan administration and led by the local population of the aristocratic elite. Subsequently, the Inner Horde became part of the Astrakhan province. The unsatisfactory treasury system was one of the reasons for the administrative-territorial changes in the Bukey Horde.

With the establishment of colonial bureaucratic rule in the steppe, some governance structures began to differ from the kinship system, and the transfer of production and distribution of social wealth was allowed from tribal forms of organisation to private ownership. This, in turn, became a threat to the integration of the Kazakh nomadic society. In 1854, the entire territory of the Siberian Branch was divided into the Siberian-Kyrgyz Region, which included Karkaraly, Kokshetau, Akmola districts, Bayan-Aul and Kushmurun, and the Semipalatinsk Region with the Kokbektin, Ayaguz districts (from 1860 – Sergiopol, from 1875 city – Lepsinsk) and Semipalatinsk (Stein, 2018: 262, Sartori & Shabley, 2019: 118). In each district, there were about 15-20 volosts, each of which consisted of 10-12 administrative auls, which in turn consisted of about 50-70 nomadic tents. At the head of the districts were uyezd orders, headed by senior sultans; Volosts were led by volost sultans, and administrative auls – by aul elders. By the end of the first half of the 19th century, the Kazakhs of the Senior Zhuz entered the protectorate of the Russian Empire, and in a special control system was created for them, headed by a Policeman in the Big Horde. After the annexation of the Zaliy lands and the creation of the Verny military fortification in 1856 on the territory of the nomadic sites of the Senior Zhuz, the Alatavsky district was formed, which became part of the Semipalatinsk region (Ventresca Miller, Bragina, Abil, Rulyova, & Makarewicz, 2019, Frary, 2019: 293, Ferret, 2018: 509).

On December 25, 1862, a decree on control over Alatavsky district was approved, which introduced a new judicial and administrative system, in which the Kazakhs of the Senior Zhuz were included in the jurisdiction of the imperial courts. After the capture of the southern region of Kazakhstan by Russian troops and the final approval by the colonial apparatus of its power in the Kazakh region, the central government started to develop administrative reforms. On July 11, 1867, the "Provisional Regulation on the Control of the Semirechinsk and Syrdarya Regions" was issued, and the next year the "Provisional Regulation on the Control in the Ural, Turgay, Akmola and Semipalatinsk Regions" was approved. According to G.S. Sapargaliev (1929-2010), the reforms were motivated by the desire of tsarism to provide the Russian capital with the most favourable conditions for the exploitation of people and natural resources of a vast region, to maximise treasury revenues, and to strengthen the positions of Russian officials, landowners, capitalists, and kulaks, as well as support of tsarism in Kazakhstan by feudal lords and biys by means of military and colonial plundering of the people. Reforms of 1867-1868 represented the legalisation of the final stage of the accession of Kazakhstan to Russia and its final transformation into a tsarist colony" (Sartayev, 1982: 87-88).

Intensification of the political influence of the Russian Empire on the Kazakh lands

In the mid-1860s, almost entire Central Asia was in possession of the Russian Empire. A new order of specific governance for Kazakhstan and other national regions of the empire was developed and came into force. These were the administrative reforms of 1867, 1868 and the legislation according to which the Kazakh lands became colonies of the Russian Empire. The introduction of the new administration and the settlement of the Kazakh territory by tsarist Russia was carried out in several stages. At the end of the 18th – the beginning of the 19th centuries Kazakhstan was considered by Russia as a border area, and in the middle of the 19th century it was turned into the inner part of the empire. At that time, the Kazakh steppe was under the jurisdiction of the West Siberian general-governorship and the Orenburg general-governorship. This process was implemented on the basis of a large number of measures and legislations on the management of Kazakh lands adopted by the tsarist government. The "Charter on Siberian Kyrgyz" (Kazakhs) of 1822 and the "Charter on Orenburg Kyrgyz" of 1824 in Kazakhstan have put an end to the khan's power. According to this charter, tsarism began to rule the Middle Zhuz by means of uyezd orders. The orders were headed by the "senior sultans" elected by other sultans. The territory of the Junior Zhuz was divided by the tsarist government into Western, Central and Eastern parts, where the power was held by older sultans.

By the middle of the 19th century, tsarism was not satisfied with the governance of the Kazakh people. Since the 1850s, many measures have been taken to improve administrative rules in line with Russia's interests. The charter "On the management of the Orenburg Kyrgyz" dated June 14, 1844 was extended until a new charter was adopted (Kraft, 1898: 34). On May 19, 1854, a new type of government of the Kazakh people the Siberian Department, in accordance with the general laws of the Russian Empire and the territory, was divided into the

"Siberian Kyrgyz Region" and the Semipalatinsk Region. In this regard, the Omsk Border Administration was transformed into the "Regional Administration of Siberian Kyrgyz", and the post of chief was replaced by the post of military governor. In the Semipalatinsk Region, a special department was created, headed by a military governor (Clarke & Seksenbayeva, 2018: 267). By the order of the Senate of December 9, 1859 on the territory of Orenburg instead of the Border Commission, the Regional Commission was created, governed by the Orenburg Kyrgyz. Thus, in the process of colonisation, the imperial authorities began to control the Kazakh steppes, they ceased to be "borders" and gradually conquered the Kazakh lands. As a result of the innovations, the power of sultans was abolished, along with the khan of the Bokey Horde (February 2, 1847). In the Junior Zhuz, the public officials dominated the local authorities.

In the middle of the 19th century, favourable conditions were created for the transformation of the Kazakh lands into the inner regions of the Russian Empire. Moreover, the administration of the Orenburg region on March 24, 1859, with the support of the Ministry, was transferred by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to the Ministry of Internal Affairs (Kraft, 1898: 40). By this act, the tsarist government sought to show that all the lands of the Orenburg Territory were "internal" possession of the Russian Empire, and the Kazakhs, from a political standpoint, were citizens of the Russian state. In this regard, all political actions on the Kazakh land were affected by "internal" policy of the Russian state. Thus, Russia has justified military punitive measures from the standpoint of international law. Now they had the opportunity to solve their economic and political problems in the territory of Central Asia.

In the mid-1860s, tsarism also seized power in the lands of South Kazakhstan. From this period, the government, with the aim of complete and final transformation of the Kazakh lands into colonies, began to create a centralised government apparatus in Kazakhstan. This task was reflected in the administrative reforms of the Kazakh steppe management, which began to be implemented in 1867 and 1868. According to the reform documents, the need to introduce a new administrative system was caused by the fact that "the Kyrgyz steppe of Orenburg and the Siberian Department were governed by two systems that were sharply different from each other. Such a dual nature of government of one and the other people had favourable consequences for the development of citizenship among the semi-barbarian population and corresponded to the types of government" (CSAKR. Fund 4. List 1. Matter 490. Page 1).

But the main goals of the new administrative reforms had a different, hidden meaning. The main goal of this reform was to change the legal status of the Kazakh lands in the Russian Empire, namely, its final transformation into a colony. Through the strict rule over the Kazakh steppe, tsarism tried to ensure complete submission, dependence of the Kazakh people on the imperial administration. The Russians understood that the intensification of political rule creates conditions for accelerating the spiritual and economic conquest of Kazakhstan, since, the economic "conquest" of the territory could be successful and unlimited only if its political conquest was consolidated. One of the main tasks of the new reforms was to weaken the political influence of the Kazakh aristocracy. To accomplish this task, the tsarist government planned to change the system of local government and territorial structure, weaken the

tribal basis and limit the power of the local population, attracting it only to the lower level of the state apparatus in the volost administration. Thus, it was believed that alienation of the Kazakhs from political power will limit their freedom and exercise complete political domination over the Kazakh people.

Moreover, in order to strengthen its social base in the conduct of colonial policy in the Kazakh steppe, tsarism tried to "buy" the influential elders of the clan by offering them "gifts" and appointing lower positions in the administrative apparatus. These were steps aimed at the internal demarcation of Kazakh society. Admittedly, uncoordinated people are easy to control. The tsarist government, with the help of new administrative reforms, was called upon to form a military-bureaucratic mechanism, which was supposed to serve to control the territory in the interests of the Russian Empire. For the effective implementation of these goals, the Russian officers were involved. The officers have received benefits, and local residents had to pay salaries to these officers.

According to the reform of 1867-1868, the entire territory of Kazakhstan was divided into six regions, which were part of three general-governorships: Turkestan (the Semirechinsk and Syrdarya regions), Orenburg (Ural and Turgay regions) and West Siberia (the Akmola and Semipalatinsk regions). The regions were divided into uyezds, and each uyezd, in turn, was divided into volosts, which themselves were divided into administrative auls with 100-200 nomadic tents.

The power of the local administration was so great that even the assistance of the central authorities in any matter did not provide the desired result. The order of the central office could be completely ignored or executed only formally, if there were difficulties with its implementation in practice. Provincial administrations were brought under the control of governors; they consisted of three departments: administrative, economic, and judicial. The regional board oversaw a wide range of issues. In particular, the department dealt with the administrative division of the region, promulgation of statutes and government decrees concerning the region, administrative fines, and the trial of officials for crimes and misconduct, decisions on elections to positions, public self-government, control over the appearance of "suspicious people" in the region, and the administrative expulsion of persons who violated administrative rules. The economic department was responsible for the distribution of land among residents and the collection of taxes and fees from Kazakhs. The judicial collegium was preparing for the consideration of civil and criminal cases, which were considered by the regional collegium as a judicial court. A key figure in the new administrative system, which was entrusted with almost all police and local government functions, was the uyezd governor appointed by the governor-general. In contrast to the position of the district chief, the volost and aul chiefs were elected every three years, although the authorities of the regions and uyezds had every right to recognise or cancel the election results. In general, the consolidation of the electoral system in the steppe at the local level solved the dilemma of the political legitimacy of the Russian autocracy. It was quite difficult to implement the reward for Kazakhs who were in favour of colonisation, and at the same time ensure the loyalty of the vast majority of the nomads, who were the source of legitimacy in the steppe.

The elections have become a good way of reconciliation. These democratic procedures concealed the relationship of domination.

The administrative reforms of 1867-1868 coincided with the strengthening of capitalist interactions in the Russian economy. For the young, rapidly developing capitalism, the internal market was small. European markets were closed to the products of Russian factories due to the low quality of goods and, at the same time, high prices for them. Russian producers needed new markets, rich sources of raw materials, and cheap labour. Orenburg governor-general, Adjutant General N.A. Kryzhanovsky at the opening ceremony of the Orenburg branch of the Russian Geographical Society in 1868 said that "despite the sad state of the Kyrgyz steppe in terms of the future civilization for Russia, it was not only good but also useful, in all cases, it was necessary. If we had not owned it for reasons more economic than political, we would have to conquer it" (https://lib.rgo.ru/dsweb/View/ResourceCollection-123). This way he clearly stated his colonial point of view.

Colonial policy of Russian imperialism in the Orenburg region

The governor-general has expressed the colonial intention of the Russian Empire to attract Kazakh territory into the economic system of Russia, to plunder the wealth of the steppe region. For this purpose, in order to turn the Kazakh steppe into a market for products and sources of raw materials, the tsarist government must intensify its political dominance by introducing a new administrative system in Kazakhstan. Through administrative reforms, the tsar decided to forcibly colonise the Kazakh lands. The commission for the development of the "Provisional Decree" showed that "the government in resolving the land issue should take such measures that, on the one hand, met the modern requirements of people, without destroying its way of life, and on the other hand, should have been beneficial for Russia" (CSAKR. Fund.4. List.1. Matter 490. Page.40).

Due to the reforms, the tsarist government took measures that served as the basis for a predatory, colonial agrarian policy. The interests of native residents were not taken into account, moreover, the colonists intended to seize fertile lands, water resources and push them into the desert, arid territory, giving their lands to Russian settlers and the Cossack army. It was an unreasonable policy that led to the destruction of the traditional way of using the pasture meadows, the free movement of Kazakhs to winter and summer meadowlands, which disrupted the nomadic lifestyle. The new division of the Kazakh also led to the separation of large clans, which weakened the influence of the leading clans. Later, the inspector of the Turkestan Territory K.K. Palen cited an argument that was used by the tsarist government when artificially dividing the Kazakh steppe: "the division of the Kyrgyz on the basis of tribal relations was legally eliminated, these measures were taken because the unification of a large clan under one ancestor prevented peace in the steppe" (Abenova, 2013: 28). The new division of the region was carried out according to the territorial principle and depended on the interests of the tsar in solving political and military affairs.

One of the main tasks of the tsarist government in carrying out administrative reforms was to change the tax policy in the Kazakh steppe. Having analysed the types

of taxes levied from Kazakhs of the Orenburg region, the Commission came to the conclusion that "the collection of the tent of nomads essentially did not reach the amount that was needed for the state treasury" (CSAKR. Fund 4. List 1. Matter 90. Page 32). Accordingly, tsarism began to strengthen fiscal policy with the aim of "substantially increasing the income of the treasure". It was planned to increase the tax on nomads' tent to fulfill the list of duties. Thus, the imperial power did not take into account the needs and interests of people. To further strengthen the dishonest robbery of the local population, an improvement in the administrative-territorial division was noted with a clear definition of the boundaries of new buildings of auls, volosts, counties, regions, and these measures were aimed at improving the procedure for collecting taxes.

By introducing a new order into the structure and activities of the colonial administration, tsarism sought to strengthen the Russification policy. The tsarist government sought to forcibly Russify the Kazakhs, to deprive them of national characteristics and much more, in order to force them to speak Russian. The goal was to Russify the administrative apparatus, and relatively it was decided to hire only Russian officers for government positions. In addition, there were favourable conditions for the deep penetration of the Christian religion into Kazakh society and, conversely, for curbing the spread of Islam. The documents of the Commission noted that "it was time to put an end to the influence of the mullah, to protect the Kyrgyz youth, because the weakening of Mohammedanism in the steppe and, to some extent, the success of the rapprochement of the Kyrgyz with the Russians depend on it" (CSAKR. Fund 4. List 1. Matter 490. Page 54). These were tsarist measures that were taken not only for the political and economic conquest, but also for the spiritual enslavement of the Kazakh people. The heads of the Orenburg Territory believed that the main goal of any Christian government, in the opinion of Muslims, is to weaken Mohammedan fanaticism with its harmful signs, increase mental development, spread common sense and the gradual introduction of Kazakhs to the ruling nationality (State Archives of Orenburg district (Russian Federation). Fund 6. List 6. Matter 4005. Page 30).

The Russian Empire worried about the spread of Islam among the Kazakh population. Therefore, up to the 19th century, the government adhered to the course of using Muslim religious influence on the mentality and increasing Russia's influence in the Kazakh steppe. Undoubtedly, tsarism needed Islam as a means of achieving its intentions, but not as a religion as such. For some time, Islam had a negative orientation towards colonialism. N. Chernavsky wrote with regret in his "Reconnaissance": "This policy of tolerance and even patronage of Islam was necessary to obtain political benefits from Catherine the Great; this policy had a bad effect on the Kyrgyz, whom we wanted to attract through Islam to Russia, but we failed. We ourselves for a long time forced the Kyrgyz, semi-savage pagans, to believe in Islam in order to protect them from the favourable influence of Christianity and Russian culture" (Chernavsky, 1900: 17).

Therefore, the Orenburg administration was concerned about this position and began to take measures to prevent the spread of Islam: according to the administrative reform of 1868, the construction of mosques was prohibited; the issue of appointing a

mullah was resolved; The Tatar, Bashkir, and especially Central Asian mullahs were prohibited from living in this territory. In the middle of the 19th century, a new Central Asian policy of the Russian state began. Russia actively pursued its foreign policy, with the exception of the southern territory of Kazakhstan, dominated over Tashkent and Samarkand. Gradually, the empire conquered the territory of Central Asia, "which attracted the attention of not only Russia, but also Europe, joining this new land and with the formation of the Turkestan governor-general, the Trans-Ural steppe, its nomads became closer to European Russia" (CSAKR. Fund 4. List 1. Matter 277. Page 12). Now tsarism has set a goal to turn the territory of Kazakhstan into an inner region of the empire and an important place on the way to get acquainted with Central Asia. N.A. Kryzhanovsky in his work "Notes on the administrative structure of the Turkestan region and the Orenburg region" indicated that the conquered region brought more profit to Russia, therefore the Orenburg Administration "it is necessary to use everything for the good of our Motherland, so that as much benefit as possible would get from the Kazakh lands to Russian" (CSAKR. Fund 5. List 3. Matter 13. Page 6).

One of the important directions of the new system of government was the spread of the general laws of the Russian Empire on this territory. With the help of these reforms, the tsarist government planned to create a judicial system that would enhance the role of the colonial administration. Instead, it was planned to limit the influence of the district court (arbitrator), which had great influence on people who made fair decisions, reasonably controlled legal interactions in the Kazakh steppe. At the same time, the Commission expressed the idea that "the government should not refuse to join this nation; The People's Court should be maintained until the gradual success of citizenship of the Kyrgyz nation reaches the same level as the rest of the population of Russia" (https://lib.rgo.ru/dsweb/View/ResourceCollection-123). Admittedly, the legislators were not worried about preserving the court, but they tried to adapt it to work in a new environment that did not contradict the government's colonial goals. These goals and objectives of the complete colonisation of Kazakhstan through the administrative reforms of 1867, 1868 were concealed by the tsarist government in "the need to develop citizenship" among the Kazakhs.

Before the reforms of 1868, the lands of North-West Kazakhstan were part of the "Orenburg Kyrgyz Region" with an area of about 900 thousand square kilometres. The population in the 1860s was about 750 thousand people. The region bordered in the west with the Caspian Sea, in the east with the "Siberian Kyrgyz Region", in the south with the Kokand and Khiva khanates and in the north with the territory of the Astrakhan, Saratov and Orengurg regions. But the territory of the region was crossed by the huge Kazakh rivers Ural, Emba, Syrdarya, and Tobol. The Orenburg Territory was of great military and strategic importance for the expansion of tsarist Russia to the eastern lands. This region, occupying the western part of Kazakhstan, was considered by the Russian government as a bridge leading to Central Asia and to the southern, eastern lands of the Kazakh steppes. During this period, the Orenburg steppe found itself in a ring of fortresses, which became the base for a deep invasion of the tsarist power into the Kazakh steppes. Orenburg (1845), Ural (1845), Novopetrovsk (1846),

Raim (1847), Karabutak (1848) and Embinsk (1862) fortresses played an important role in the military-strategic plans of the Russian Empire.

According to the documents of the Administration, the city of Orenburg was built as a political and commercial centre, as a link in all spheres of local governance, and, in turn, to protect against "nomads on the other side of the Urals" (CSAKR. Fund 4. List 1. Matter 4067. Page 10). For the Russian Empire, the Orenburg region was important not only for its natural resources, but also as a caravan route to connect with the khanates of Central Asia. N.A. Kryzhanovsky wrote that "in general, Russia did not exist for Orenburg, but Orenburg for Russia, the region with all its resources and wealth should live and serve for the good of Russia, even infringing on its own local interests" (https://lib.rgo.ru/dsweb/View/ResourceCollection-123). The need for colonial development of the eastern territories, the importance of the Orenburg Territory for the implementation of political, strategic, tactical goals of the Russian Empire, and the profit received from the colonisation of the Kazakh lands, all this required the government to develop and improve the administrative system in Kazakhstan.

Conclusions

Kazakh society underwent significant changes in the process of accession to the Russian Empire. The customary law of the Kazakhs has also undergone fundamental changes. The legal norms of the nomads were replaced by the laws of the Russian Empire. Imperial boundlessly destroyed uniformity, annihilating traditional rules and abolishing the existing conventions and agreements that had operated prior to their acceptance, and was supported by voluntary agreement. This, in turn, led the nomads to stop relying on existing customary law and to abide by any agreements, leading to the imposition of harsh criminal penalties and other punitive measures by the colonial authorities.

In addition, significant changes have been made to the traditional routes of the nomads. Through administrative and territorial reforms, the colonial authorities not only destroyed the usual places of nomadic pastures, but also contributed to the inter-tribal struggle for pastures. To resolve conflicts, nomads had to turn to the Russian administration, which was the arbiter of disputes and relied on the norms of imperial law introduced into Kazakh society. Thus, in the hands of the colonial authorities, the law not only performed the function of resolving social conflicts, but also was a means of their imposition. In the end, administrative and territorial changes and legal reforms led to the forced settlement of the Kazakh population and the final loss of the sovereignty of the Kazakh Zhuzes.

1. The duality in the management of the Kazakh lands, transferred by the governor-general to Orenburg and Western Siberia, caused difficulties in the implementation of the set goals. In the "Report of the Uyezd Administration of the Orenburg Kyrgyz to the Governor-General" (December 12, 1864) it was stated that the main direction "in the issue of managing the Kyrgyz was not improving the existing economic system, but creating a new system according to the general Imperial laws". This system must correspond to the economic and political status entrusted to the Horde.

2. Moreover, the old system is unsuitable, the carelessness of the district administration, similar administrative decisions, the lack of people, the difference in the methods of implementing colonial policy, inefficiency, and low efficiency of administrative control – all this impeded the implementation of colonial policy.

3. Therefore, tsarism began to prepare reforms aimed at transforming the region into a legislative colony of the empire and depriving the Kazakh people of independence and freedom.

4. The reforms carried out to improve the system expanded the spheres of colonial administration and became the basis for the creation of parts of the state apparatus of the Russian Empire.

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ECONOMIC ASPECTS OF THE CREATING AND FUNCTIONING OF REGIONAL RAILWAYS IN BUKOVYNA IN THE SECOND HALF OF THE 19th – EARLY 20th CENTURIES

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Abstract

The purpose of this paper is to study the objective economic aspects and prerequisites for the creating and functioning of regional railways in Bukovyna in the second half of the 19th – early 20th centuries. The deployment of railway construction on the lands of Bukovyna in the second half of the 19th century was associated with the processes of the capitalist structure formation in the economies of the countries that included these lands – Austria-Hungary and the Russian Empire. The successful activities of the large railway companies in Bukovyna were facilitated by their strong ties with banks and close mutually beneficial cooperation with various parts of the state apparatus of Austria-Hungary and the Russian Empire. There was certain dependence between railway companies and States that, on the one hand, companies could not do without financial assistance from the State. On the other hand, the State did not possess sufficient funds at the end of the 19th century to independently expand the railway network and it was forced to entrust the construction of railway lines to private companies. Banks willingly acted as founders of new private railway companies in Austria-Hungary, which intensively stimulated the development of railway construction in Bukovyna. The high degree of the capital concentration in comparison with the other branches of private capitalist production was one of the characteristic features of the railway companies of Bukovyna.

Key words: *Bukovyna, regional railways, economic aspects, banks, Austria-Hungary, Russian Empire*

Introduction

In the development of Austrian capitalism in the 80s and early 90s of the 19th century, profound technical-economic and social shifts, which were associated with the intensive process of the development of the industrial revolution in the country, took place (Good, 1981; Kun, 2019; Szavari, 2012). During these years, the capacity of the production apparatus of enterprises in the large machine industry increased sharply, the process of concentration of production and the centralization of capital accelerated. The process of the formation of the state-capitalist system of economy was significantly developed, including the railway transport of the Austrian Empire (Kaim, Taczanowski, Szwagrzyk & Ostafin, 2020; Lipelt, 2019; Karl Prochaska, 1898).

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Data on the founding activities of the banks of the Austrian Empire in the field of private railway construction during the years of the industrial boom indicate an intensive process of merging of banks with railway companies (Evans, 1928; Komlos, 1987; Pammer, 2010; Rudolph, 2008: 34; Ziffer, 1891: 1). This merger was carried out mainly by means of financing, to which the banks were very willing.

The participation of banks in railway construction gave them the opportunity to receive huge amounts of founding profit, income from the issue and sale of bond capitals, from savings in the construction of new lines, from the stock exchange speculation with railway securities, as well as to operate significant railway deposits. As a rule, banks participated only in the establishment of joint stock companies. But the banks showed no interest in the construction of railways and their operation.

The most common form of financing for Austro-Hungarian railway companies was the adoption by banks of the implementation of new share issue of enterprises (Pammer, 2010; Peukert, 2019). In most cases, the sale of shares was carried out by syndicates from several friendly banks and banking houses. However, only one leading bank played a major role in such syndicated loans.

It is important to analyze the key issues that reveal the processes of concentration and monopolization in the leading sectors of the Austro-Hungarian economy in the second half of the 19th – early 20th centuries. Undoubtedly, in this complex of issues, a special place was occupied by private regional railway transport, which represented a powerful, highly concentrated branch of the capitalist economy. There is no doubt that transport, and especially railroad one, is the largest embodiment of the capitalist mechanism, most centrally built on the basis of large material technology and the most necessary for the State.

A comprehensive and in-depth study of the objective economic aspects and prerequisites for the creating and functioning of regional railways in Bukovyna (both state and private) has not yet been in the focus of our historical science.

The purpose of this paper is to study the objective economic aspects and prerequisites for the creating and functioning of regional railways in Bukovyna in the second half of the 19th – early 20th centuries.

Research methodology

Analysis of the literature on the problems of the history of railway transport indicates that certain aspects of the development of private railway transport have already received proper coverage (Jacolin & Roth, 2016; Ogawa, 1998; Pylypchuk & Strelko, 2020; Strelko & Pylypchuk, 2021; Zhuravlyov, 1983). This is especially true for Japan, the Russian Empire, and Austria-Hungary. In particular, the role of bank capital in the railway construction of these States on the eve of the First World War, studies of the history of the creation and activities of a number of railway companies have been considered, issues of the relationship between private railway companies and the State have been highlighted.

However, the private railways of Bukovyna as an independent branch of the capitalist economy of Austria-Hungary were not specially studied. Meanwhile, without studying this important branch, our ideas about the level of development of capitalism in Austria-Hungary, about its features, will be incomplete. The political

and scientific relevance of this topic, as well as the state of historiography, necessitate its special development. The task of our study is, firstly, to determine the importance of private railways in transportation during the years of the pre-war industrial boom in Bukovyna, secondly, to investigate the relationship of railway companies with the state apparatus, and thirdly, to consider the role of banks in the creating and financing of railway companies.

Results and discussion

The private regional railways of Bukovyna as the most important through-passages have had and continue to have national importance today. They played a special role in the transport system of Austria-Hungary. After all, they served the leading economic regions of the country, acting in each of them as an integral part of the production. In other words, with their help, local, intersectoral, and regional ties were carried out. The regional private railways of Bukovyna were also very important transport routes in the international aspect. They connected Bukovyna in the west with Galicia, and then with Poland and even further with Europe, in the east – with Tsarist Russia, and in the south – with Romania. Private railway enterprises of Austria-Hungary were united into joint-stock companies, which differed from each other in financial and economic indicators. The leading role of two railway companies in the private railway sector in Bukovyna (Lviv-Chernivtsi-Iaşi Railways, Joint-Stock Company, and Local Railways of Bukovyna, Joint-Stock Company), as well as the constant increase in profits reflect the process of concentration of production and capital, which took place in the railway economy is very intensive.

Powerful transport enterprises controlled by large railroad companies generated high returns for shareholders. This was facilitated by the following factors: 1) private regional railways were located in densely populated and economically developed areas of Bukovyna (in the pre-war period, these companies received additional rights to build railways in various regions of Bukovyna, and thus, they fully established themselves, having removed their state competitors claiming to implement their projects); 2) they had favorable conditions for the formation of transport tariffs; 3) private regional railway companies owned an extensive network of auxiliary enterprises.

The successful activity of large railway companies was facilitated by their strong links with banks and close mutually beneficial cooperation with various parts of the state apparatus. There was certain dependence between the railway companies and the State that, on the one hand, the companies could not do without financial assistance from the State (since railway construction required large and long-term investments that the Austro-Hungarian government could provide). On the other hand, the State did not possess sufficient funds at the end of the 19th century to independently expand the railway network, and it was forced to entrust the construction of railway tracks to private companies: the Emperor Ferdinand Northern Railway, the Karl Ludwig Railway, Joint Stock Company of the Lviv-Chernivtsi-Iaşi Imperial Royal Privileged Railway. At the same time, the State made numerous concessions, in particular, it provided the "oldest" Emperor Ferdinand Company with additional rights to build roads in the economically developed regions of Bukovyna, and the "new" companies that were created before the First World

War, it refused broad financial support and, as a rule, limited itself to a guarantee of share capital during the construction of the railway and its commissioning, that is, before the time when the railway could bring income.

By granting the "old" companies the right to build regional railways in Bukovyna, the State increased its role in obtaining profit from private railway companies. Simultaneously, Austria-Hungary held effective means of interfering in the economic activities of private companies in its hands. And although petty regulation and tutelage on the part of the State bodies caused discontent among shareholders, these frictions were not too serious. Railway companies ultimately benefited from interactions with various parts of the government apparatus. Moreover, private railway companies, consolidating their financial and economic positions by developing cooperation with large commercial banks, were able to effectively influence through various state bodies on the development of railway transport in Austria-Hungary in general and in Bukovyna in particular.

The pre-war industrial upsurge promoted increased capital accumulation and led to a significant strengthening of the economic positions of large commercial banks. These banks concentrated in their hands all major operations related to the founding and financing of railway construction. The participation of banks in railway construction gave them the opportunity to receive huge amounts of profit, income from the issuance and sale of bond capitals, from "savings" in the construction of new regional railway lines, from the stock exchange speculation with railway securities, as well as to operate significant railway deposits. Banks, as a rule, participated only in the establishment of joint stock companies. The banks showed no interest in the construction of railways and their operation.

The literature on the problems of private railway transport in Austria-Hungary is predominantly of a publicistic nature (Lazechko, 1990). But, since their authors were not only contemporaries, but also participants in the events described, who knew the state of things well, their works are of undoubted interest. Modern historians and economists who have studied the development of the most important branches of the Austro-Hungarian economy have so far paid little attention to the formation of the regional railway network in Bukovyna (Zhaloba, 1998; Zhaloba, 2000; Zhaloba & Pyvovarov, 2000). As a rule, the authors considered them in the context of other problems. Written works, which to one degree or another highlight the history of private railway transport, can be divided into two groups.

The first one includes studies on general issues of the development of railway transport in Austria-Hungary. This group includes, first of all, the *History of the Railways of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy* (1890) (Geschichte der Eisenbahnen der Osterreichisch-Ungarischen Monarchi, 1890). One of its sections concerns the history of the development of railway transport in Austria-Hungary. In this context, the role of the treasury in the construction of railways in the empire has been analyzed, the size of capital investments in private railway construction has been determined, and the dynamics of their growth from 1873 to 1890 has been traced. After calculating the construction cost of the railways, Ziffer, for example, indicates the need to take into account the amount of the outstanding contribution for the first time (Ziffer, 1908: 67). The tables published in Ziffer's work contain summary data on the profitability of

the regional railways of Bukovyna, on the productivity, and wages on these railways (Ziffer, 1908: 63–72). An in-depth analysis of these data led to the conclusion that the increase in the profitability of the Austro-Hungarian railways before the First World War was achieved through a direct increase in the exploitation of railway workers.

In the works of T.S. Khachaturov and O.G. Naporko devoted to the economic problems of railway transport in the former USSR, the development of this type of transport in Tsarist Russia and foreign countries, including Austria-Hungary, has been raised. In particular, the main stages of its history have been characterized, and the fact of monopolization of private railways has been stated (Naporko, 1954; Khachaturov, 1952). *Essays on the History of Technology in Russia* are of great interest for studying the process of concentration and monopolization of railway transport, the technical development of private railways in Tsarist Russia (Artobolevskii & Blagonravov, 1975). The focus of the authors of the *Essays* is the issue of technical and operational development of railway transport. The materials cited by them indicate that private railway transport in Russia, in terms of important technical parameters, was not inferior to the transport of the more developed capitalist countries at that time, including Austria-Hungary.

Among the generalizing works of the last quarter of the 20th century devoted to the development of railway transport in Russia, it is necessary to highlight the monograph *Railway Transport in Russia in the Second Half of the 19th century* by A.M. Solovieva (Solovieva, 1975). It examines the role of railway transport in the development of the industrial revolution in Russia, localizes the process of the formation of the state-capitalist economic system in railway transport. One of the sections of the monograph is devoted to the initial stage of monopolization of private rail transport abroad (Solovieva, 1975: 229–234), including in Austria-Hungary. The author examines the ways of creating railway monopolies at the end of the 19th century, the influence of the policy of the tsarist government on the process of monopolization of private railway transport. The work of A.M. Solovieva, in fact, is the starting point for studying the activities of the largest railway companies at the turn of the 19th and 20th centuries.

The works of the second group include studies dealing with specific problems in the history of private railway transport. In the paper *On the Question of the Role of Financial Capital in Railway Construction before the First World War* by A.M. Solovieva, the issue of the role of banks in the creation and financing of railway companies in the years of the pre-war industrial boom was considered for the first time (Solovieva, 1956: 173–209). Introducing into scientific circulation the materials of the funds of St. Petersburg commercial banks – Russian-Asian, St. Petersburg International, St. Petersburg private – the author of the paper came to the conclusion that Russian and foreign banks were closely connected in financing railway construction. At the same time, Russian banks played a leading role in the creation of new railway companies and obtaining concessions, and the French and Austro-Hungarian ones—in the sale of railway bonded loans. According to the calculations of the author of the paper, the share of foreign capital in railway construction in tsarist Russia before the First World War was 28.5%.

The merit of A.M. Solovieva was the publication of the minutes of joint meetings of representatives of Russian, French, and Austro-Hungarian banks, texts of syndicated agreements on the sale of capital of railway companies, and other documents found in the Central State Historical Archive of St. Petersburg (Solovieva, 1959: 575-601). These materials make it possible to trace «the mechanism of the banking syndicate, the acute struggle of individual groups of banks for the seizure of a particular railway concession for a share in the distribution of profits».

Undoubtedly, private railways, including the regional railways of Bukovyna, played an important role in the economy of Austria-Hungary. Thus, during the years of pre-war industrial growth, private railways in Bukovyna accounted for a third of the operational network, freight and passenger traffic. Railway construction was carried out almost exclusively by joint stock railway companies. The study of this important branch of capitalist production is necessary to clarify the main directions of the development of the economy of Austria-Hungary during the period of imperialism (Solovieva, 1956). In the Austro-Hungarian period, the coverage of the development of private rail transport in Bukovyna is in several aspects. Firstly, all researchers sought to determine the importance of railways in transportation during the pre-war industrial upsurge, secondly, they studied the relationship of railway companies to the state apparatus, and thirdly, they considered the role of banks in the creation and financing of railway companies.

We also investigated the activity of regional railways in Bukovyna for the period from the beginning of their foundation – the last quarter of the 19th century – and up to the First World War. This was the time when the formation of monopoly capitalism was completed in Europe, banks turned into the main «nerve nodes» of the entire capitalist system of the national economy, and finally, the merger of banking and industrial capital came true, that is, finance capital was formed. Banking monopolies have captured key positions in many industries and transport. The qualitative changes that took place in the economy of Austria-Hungary during the industrial upsurge were clearly manifested in the private regional railway transport.

Analysis of the literature also shows that it examines the main problems of the history of private regional railways in Bukovyna in particular and Europe in general. The actual absence in the historiography of works devoted to the regional railways of Bukovyna as a branch of capitalist production undoubtedly creates a gap in the study of the economy of Ukraine in the era of imperialism. This is especially true of the period of the pre-war industrial boom. Basic information on the construction and operation of the railway network, tariff and financial policy of the Austro-Hungarian government was collected during the study of the materials of the Special High Commission for the study of the railway business in Austria-Hungary and Russia.

Analysis of the activities of private railway companies and showing their role in rail transport not only allow us to obtain a general description of these companies, but also to highlight the location of a private regional railway line, its technical equipment, to consider the participation of regional railways of Bukovyna in the transportation of goods.

In Austria-Hungary, on the eve of 1914, there were 14 railway companies that owned railways of general importance, and 12 companies that owned railways of local

importance. The latter accounted for 31,500 versts of railways, or more than 30% of the total length of the empire's railroad network. A comparative analysis of the technical and economic state of the Austro-Hungarian railway companies has shown that they differed from each other by various characteristics: either the length of the railways that they owned, or the cost of the surface deck, the size of fixed capital and income. The length of railway lines in Russia, for example, belonging to separate companies, ranged from 70 to 600 versts on general railways and from 15 to 150 versts on local railways. The share of these societies accounted for 1,450 versts, or 70.3% of all railways of local importance. But it was not only the different lengths of the railways that the companies differed from each other. There was also a great difference in the surface cost of the railways and individual tracks belonging to them. Thus, the surface cost of the Chernivtsi-Vyzhnytsia line was 43,300 krones, Chernivtsi-Zastavna, Chernivtsi-Lipcani – 35,000 krones. The surface value was influenced by technical, economic, and financial reasons.

Technical reasons include the following:

- topographic conditions that required major work on the construction of bridges, tunnels, embankments, etc.;
- the capacity of each railway as a transport enterprise (i.e. the number of rolling stock, one- or two-track railway, the presence of large workshops, junctions and marshaling stations).

Economic reasons include the cost of labor and materials, as well as the cost of land that was alienated for the construction of the railway. The reasons for the financial nature lay in the large losses in the sale of capital, as well as in the amount of money that was paid on loans during the construction of the road.

The effect of all these three factors was especially noticeable in Bukovyna, on significant regional railways, which had a large number of rolling stock and which ran over geographically difficult terrain with many artificial structures.

One of the characteristic features of railway companies was the high degree of concentration of capital in comparison with the other branches of private capitalist production. Among the private companies operating the railways of general importance, two companies had fixed assets ranging from 108 million krones to 415 million krones. The high degree of concentration of capital in the railway sector was explained by its specifics. Railways as transport enterprises include railroad tracks, rolling stock, and mechanical engines. Each of these elements of rail transport was expensive. Combining them within the framework of one enterprise led to a huge concentration of the fixed capital of railway enterprises.

The structure of the fixed capital of railway companies was also peculiar. These capitals were created mainly by issuing shares and bonds guaranteed by the Austro-Hungarian government. Debentures were created through railway bonded loans, often obtained abroad. As a whole, debenture prevailed in the structure of fixed capital of railway companies. By January 1, 1914, private companies spent 5 million crowns on the construction of regional railways in Bukovyna. Only 6.3% of this amount was equity capital, the rest was obtained by issuing bonds or through appropriations from the state budget. As a rule, information about the regional railways of Bukovyna for 1913 was taken from the reports of the Railway Reporting

Department of the State Audit Office, according to the operational reports of the railways, as well as from other literary sources.

Despite the advantages in the structure of the fixed capital, the shareholders had huge profits from the activities of the railway companies.

The profitability of large railway companies in Bukovyna was largely determined by the advantageous territorial location of a private railway network, including regional railways. An analysis of the territorial distribution of regional railways in Bukovyna has shown that they passed through areas that were economically developed in this region. It was in Northern Bukovyna, in Central, and South. Major main roads in Bukovyna are located diagonally to the regional ones, connecting the most important economic regions in the shortest possible way. Such a favorable location of regional railways immediately contributed to their success in the competition with state (government-owned) railways.

An analysis of the technical equipment of the regional railway network in Bukovyna shows the reasons for the weak use of the capacities of the locomotive factories and the lack of rolling stock. All of these reasons were rooted in the policies pursued by the railway companies. The essence of this policy was to increase the profitability of the railways by saving on the purchase of additional rolling stock. An analysis of the results of the activities of each of the regional railways in Bukovyna allows us to conclude that before the First World War, the net profit of these companies grew by reducing the cost of technical equipment of the railways. In fact, the "economy" on the technical equipment of the railways, which was carried out by private companies, had a certain basis. The fact is that before the First World War, the date of the redemption of the railways by the treasury was approaching. The amount of the redemption sum depended on the amount of dividends per share in the years preceding the redemption. That is why private companies sought to increase their incomes by drastically cutting the costs of technical equipment for railways and repairs of rolling stock. During the years of the pre-war industrial upsurge, the increase in the rolling stock on the private regional railway transport lagged behind the needs of the growth of freight and passenger traffic. In order to cope with the increasing traffic, private railway companies of Austria-Hungary took the path of intensifying the work of the entire rolling stock, maximizing the use of the capacities that were available: there was an increase in the load of a freight car, the carrying capacity of platforms increased, and powerful steam locomotives appeared. But the technical level of the track facilities of regional railways in Bukovyna did not meet the requirements for the development of rolling stock.

The industrial upsurge, which began on the territory of Austria-Hungary in the last quarter of the 19th century, and which, in particular, initiated the creation of not only the main trunk lines, but also regional railways, had a very significant impact on the growth of railway freight turnover: the transportation of goods and passengers, as well as for cargo turnover. Transportations on the regional railways of Bukovyna were constantly growing.

So, the traffic on the regional roads of Bukovyna increased by 31.3% from 1909 to 1913. These railways accounted for 30% of all traffic in the country. This is evidenced by the general transportation of goods. Therefore, we will not be mistaken if we

conclude that regional railways played a significant role in the transportation of goods to the most important economic regions of Russia, Romania, in the territory of the Austro-Hungarian Empire. Moreover, sometimes they occupied a monopoly position in the transportation of goods relative to the Chernivtsi-Ocniţa, Chernivtsi-Zhmerynka, and others. The share of regional railways in the transportation of goods in these areas accounted for 100% and 75% of cargo transportation, respectively.

At the beginning of the 20th century, due to the increase in freight turnover, competition between private and state railways intensified. The study has found that regional private railways tended to gain the upper hand in this struggle by providing a range of services to their customers. So, it was, for example, accelerating the delivery of goods at lower tariffs than on state railways.

In our study of the forming and functioning of the regional railways of Bukovyna, we also touch upon the issues of the policy of the Austro-Hungarian government in the field of private railway construction, as well as the relationship of railway companies to the state apparatus.

The state policy in the field of railway construction was developed by the Austro-Hungarian government back in the 90s of the 20th century and it is aimed at the widespread development of private railway transport; it was also continued at the beginning of the 20th century. Private railway construction played an important role in the economic policy. This is due to the fact that over the years, the government of Austria-Hungary was no longer able to allocate significant funds for the further development of the state railway network, as in the 90s of the 19th century, and therefore, it was decided to turn to private capital.

In the pre-war period, in accordance with the statutes of a number of railway companies, it was time for the redemption of individual regional railways in Bukovyna, and not only on it. Discussion of the issue of redemption of the main and regional railways by the treasury ended with an agreement between the State and the railway companies. This agreement took the form of a supplement to the charter of railway companies. According to these supplements, the railway companies and the State made mutual concessions: the first one received the right to build railways in the economically developed regions of the country, and the treasury increased its share in the profits of the railway companies.

The relationship between joint-stock railway companies and the State was determined by the very nature of railway construction and was formed on mutually beneficial terms. The State was interested in the development of the railway network by railway companies, and the latter, in turn, needed the support of the Austro-Hungarian government, which was endowed with power and economic potential. This led to the necessary relation between the railway companies and the individual links of the state apparatus. Going towards rapprochement with state authorities, railway companies used them to solve their own problems related to the construction and operation of railways, and, ultimately, to generate additional income.

The issue of the relationship between railway companies and banks is extremely interesting. In our study, we also consider the role of banks in the creating and financing of railway companies. The results of the study have shown that Austrian and foreign banks actively participated in the financing of joint-stock railway companies, in the issue

and sale of bonded railway loans, and assumed the settlement functions of individual railway companies. As a rule, from the very beginning of the construction of regional railways in Bukovyna, banks took an active part in the creation and formation of separate railway companies. Their role especially increased in the pre-war period. Banks have taken leading positions in the organization and feasibility of private railway companies. Their interest in private railway construction was caused, first of all, by the possibility of obtaining significant income from issuing and constituent operations.

The shares of the Austro-Hungarian railway companies brought in 3–5% of the government guaranteed income per year. After the introduction of a railroad into operation, "matured" shares were put into quotations on the stock exchange. At the same time, banks, which acted as shareholders of railway companies, received huge amounts of founding profit. Banks also made significant profits by issuing railroad capital bonds. They strove to establish under the contract the lowest possible rate of the selling price of bonds and, thus, on the difference between the selling and exchange prices, they received huge profits. This led to a significant increase in the cost of railway construction, which was in the hands of banks, that is, it gave bank founders the opportunity to profit from "saving" money in the construction of private regional railways.

In the years before the First World War, when the industrial upsurge was especially active in connection with the development of call operations, banks needed new funds. However, the banks did not have significant funds of their own at that time. This problem can be solved with the help of invested capital. At the same time, preference was given to deposits that were taken at a low interest rate and for a long time. Such conditions were professed by the new railway companies created by interested banks. Banks usually took deposits from railway companies at low interest rates (3.5–5%) and received 7.5% or more for providing loans. This percentage difference was the profit of the banks. Therefore, they willingly financed the construction of railways. Moreover, the amounts sold on bonds and shares were placed in them on current accounts and in deposits. At the same time, all income from the sale of securities, issued commissions, etc. settled in banks.

The data on the founding activities of Austrian banks in the field of private railway construction during the years of the industrial boom indicate an intensive process of merging of banks with the railway companies. This merger was carried out mainly through financing, which banks were willing to accept. The most widespread form of financing the Austro-Hungarian railway companies, taken over by the banks, was the implementation of new issues of shares of enterprises. As a rule, the sale of shares was carried out by syndicates from several friendly banks and banking houses. However, only one leading bank played the main role in such syndicated loans.

Thus, Austrian banks were interested in financial and speculative operations related to the formation of railway companies to a greater extent than the subsequent operation of railway lines. The founding activity of Austrian banks in relation to private railway construction confirms Lenin's thesis that «as banking develops and it is concentrated in a few institutions, banks grow from a modest role of intermediaries into omnipotent monopolists who manage almost all the money capital of the entire

aggregate of capitalists and small owners, as well as most of the means of production and sources of raw materials in a given country and in a number of countries».

Railway transport of Ukraine as the main type of communication has a rich history and remarkable scientific, technical and labor traditions. In no case, they should be forgotten, because you cannot build something new without knowing your roots, your past, without using the rich experience of all the previous. After all, the proverb says not in vain: 'the new is the well-forgotten old". In this regard, the famous Russian writer Vladimir Chivilyukhin said that "history is a long-standing reality of life, which has already come true, and all that is heroic in history is necessary for humanity for the future" (Kraskovski & Uezdin, 1994: 4). He spoke out against criticism of the past, against any deviations from the truth.

At one time, the Tsarist Russian Empire, which included most of Ukraine, later on, other countries took the path of capitalist development. The growth of industrial and agricultural production and export of grain after the reform of 1861 caused a sharp increase in the volume of traffic. But for this, it was necessary to strengthen the construction of railways. So, from 1865 to 1875, the average annual growth of Russian railways was one and a half thousand kilometers, and from 1893 to 1897 – over 2,000km. At this time, the lines Moscow – Kursk (1868), Kursk – Kyiv (1870), Moscow – Brest (1871), and others were built. On the importance of railways, the builder of the Trans-Siberian Railway, railway engineer and talented writer N.G. Garin-Mikhailovsky (1852-1960) wrote, "We need roads like air, like water. The East is dying because there are no roads" (Garin-Mikhailovskii, 1958: 158).

The huge rise in railway construction, the commissioning of new railway lines served as a powerful impetus for the development of the metallurgical and machine-building industries in Ukraine, economic and trade relations with other countries. Undoubtedly, during the construction of railways, especially at first, the foreign experience was taken into account and adapted to the conditions. Separate lines were built by compatible joint stock companies. The main part of the railways was built at the expense of the State. However, as life has shown, some private domestic and foreign entrepreneurs were worried, first of all, about the benefits and least of all about the quality of work. As a result, the roads they built had many shortcomings and they were less prepared for operation than state roads (Golovachev, 1881: 367–382).

The deployment of railway construction on the Bukovynian lands in the second half of the 19th century was also associated with the formation of a capitalist structure in the economies of the countries that included these lands. It is worth recalling that at this time, the border between the two empires – the Russian and the Austro-Hungarian – divided Ukraine into two parts unequal in area. For, as you know, the final distribution of Ukrainian lands took place at the end of the 18th century as a result of three successive partitions of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth in 1772, 1793, and 1795 between Russia, Austria, and Prussia. All Right-Bank Ukraine became part of the Russian Empire, which controlled 80% of the Ukrainian lands since then. The rest belonged to the Habsburg monarchy. Transcarpathia has entered the Austrian Empire together with Hungary in 1526, Galicia–after the first partition of Poland in 1772, Bukovyna, which was mined from Turkey, gradually in parts in 1774–1776.

During this period, the Bukovynian lands were considered by the governments of both States to be their organic part and they were perceived as provincial outskirts. Western Ukraine suffered especially as it lagged behind other European regions in socioeconomic development for a very long time. Most of the 2.4 million western Ukrainians at the beginning of the 19th century lived in Eastern Galicia, the rest – in Bukovyna and Transcarpathia. The social structure of the population of this part of the Habsburg monarchy corresponded to the economic situation of this corner of Europe: 95% were poor peasants.

Thus, as a result of the partition of Poland (1772), Galicia, and from 1776 the whole of Bukovyna, became a part of the Habsburg Empire and they were cut off from the land and waterways that passed through the Ukrainian lands and connected Central Europe with the East and the Black Sea. The life-giving connection with Volhynia and the Right Bank was broken. Lviv, Chernivtsi, Uzhhorod, and other cities of Western Ukraine lost their role as traditional, cultural, political and economic centers and were considered by the Austrian and Hungarian administration to be a European, but a sleepy region. The Transcarpathian routes that had existed for a long time also lost their importance, and Brody, a town that was located on the very state border between the two empires, suddenly became a significant trade center. And the Eastern Galicia became one of the main markets for goods of the Western Austrian possessions and, at the same time, one of the raw material bases for Vienna. However, the export and import of goods were carried out by horse-drawn vehicles. Thus, about 700 million tons of grain were exported from Galicia annually to foreign markets. At the prices of that time, for example, the cost of transporting grain over a distance of more than 10km was no longer covered by income from its sale. Therefore, a part of the goods (grain, livestock, etc.) did not find sale due to the lack of good communication routes and the lack of mechanized transport (Subtelnyi, 1991: 193–199).

Meanwhile, in the countries of Western Europe (in 1830 – in England, in 1831 – in France, in 1835 – in Belgium and Germany) and the USA (in 1830–1831), the first railway lines were put into operation. In Austria, the project of communication of Galicia with Vienna by means of the railway, which was proposed by the professor of geology Franz Ripley, was considered something incredible. And, not finding support in the Austrian government, he turned to the Viennese banker Solomon Rothschild, who had iron ore and coal deposits in Moravia and therefore was very rich. After some time, the new Austrian Emperor Ferdinand, responding to Rothschild's request for a patent for the construction of a railway, allowed the creation of a joint-stock company for this purpose, which became known as the Privileged Company of the Emperor Ferdinand Northern Railway.

In order to develop the project of the Galician railway, a commission, which included seven large industrialists and landowners of Galicia, headed by Knyaz Leon Sapiega, was created in 1840–1842. In the presented report, the main line was determined: Bochnia – Dębica – Rzeszów – Przeworsk – Przemyśl – Lviv, as well as the southern line from Lviv to Chernivtsi through Khodoriv and Stanyslaviv. The report noted that this route will bring great benefits to the whole of Europe.

Only in 1845, the Galician railway was approved as a state railway and preparations for its construction began. Everything seemed to start. However, the poor

harvest and the uncertain political situation of the Austrian monarchy slowed down this process for more than ten years. At the same time, the military-political interests of the Austrian crown forced the government to expand the country's railway network – in 1854, as many tracks were built as no other country in Europe could at that time – 1,766 km, but in Galicia, this did not materialise. Only in 1856, the affairs of the Emperor Ferdinand Northern Railway went up, the successes in technical equipment were special (for example, it was here that kerosene lanterns were first used to illuminate the train carriages). Taking advantage of the precarious situation in the government circles and financial trouble, the government achieved the transfer of all existing Western-Galician (mainly in the direction of Vienna) and projected to Lviv and further to the east railway lines for their own use. The Emperor agreed to grant privileges to the newly created company for the construction of Eastern-Galician, that is, Western-Ukrainian, railways.

In 1857, the Emperor Ferdinand Northern Railway Company abandoned all railway lines east of Krakow and entered as a shareholder in the company formed by the Galicians by Knyaz Leon Sapiega and the magnate Adam Potocki, which from January 1, 1858, received the name of the Privileged Company of Karl Ludwig Galician Railways. Since it was actually at its expense that the project was finally implemented to connect the last link of the Galician capital with the network of existing Austrian railways – the route between Przemyśl and Lviv. This distance – 97km – was covered by the builders in a year. We cannot tell about all the vicissitudes of the construction of this branch, this is thoroughly described in the great monograph *Railways of Ukraine: A Historical Sketch* (2001) by H.M. Kirpa, O.M. Pshinko, I.V. Ahienko. We are more interested in that page in the history of the Lviv railway, which is associated with the construction of a track from Lviv to Odesa, but through the capital of Bukovyna-Chernivtsi.

Today, it is known that the founder of this project in the early 60s of the 19th century was the energetic Austrian official Offenheim, who was in the service of the Company of Karl Ludwig Galician Railways, but did not support his purposeful policy of building routes in the east. This Offenheim constantly argued that it was necessary not only to get to the Russian border by rail, but to build a railway line of European importance. That is why he constantly argued that a route should be built in the direction Lviv-Chernivtsi-Chişinău-Odesa, which would go to one of the largest Black Sea ports.

On June 3, 1864, the Lviv-Chernivtsi Railway Company under the chairmanship of its President, Knyaz Leon Sapiega, officially began its activities. Knyaz Karol Yablonsky was the deputy president. The leadership is located in Vienna. Offenheim took over as Director General. Emanuel Ziffer became the Director of the Movement, or Executive Director (his office was in Lviv).

The indefatigable Offenheim managed in 1868 to expand the scope of the Lviv-Chernivtsi Railway Company – the planned route was to be continued even further south to Iaşi. Therefore, the new name – the Lviv-Chernivtsi-Iaşi Railway – allowed Offenheim to achieve something absolutely incredible: to get permission from the Austrian government to implement this project. It should be noted that this was for the first time provided by parliamentary means.

But the construction of the railway between the capital of Galicia – Lviv and the capital of Bukovyna – Chernivtsi was started even before the fuss with the names of the Company, namely, in 1865, and it was carried out at a frantic pace. The path was laid in the direction from Lviv through Khodoriv and Stanyslaviv to Chernivtsi. On September 1, 1866, 267 kilometers of railway rails connected Lviv and Chernivtsi. On November 28, 1869, the next 90km to Suceava were opened for traffic, and already in 1970 – along the entire railroad section to Iaşi.

In 1884, the new management of the already state-owned Chernivtsi-Iaşi Railway built a branch line from Chernivtsi to Novoselytsia, a town on the Russian-Austrian border. However, on the Russian side, the railway network was connected to Novoselytsia through Lipcani-Mogilev-Ocniţa-Zhmerynka only in 1893. This was another, already the third in order, railway version of the connection between the two empires.

In the 90s of the 19th century, the regional railway network of Bukovyna began to actively expand. In this decade, trains reach Vyzhnytsia, Karapchiv, Chudel, Mezhybrody, Luzhany, Zalishchyky, small towns and villages.

More than a century and half have passed since those distant times, when the first railway lines were laid on the Bukovynian land. The history of the regional railways of Bukovyna of the Austrian period is closely connected with the history of our State and Europe. The main stages of the formation of the Bukovyna railway network are pages of the development of historical events in this region of Ukraine. Complex and controversial, but rich in glorious traditions, this story continues today.

One of the characteristic features of railway companies was the high degree of concentration of capital in comparison with the other branches of private capitalist production. Among the private companies operating the railways of general importance, two companies had fixed assets ranging from 108 million krones to 415 million krones. The high degree of concentration of capital in the railway sector was explained by its specifics. Railways as transport enterprises include railroad tracks, rolling stock, and mechanical engines. Each of these elements of rail transport was expensive. Combining them within the framework of one enterprise led to a huge concentration of the fixed capital of railway enterprises.

The structure of the fixed capital of railway companies was also peculiar. These capitals were created mainly by issuing shares and bonds guaranteed by the Austro-Hungarian government. Debentures were created through railway bonded loans, often obtained abroad. As a whole, debenture prevailed in the structure of fixed capital of railway companies. By January 1, 1914, private companies spent 5 million crowns on the construction of regional railways in Bukovyna. Only 6.3% of this amount was equity capital, the rest was obtained by issuing bonds or through appropriations from the state budget. As a rule, information about the regional railways of Bukovyna for 1913 was taken from the reports of the Railway Reporting Department of the State Audit Office, according to the operational reports of the railways, as well as from other literary sources. The share of the share capital in the fixed capital of individual railway companies was on the Chernivtsi-Vyzhnytsia Railway.

Despite the advantages in the structure of fixed capital, the shareholders had huge profits from the activities of private railway companies.

Conclusions

The deployment of railway construction on the lands of Bukovyna in the second half of the 19th century was associated with the processes of the capitalist structure formation in the economies of the countries that included these lands – Austria-Hungary and the Russian Empire.

The successful activities of the large railway companies in Bukovyna were facilitated by their strong ties with banks and close mutually beneficial cooperation with various parts of the state apparatus of Austria-Hungary and the Russian Empire. There was certain dependence between railway companies and States that, on the one hand, companies could not do without financial assistance from the State. On the other hand, the State did not possess sufficient funds at the end of the 19th century to independently expand the railway network and it was forced to entrust the construction of railway lines to private companies.

Banks willingly acted as founders of new private railway companies in Austria-Hungary, which intensively stimulated the development of railway construction in Bukovyna.

The private regional railways of Bukovyna during the period under study became important through-passages in Austria-Hungary and Europe as a whole, were of national importance and played a large role in the transport system of the entire country. They served the leading economic regions of the country, acted in each of them as an integral part of production. In other words, with their help, local, intersectoral, and regional ties were carried out.

The high degree of the capital concentration in comparison with the other branches of private capitalist production was one of the characteristic features of the railway companies of Bukovyna.

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CENTRAL AND SOUTH ASIA AS A PRIORITY OF RUSSIAN AND BRITISH FOREIGN POLICY IN THE SECOND HALF OF THE 19TH AND EARLY 20TH CENTURIES

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Abstract

For centuries, world powers have struggled for influence in the geographical area formed by Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan. Central Asia is the least explored world region and has long been a source of geopolitical tension. The aim of this study was to characterize Central and South Asia as a priority for Russian and British foreign policy in the second half of the 19th and early 20th centuries. Scientific and historiographic methods were used to analyze documented facts and ensure reliable results. Foreign policy relations of the Russian Empire and Great Britain during the great geopolitical confrontation were analyzed by comparison. The results support the hypothesis that there were influence spheres, contentious issues, and interests, which enabled the players to find compromises at the end of the 'Great Game' without resorting to force. These facts enriched diplomatic practices in buffer states, natural boundaries, de-escalation, and agreements for improving conflict management between competing foreign nations.

Key words: *Central Asia, South Asia, Russia, Britain, foreign policy*

Introduction

The 'Great Game' or 'Shadow War' were names given to the rivalry between Russia and Britain in the late nineteenth century for influence in south and central Asia. The coining of the term was attributed to British intelligence officer Arthur Conolly, and it was popularized by Rudyard Kipling in his 1904 book, *Kim*, in which he presents the idea of a power struggle between great nations as a kind of game (Chakraborty, 2013). It was a geostrategic and political struggle, but also a duel between the intelligence services of two powerful empires that took many interesting twists.

As early as the eighteenth century, the British began to focus on the Russian expansion to the south. They did not believe Russia's stated aim of protecting Christians living outside the Caucasus. At that time, the English were making full use of India as the 'jewel in the crown' and were trying to keep their direct rivals (France, Portugal, and Holland) at bay, taking precautionary measures and not failing to control their smallest moves in this direction. At the same time, Tsarist Russia was trying to expand its territory and sphere of influence to create one of the largest land empires in history. The Russians wanted to take control of India away from the British (Dankov, 2016). As Britain consolidated its position in India, including Burma, Pakistan and Bangladesh, Russia conquered the central Asian khanates and tribes along its southern border. The front line between the two empires ran through Afghanistan, Tibet and Persia (today's Iran) (Smolarz, 2020; Tonooka, 2021).

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British Lord Ellenborough began the Great Game on January, 12, 1830 by a decree, which established a new trade route from India to Bukhara, using Turkey, Persia and Afghanistan as buffer states against Russia to prevent it from controlling ports in the Persian Gulf (Boulger, 1879). The objective was to protect the main maritime trade routes of Britain and India, cutting off Russia from acquiring a port on the Indian Ocean and the Persian Gulf. Meanwhile, Russia wanted to create a neutral zone in Afghanistan, allowing it to exploit crucial trade routes. This led to four unsuccessful wars fought by the British for the control of Afghanistan, Bukhara and Turkey, all of which they lost: (1) the First Anglo-Saxon War (1838), (2) the First Anglo-Sikh War (1843), (3) the Second Anglo-Sikh War (1848) and (4) the Second Anglo-Afghan War (1878). The outcome of these defeats was that Russia took control of several khanates, including Bukhara (Djurabayev, 2015). Although Britain's attempts to conquer Afghanistan ended in humiliation, that independent and unruly nation, seen as a buffer between Russia and India, was like a bone in the throat for the great metropolis. Britain took control of Tibet only two years after the Junghasband expedition from 1903 to 1904, after which control was moved from China to Qin imperial dynasty. The Chinese emperor fell only seven years later, allowing Tibet to rule itself again (Ishchenko, 2020).

The literature reviewed for this investigation revealed that most studies focused on the confrontation between central Asia, Russia and Britain, the historical schools, the main methods and concepts formed in British and Russian historical documents on the Great Game in central Asia. The first group of documents appeared from the second half of the 19th century to the early 20th century and briefly dealt with the subjects under study. In his book "Russia and Britain in Central Asia", Terentyev (1875) analyzed the work of foreign writers, mainly the British orientalist Rawlinson and the Hungarian scholar Vambery. In the book "Afghanistan", Snesarev (2002) also offered an informative overview of the history of confrontation between Russia and Great Britain in Central Asia. Interesting and useful commentary on domestic and foreign history is found in Khalfin´s works; he was a famous Soviet orientalist and expert on central Asian countries (Khalfin, 1959 and 1965). Martirosov's monograph (1962) is a work that does not lose sight of the history of the Anglo-Russian confrontation in central Asia. This work has great historical value, combining a high level of research scholarship with careful assessment of other sources and studies. To this day, Martirosov's monograph is the only major discussion of the confrontation between Russia and Britain in central Asia before the revolution and creation of the Soviet Union.

In the 1980s and early 1990s, a number of books on Soviet history and the build-up to the confrontation between Russia and Britain in central Asia appeared. The most interesting were two monographs: Britain in the Middle East in the 19th and early 20th centuries, an analysis of foreign policy concepts by Zhigalina (1990) and British and American policies in the Middle East by Kozhekina and Fedorova (1989). In her work, Zhigalina (op. cit.) analyzed the British Empire's concept of foreign policy in Central Asia, and she pointed out the struggle of the British rulers with Eastern political issues. In the 1990s and early 2000s, the historiographical aspects of the study of the Great Game were practically ignored. During this period, there were only a few published studies on the subject by Brezhneva (2000), Kuzminov (n.d.), and Terentyev (2006).

Overall, the events of the history of the central Asian region during the highlighted period provide a vast arsenal for analyzing and characterizing the tools and techniques of British and Russian diplomacy. Active confrontation between the colonial empires of the time led to a transformation of the geopolitical status of central Asia, which became a kind of prerequisite for the creation of an independent Afghanistan and Iran by the end of the nineteenth century. All these factors still contribute to the political instability of today's central Asian states. The present study has a clear aim, therefore, to characterize central and south Asia as a priority of Russian and British foreign policy in the second half of the 19th and early 20th centuries.

Methodology

In light of important developments in Russian history, this article focuses on a civilizational model as a strong basis for a wider understanding of the foreign policies adopted by Russia and Great Britain towards central Asian regions during the second half of the 19th and early 20th centuries. The model, sometimes called the traditional model, was primarily based on the foundations of the primitive communal system, which provided the main support for social experience transmission. Melko (2002: 69) suggested that civilization "is a large society possessing a degree of autonomy and internal integration" that promotes an interaction of cultural attributes related to every relevant aspect of human life. This civilizational model is characterized by geographical dependence, an extensive type of development, conservatism and non-mobility that certainly influence the socio-political dealings conducted in specific territories. In this sense, Hale and Laruelle (2021: 597) maintained that a civilization's identity had a great influence on expectations of the behavior of countries and individual people; and "these different perspectives also generate diverging views on what civilizational identity explains in contemporary world politics". The author of the study felt that social development in every country and community was the same, but that there were different interpretations of what made this concept applicable. In practical terms, this could be applied to cultures, economies, history and other aspects of life. As a result, the process is not the same for all communities; the cultural and sociopolitical evolution in human society varies.

To conduct this study, Russia and Great Britain were considered in the widest sense as two civilizations that shared a number of common features of development, but at the same time which had individual priorities defined by their societies. The main aim of this paper was to conduct a historiographic study of the relations between Russia and Great Britain from the second half of the 19th through the early 20th century. The focus of the study was principally on the Central Asian region as a priority for Russian and Great Britain's foreign policy and as a factor in the aggravation of diplomatic relations between these states during this period. The basis of the study can be found in three principles: (a) the principle of historicism that considers the research subject in its emergence, formation and decline in order to explore the historic development more deeply and to understand the conflict between Russia and Britain in Central Asia from a contextual and historical view; (b) the principle of scientific objectivity defined by scientific truth, which requires the author to overcome subjective errors and the influence of special interests; the material presented in the study was based on historical

facts and does not reflect the author's subjective assessment; and (c) the principle of fairness, in which the author provides an overview of history, treating the various phases and aspects as a system of interrelated knowledge, to explore the causes of change and their impact on social knowledge, politics and history.

The methodological basis was developed from scientific and historiographic methods and their specific processes and techniques. Scientific methods include analysis, synthesis, modelling, and systematics as well as historiographic methods such as narrative, historical and genetic approaches, and periodization. The use of these methods ensures reliable results since concrete, documented facts are analyzed from an empirical viewpoint and contextual perspective. A clearer understanding of the historical process can be achieved by recognizing the exceptions, interpreting them in light of multiple lines of evidence (Firat, 1987), and approaching them by historiography in an inductive and specific way. The following paragraphs detail the technique and specifications of each method.

The scientific method is supported by analysis, which seeks to understand the details by examining each scholarly work, assessing the knowledge level, the main ideas presented by the authors and the conclusions drawn from their work. For example, such analysis allows us to compare changes in Russian foreign policy in the Asian region before and after the Crimean War. Similar studies, such as that of Mayorova et al. (2020) used analysis to establish concrete facts for analysis of the confrontation between the two powerful states that took place in the border regions of Central Asia in the 1920s through the prism of its inhabitants, similar to Orenburg and Alder (1981) in their study of Indian foreign policy in the context of the Great Game. Alder (1981) used synthesis to identify the 'normal' mode of development of the Great Game in order to understand the full range of events. Suzuki (2019) used this method to examine a strategic incident in Asia between Britain and Russia in 1885, which caused a serious threat of war between the great powers.

In addition, systematic and modelling approaches were also used to get a broader review of the facts and ensure reliable results. Systematization allows the status of each actor and the external relations of a country to be determined. From a holistic perspective, the consideration of foreign policy as a system makes it possible to clarify the motives pursued by each empire in relation to Central Asia at that time, while the geopolitical specifications and the spheres of influence between the empires were identified through modelling. Similar research specificities can be traced at Urakov (2020) and Cooley (2012) respectively. From a historical point of view, Urakov (op.cit.) analyzed the geopolitical situation in Central Asia in the middle of the 19th century and used a systematic approach to model the political and diplomatic struggles of the world's major developed countries for control of the territory. In the same way, Cooley (op. cit.) in his study of the Great Game according to the local rules of the new great power contest in Central Asia, explored the dynamics of the new competition for influence over the region since 9/11 and found that Central Asian governments had proven themselves critical agents in their own right, establishing local rules for external involvement that served to fend off external pressures and bolster their sovereign authority.

This study made extensive use of the so-called narrative method of research from a holistic standpoint. This approach to the documented historical facts and the interpretation of causal relationships from the research materials included the main methods and concepts embodied in the British and Russian historical documents on the Great Game in Central Asia. The culture of the time must be understood in order to appreciate the facts as they were documented in terms of the cultural tradition; this documentation reflected how each culture perceived the world and its facts (Firat, op. cit.).

The historical-genetic method was applied as a tool for periodizing relations between Russia and Britain in the Central Asian region. Green (1992) affirmed that periodization is the most prominent theoretical characteristic of historiography and has been employed to divide history into specific time periods for easier discussion. Periodization involves the conditional division of the historical process into specific chronological periods in relation to the nature of the foreign policy conducted by empires. In particular, the results of this investigation demonstrated four main stages of the Great Game in Central Asia. Similar studies have used this method to conduct their researches. One such example is the state formation and periodization in inner Asian history presented by Di Cosmo (1999), in which he explored the basic mechanisms of state formation in inner Asia and proposed four phases of periodization. Sayfullayev (2016), in his study of Uzbekistan´s diplomacy in the modern international relations system, made a temporal division of the sovereign history of Uzbekistan into six stages to show the evolution of Uzbek diplomacy into the 21st century.

Results and discussion

Examining the motivations of each empire, it is worth noting that, above all, they were acting according to the rules and traditions of their time. England's main motivation during the Great Game was the fear of losing India. Nineteenth-century British India encompassed modern-day Pakistan, Bangladesh and Myanmar, in addition to modern-day India. The undeniable financial basis for England's economic growth and prosperity for more than two centuries was the income they derived from this vast colony; a fact familiar to any educated Englishman of the time. Russia had no such source of profit. Of course, the vast expanse beyond the Urals had been generating income in the form of valuable furs since the sixteenth century, but this hardly recouped the investment in it. Russia continued to acquire new territories, with little return until the development of the oil fields in Baku. And there was little reason to believe they would be profitable, and many thought the conquest of these territories was a mistake. In the 1860s and 1870s, General Rostislav Fadeev wrote newspaper articles claiming that the Asian territories were a shackle to Russia. He gave figures that the per capita tax for the inhabitants of the Caucasus was a quarter of the Russian rate, while the inhabitants of Central Asia paid only one fifth. In spite of this criticism, Russia continued to make huge steps forward.

Being in a natural state of geographical isolation (and often political isolation in the west), Russia sought new trade routes. As might be expected of an empire, Russia repeatedly tried to establish the necessary access by force. This was the reason for Prince

Bekovich-Cherkassky's Khiva campaign in 1717 and Peter the Great's Persian campaign, 1722-23.

Russian trade with Bukhara, Samarkand, Kokand and Herat was hampered by militant Kazakhs, Kirghiz, Khivans, Turkmen and Karakalpaks. The whole of the eighteenth century was marked by their raids on Russian, Kalmyk and German settlements in the Lower Volga.

Nomads robbed caravans, captured prisoners and sold them into slavery in the Bukhara and Khiva khanates. Slavery and the slave trade may have been Bukhara and Khiva's main economic sources. In the 1830s alone, they kidnapped around two thousand Russian subjects. In 1845 an English official, Joseph Wolf, gave a speech in London stating that of the 1.2 million people living in Bukhara, 200,000 were Persian slaves. Looking ahead, two of the first measures taken by the Russian government after its victory over the three monarchies of Turkestan were to order its rulers to free all slaves and prohibit slavery. This fact alone allows one to accept the assertion formulated in Soviet textbooks about the "progressive significance of the unification of Central Asia with Russia". Russian historian Sergeev (2013) wrote: "As documents show, tsarist strategists were worried about planning military actions in the Caucasus and ignored India until the Crimean War. But people who are afraid see danger everywhere, and alarmists in London accuse their government of turning a blind eye to the Russian threat. It was inevitable that Russia would expand from the Urals and southern Siberia towards Central Asia". The main directions of Russia´s policy towards Central Asia during this period are shown in Figure 1.

Figure 1. Russia's Asian policy.

The main reason for this policy was the obvious difference in potential between the empire and the archaic agricultural and nomadic monarchies. Ingram (1980) affirmed that manufacturers of Russian goods (textiles, sugar, flour, tools, metal, glassware, clocks, crockery and paraffin) needed to find new markets and Russian merchants needed access to cotton, silk, sheepskins, carpets and spices from

Turkmenistan. But trade caravans were subjected to raids by militant nomads. As early as the Petrine era, Russia began to form defensive lines along the perimeter of the Great Steppe, slowly pushing the nomads southward to Orenburg, Novy Orenburg, and the Syr Darya and Aral regions.

From the late 1820s onwards, British scouts found themselves in Bukhara and Samarkand. The oases of Turkmenistan were tantalizingly close to northern Afghanistan, which had tacitly become part of the British sphere of influence. Once they had secured a foothold in these oases in what was still neutral territory, a hostile England was able to cut off Siberia from the older regions of Russia with the swift movement of its Sipai army (Laumulin, 2010). The events of 1839-1842 heightened fears in St Petersburg. For reasons only they understood, the British brought their Indian troops into Afghanistan and kept them there for more than three years. Intelligence and rumors from Kabul were contradictory. Russia had every reason to worry that the British had effectively annexed Afghanistan and could move north at any moment, first taking the oasis of Merv, from which point Samarkand and Bukhara would be quite easily accessible. If they crossed the Hindu Kush, what would prevent them from capturing all the lowlands in Turkestan? In 1842, the British were utterly defeated in Afghanistan and went home after losing 18,000 soldiers. But the threat was real and still hanging in the air, and it had to be met not on the border of the Ural-Siberian 'underbelly', but as far south and as far away as possible. Russia made a firm decision to push its border beyond the vast strip of deserts and semi-deserts, while the fight against brigands attacking merchant caravans was relegated to the back burner. When the situation in the Caucasus was finally stabilized and the Polish revolt of 1863 was crushed (with Prussian help), Russia again began its expansion into Central Asia, which would continue almost until the end of the century; indeed, "since the 17th century, mercantilism has been the main instrument of semi-peripheral countries seeking to become 'heartland' " (Yeghiazaryan, 2013). Henceforth, the Russian Empire did not forget about the English factor in its foreign policy; thus began the Great Game (Table 1).

Table 1. The Great Game between Russia and Great Britain.

UK	Russia
The aim of Britain was to prevent the region from coming under Russian control, to use the Central Asian Khanates to eliminate Russia's strengths in the region, and to threaten the Urals and Siberia.	It was vital for the Russian government to establish control over Central Asia to protect its borders.
England had a good foothold in Afghanistan, and British instructors were showing up in the Bukhara forces.	

England continued its worldwide expansion, conquering territories in South Africa, Burma, the West Indies and Nigeria; turning the Gold Coast (Ghana), Lesotho and Sikkim into its colonies; putting the finishing touches on its holdings in Canada and Australia; and subjecting the semi-independent principalities of India (over 600 of them) to the British crown. Beginning in 1864, England occupied Egypt, invaded Fiji, Cyprus,

Afghanistan and Ethiopia, and colonized Malaysia. The nature of England's foreign policy is shown in Figure 2.

Colonization strongholds

- Gibraltar. Control of the exit from the Mediterranean Sea to the Atlantic Ocean.
- Aden. Exit from the Red Sea to the Indian Ocean.
- Cape Town. Route around Africa from the Atlantic to the Indian Ocean.
- Singapore. Route from India to China.
- Hongkong. Access to China.

Most important colonial possessions

- India. A huge territory with a population about ten times larger than the population of China.
- Australia. So-called 'white' settler colony in its purest form, as the local population had been nearly annihilated. Until 1868 served as a place of exile for convicts.
- Canada. A major settler colony, which received dominion rights in 1867.
- New Zealand, the Cape Colony in South Africa, territories in West Africa.
- South Burma, etc.

Figure 2. The nature of England´s foreign policy.

The history of Russian-English relations during this period is a story of jealousy, veiled threats, mutual obstacles, intrigue, and temporary alliances at high levels. Each side bluffed and tried not to make the first move, which more than once led to a dangerous situation. At a lower level, however, there were negotiations between Russian and British officers and mid-level diplomats--not in the capitals, but on the basis of common interests on neutral ground. There was no difficulty in understanding each other as both sides could speak French. There were secret meetings between spies, as well as veiled meetings between military travelers. Through their joint efforts they helped to avoid direct conflicts. At the same time, Russia and England were also developing plans to end their problems militarily. Characteristically, in a note in 1863 to

Foreign Minister Gorchakov, the Russian General Ignatyev wrote: "To have peace with England and make her respect Russia's voice, to avoid breaking with us, it is necessary to discuss with British officials the misunderstandings that have arisen concerning the security of their Indian possessions, Russia's inability to resort to aggressive action against England, the lack of enterprise on our part or sufficient access to routes through Central Asia". Ignatyev knew what he was writing about: at that time the General Staff had at least three plans for a campaign attack India from different directions.

In Russia, it was felt that the boundaries of its interests and those of England did not touch each other directly. It would be better if they were separated by an independent Persia and Afghanistan. The Russian Empire felt that it was necessary to establish borders with those countries directly, as British India already shared a border on the 'opposite' side. Of course, the northern borders of Persia and especially Afghanistan were not entirely clear. The situation in the Pamirs was also unclear, not to mention the Tien Shan. And the question remained: was it necessary to absorb the Central Asian khanates or was it enough to make them protectorates of Russia, given the free movement of Russian troops? (Livshits &Shahumyan, 2017). On the initiative of War Minister Miliutin, the great campaign for Central Asia began in 1864. As a result, there were some changes in relations between Russia, Britain and Central Asia, but these were by no means beneficial to the Russians. Russian interests in this area were replaced by the strengthening of existing borders with Central Asia. England had not succeeded in this area; the expansion into Afghanistan had ended in discontent with the natives and decline of the British Guards. However, the result of the Crimean War altered the situation dramatically, resulting in changes to Russian foreign policy (Figure 3).

Russia's foreign policy had finally shifted from the Middle East to Central Asia	The Central Asian bridgehead gained importance against the British danger that became a reality after Britain's final establishment in Hindustan.

Turkey sought to unite the efforts of Kokand, Khiva, and Bukhara to act as a united front against Russia.

Figure 3. Changes in Russian foreign policy as a result of the Crimean War.

The second half of the 19th century saw the territory become a battleground between Russia and Britain. Russia regularly sent exploratory and military expeditions into Central Asia. The Russian occupation did not have a major impact on southern

Kazakhstan, but it marked a significant and important moment in Russia's economic development. The modern use of the term as a geopolitical resource for Central Asia was influential in general, and within a short period, Kazakhstan became part of the Russian Empire. Russia was nearing success in ending British colonial rule in India, which led to anti-Russian sentiments in London: "One of the hallmarks of 19th-century British phobia is a phobia of foreign relations with Central British economic interests". The Prime Minister was alarmed and accused the Russians of conspiring to invade the British colonies. Britain could no longer use its armed forces against Russia, so it was forced to withdraw and establish a border in Central Asia (Spechler & Spechler, 2013). In the late 1880s and early 1890s, British military expeditions on India's northwestern frontier achieved the goal of supporting a British offensive. Although England and Russia had reached a full agreement, within British society of the period the villains did wear uniforms resembling those of the Russian army. Gabdrashitova (2009) identified four main stages of the Great Game in Central Asia (Figure 4).

The first stage, which lasted from 1813 to 1838, was characterized by the absence of open military and political confrontation in the Central Asian region. At the same time, the political and economic positions of the two countries in the peripheral states were strengthened.

The second stage occurred from 1838-1864. It was characterized by the first attempts of the powers to openly penetrate into Central Asia (the First Anglo-Afghan War; the campaign of General V.A. Perovsky), as well as the beginning of the activity of Russian research expeditions (RGE).

The third stage saw the annexation of Central Asia to Russia as the main event of 1864-1885. The goal was the voluntary transition of Mervs to Russian citizenship and the London Agreement between Russia and Great Britain on the demarcation of Afghan assets. Thus, during this period, Russian influence extended from the southern borders of Afghanistan, the territories between the eastern shores of the Caspian Sea, to the western spurs of the Himalayas.

The fourth stage was characterized by the political clash between Russia and Great Britain in 1885-1907. The end of this stage was associated with the end of the Great Game as a manifestation of Big Politics in the region of Central Asia

Figure 4. Main stages of the Great Game in Central Asia.

At the same time, the definition of the British army's mission was strengthened. One of the features of British colonial policy was its history of international relations in the second half of the 19th century and the revision of colonial ownership. Competition between major powers seeking economic, political and military development intensified. Various sub-states were formed, politically and formally independent in terms of

financial diplomacy and military forces, but still dependent on rich and powerful countries. In fact, the Great Game was slowing down for many reasons, including the full-blown European crisis and German politics, the latter which was becoming more and more radical. Europe needed strong alliances to fight new enemies, and these alliances also required a lack of separation between members. However, the history of Russian civilization from the 17th to the 20th century shows that it is unrealistic to attempt to turn it into an organic part of Western European civilization (Gabdrashitova, op.cit.). Anderson and Talskaya (2019) pointed out that the colonial practices of the Russian and British empires had much in common. These features were based on the two governments' reliance on natural resources from newly acquired lands. The Russian Empire knew little about the rule of different nations and had always used traditional ways, but unlike the United Kingdom, it possessed a clear understanding of how the Russian state could be a geopolitical obstacle to a powerful enemy like Great Britain (Ahmar, 1994).

From a geopolitical point of view, the reason for Turkestan expansion lies in the lowering of Russia's frontiers. In fact, the development of Central Asia was a valid continuation of the ancient practice of expansion along natural frontiers like mountains, deserts, and waterways, the need to stop the frequent devastating attacks of nomads, make them citizens of Russia and force them to comply with Russian laws. The division of spheres of influence is illustrated in Figure 5.

Russia
- 1885 - England's recognition of the Central Asian khanates as belonging to Russia.
- 1895 - Pamir

England
- 1885 - Afghanistan, Tibet
- 1895 - The upper reaches of the Amu Darya River.

Figure 5. Division of the spheres of influence in the Central Asian region.

Even after the separation and integration of the country's borders and interests, Russia's geopolitical policy did not last in Central Asia (Spechler & Spechler, op. cit.). Based on the general conditions of the Russian Empire, it was necessary to strengthen the borders of Central Asia. One of the reasons for the government line, with no predetermined position, was the policy that a state must act without hurting itself. Thus, during the war, Russia's progress in Central Asia benefited greatly from geopolitical forces establishing borders along natural geographical boundaries, confronting Britain and appeasing local militants who regularly encroached on Russian territory.

Conclusions

The Great Game was brought to an abrupt halt at the beginning of the 20th century by external events, one of which was the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-1905. The Japanese not only destroyed the Russian navy, but also caused considerable damage to Russian pride and prestige in the international community. Moreover, with the outbreak of the First World War, the Russians and the British were fighting on the same side against the Germans. With this new geopolitical alignment, the antagonism and rivalries created by the Great Game were no longer productive for either side, so they shifted their attention from Central Asia to Europe.

Officially, the Great Game ended with the Anglo-Russian convention signed on 18 August 1907, under which Persia was divided into a Russian-controlled northern zone, a nominally independent central zone and a British-controlled southern zone. Russia recognized Afghanistan as a British protectorate and Britain recognized Bukhara and Khiva as Russian protectorates, as well as the incorporation of the rest of Central Asia into the Russian Empire.

Relations between the Russian and British empires remained tense until both empires joined forces to fight the Central powers during the First World War. Today, hostility towards each other has taken a new turn, especially noticeable after the start of the British exit process from the EU in 2017.

The Great Game kept all of Europe and almost all of Asia in tension. Over time, it spawned its own literature with a tendency towards mystery, behind-the-scenes episodes, spy operations and so on. But these entertaining pieces of writing tend to miss the main point: the efforts of these two empires over the years helped them resolve seemingly intractable problems concerning their respective spheres of influence, including the most contentious issues, and reconcile seemingly irreconcilable interests without (or almost without) resorting to force. There were many hawks on both sides, but patience, common sense and a desire to find compromises won out. The Great Game enriched diplomatic practice with notions of "buffer states", "natural boundaries", "de-escalation", "agreements" and "spheres of influence (or interests)", which were not previously present in the conceptual apparatus of foreign affairs.

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THE "SUCESS STORY" OF BILATERAL RELATIONS BETWEEN A COUNTRY IN EASTERN EUROPE AND CENTRAL AFRICA: ROMANIA AND CAMEROON (1970-1990)

Etamane Mahop Alain Thomas*

Abstract

The relations of friendship and cooperation between Romania and Cameroon in the 1970s had an exceptional quality, based on a strong and lasting partnership, reinforced by the status of the two countries. Romania, a country with a communist vocation, and Cameroon, a major privileged partner in diplomatic and economic relations. It is a traditionally close bilateral relationship initiated by the first President of Cameroon Hamadou Ahidjo, characterized by trust and mutual respect, which prevailed for twenty years. The establishment of an embassy in Cameroon then paved the way for the success of diplomatic relations, continuous and substantial development through dynamic and pragmatic political dialogue and close cooperation in many areas. The realization of several bilateral visits at governmental and parliamentary level, as well as economic missions, testified to this dynamic of the links and the importance that Yaoundé attached to Bucharest, to the open and constructive dialogue which existed between these two countries. It was therefore a priority relationship for Romania's policy aimed at the countries of Africa south of the Sahara; this is why Romania was interested in further strengthening bilateral political dialogue, diversifying and developing economic and sectoral cooperation, as well as pursuing close cooperation at the multilateral level, but also consulting on issues of common interest with Cameroon. Therefore, what were the priority axes of cooperation between the two countries? Was Cameroon a trade partner of Romania in Africa? What bilateral strategy was implemented to strengthen this partnership? Finally, what reflects the severance of diplomatic relations with Romania? The following analysis will answer the various main questions set out in order to better understand the role played by Romania in Cameroon in the 1970s to 1990s.

Key words: *Success Story, Relations, Bilateral, Romania, Cameroon*

Introduction

The constant development of Romania during the 1970s of trade relations and cooperation with African countries, had paved the way for the economic dynamism of the Socialist Republic of Romania and the increase in the production capacities of African countries. Sub-Saharan thus, significant progress had been made with regard to the extension of reciprocal and advantageous trade exchanges, the introduction of new forms of cooperation, payment facilities, the training and development of executives, had been signed between the Socialist Republic of Romania and Cameroon etc. These bilateral exchanges and agreements were undoubtedly the beginnings of a fruitful cooperation which lasted about 20 years. Romania transmitted to Cameroon, a young State which had acquired its independence in 1960, its experience of development and its strategies for economic growth; she also exchanged the experience that she herself

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had acquired by highlighting her natural resources and her human potential. At the same time, Cameroon sent its students to train in Romania as scholarship holders, in Romanian universities. It was the golden age of bilateral relations between the two countries, a success story. Faced with the development challenges between the two countries, what were the main directions of cooperation between the two countries? Was Cameroon a trade partner of Romania? What bilateral strategy was implemented to strengthen this partnership? Finally, what reflects the severance of diplomatic relations with Romania? The following analysis will answer various key questions set out on the one hand by locating the external diplomacy of Cameroon, the Socialist Republic of Romania and Cameroon in economic exchanges.

Cameroon's foreign diplomacy: historical itinerary, state sovereignty and interdependence (1884-1970)

A realistic and effective foreign policy: geopolitical situation, fundamental interests and moral and legal principles
In 1960, the country gained independence. It must develop its foreign policy at a time when two powerful blocs dominate the international scene and each strive to influence small and medium-sized states and thus compromise its independence. Jealous of its sovereignty, which it considers the indispensable condition for its progress and the affirmation of African dignity, Cameroon has normally chosen to stay out of the conflicts of the blocs. Since gaining independence, the United Republic of Cameroon has always proclaimed its commitment to non-alignment and has always endeavored to conform its international policy to its principles. Non-alignment, as we understand it, includes the peaceful coexistence of states with different social systems. This supposes first of all that we recognize the right of each people to resolve, in complete independence, its own affairs. This then implies absolute respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of all countries. This vision of Cameroon is included in the declaration according to which the international society of our time is characterized both by the sovereignty of States and their interdependence. Any realistic and effective foreign policy must take this double dimension into account while defining its objectives according to the geopolitical situation of the state concerned, its fundamental interests and the moral and legal principles it wishes to see guide international relations. Regarding more particularly Cameroon's foreign policy, three essential data must be taken into consideration. The first is that, located at the point of contact of several natural regions and at the point of convergence of migration routes, Cameroon is by vocation a country open to the world.
Cameroon: a point of contact for several natural regions and a point of convergence for peoples' migration routes
Crossroads of migrations and civilizations, Cameroon appears because of ethnic, linguistic and cultural diversity; as an authentic synthesis of Sudanese Africa and Bantu Africa (Njeuma, 1978: 8). Cameroon has a population of 22,292,000 inhabitants in 2019 (MINEFI, 2000: 22). This population is growing at a rapid rate of 2.8% per year. The rural population is still slightly in the majority at 51.8%. Women occupy a decisive place in agricultural production 57% as well as in downstream activities of production,

processing and marketing. It is teeming with a multitude of ethnicities. Certain linguists were the first to divide these populations into several groups: the Bantu of the South East forest, the Oubanguian family group which is located in the North East of the region and the Baka Bagombé pygmy group. Speaking of the large Oubanguian family whose classification links their affiliations, it is made up of the Gbaya, Kako, Yangéré, Bogando, Bagantou originally classified in the Sudano-Bantu group (Dugast, 1949: 12). For Guthrie these groups are classified in group A80 next to Djem, Dzimu and Bajoue (Guthrie, 1953: 45). Théophile Obenga is not left out because according to him, these groups are classified in the Bantu of the equator in position 4, next to the languages of the Ngumba groups (Obenga, 1985: 23).

The chances of a turbulent economic history: Cameroon and the triple colonial administration of Germany, England and France

German industrial heritage
The day after the signing of the Germano-douala treaty, the Germans took possession of Cameroon. The need to supply the metropolitan industry with raw materials prompts them to implement an ambitious cultural program. Thus, from 1884, the Germans undertook the development as a policy of exploitation of Cameroon. This policy had to go through the systematic exploitation of the country's wealth and establish structures responsible for animating the agricultural sector on the one hand industrial on the other (Owona, 1996: 75). With regard to agriculture and because of the favorable conditions for farming in most parts of Cameroon, the Germans had developed an agrarian policy. They proceeded first by creating large concessions with the intention of doing development by chartered companies. Thus, the territory was divided into two large concessions: the Gesellschaft Sud Kamerun and the Gesellschaft Nord-West Kamerun (Chazelas, 1931: 55). The Gesellschaft Sud Kamerun or the concessionary company of South Cameroon was created on November 28, 1898. Its founders are Julius Scharlach and Schalt Douglas. Located in the virgin forest of southern Cameroon, this concession had 7,200,000 ha. In 1908 it produced 1,214 tons of rubber for an estimated value of 4,780,000 marks. By 1909, rubber production increased considerably to 1,517 tons, the value of which was estimated at 7,751,000 marks. In 1912, he brought in the southern concession, 11.5 million marks.
The Gesellschaft Nord West-Kamerun or North West Cameroon concession company was founded in 1890. It stretched from Sanaga to the British border in the west. But its operation faced many financial difficulties. It is for this reason that the Germans abandoned the policy of large concessions to devote themselves to that of large plantations. With regard to the large plantations, the objective was to attract German capital inland, hence the question of development.
The British period
The end of the First World War in Cameroon had sounded the death knell for the German administration. The new English and French arrivals were to sign a succession of agreements, as Victor Julius Ngoh points out: In early March 1916, British and French representatives met in London and on March 4, they signed the London Agreement which formalized the picot partition of February 1916. On March 17,

Dobell issued proclamation No. 10 which fixed the boundaries between the British and French zones in Cameroon. Proclamation No 10 went into effect at midnight on March 31, 1916 and except for some slight modifications, it respect the March 4, Agreement. In April 1916, the French appointed Aymerich as commissioner in French Cameroon and a British Order-in-Council appointed Dobell as Commissioner in British Cameroon. This was the situation in former German Cameroon when the First World War ended in November 1918 and the victors prepared to punish the vanquished at the Paris Peace Settlement of 1919 to 1924 (Etoga Eily: 363).

This agreement led the allies to divide Cameroon. The British part was divided into two: Northern Cameroon in North Cameroon administered as part of Nigeria and Southern Cameroon in the South attached to the provinces of Eastern Nigeria (ANY. APA 10813: 1916: 2). On the agricultural level, the English had inherited large German plantations in southern Cameroon. However, agriculture in this part of the territory did not bring much change. Moreover, as Engelbert Mveng asserts: it seems that the English were aware of the potential of the subsoil of the region, but they had deliberately preferred to remain silent (Loung, 1973: 13). At the industrial level, nothing concrete was undertaken in this region. Because, its integration in Nigeria had been decisive in its industrial evolution.

Agricultural and industrial orientation during the French administration
France, which had just taken possession of Cameroon after the First World War, could not manage this territory like the other territories of the French colonial empire for two reasons. The great war was still in full swing and she did not know if Germany would be victorious; in which case it would lose not only this territory, but also all its other possessions in sub-Saharan Africa (Abwa, 2000: 202). It was going to set about reorganizing the whole territory on the one hand and developing the economy on the other hand (Nana, 1994: 60). At the economic level, agricultural policy in French Cameroon would later be influenced by the development theory developed by Albert Sarraut. This was intended to drain the maximum economic benefits to France before serving the interests of the colonies. The French were therefore going to develop food and industrial crops. As Florent Etoga Eily points out:

The French administration thus had the merit of having understood that a good diet was the beginning of development. To put a population of starving people to work was to condemn the country's economy to vegetate, to pretend to advance while it is stagnating if not retreating; because it is difficult to build a dynamic economy with a people undermined by hunger (Ngoh, 1990: 120).

France was therefore concerned with ensuring the extensive practice of food crops. Some rice seeds were distributed to areas where trials had been undertaken previously. Emphasis was also placed on export crops such as: Cocoa. In 1937, French Cameroon produced 2,700 tons of cocoa and in 1948, a station was created in Nkoemoun to study and disseminate this culture (Etoga: 342). Coffee Following cocoa, coffee occupied an important place in the French era. Its cultivation began in Ebolowa, Nkongsamba, and Dschang where there were huge sales. The types cultivated were Arabica coffee and Robusta coffee in 1937; 4000 tons of coffee were harvested.

In terms of tobacco and cotton, it was in 1946 that the Mission Métropolitaine des Tabacs and the Bastos Company began to market. Cotton was developed in the North where the climatic conditions were favorable to the development of this crop. Its cultivation was managed by the French Company for the Development of Textile Fibers (CFDFT). However, to extend its agricultural monopoly in Cameroon, France created agricultural promotion instruments whose objective was to regulate the agricultural sector. It is thanks to these instruments that agricultural activity developed throughout Cameroon during the French administration.

The industrial sector was not to be outdone during the French era. Here, the French were very aware of Cameroon's special status. Where, investing was risky due to the fact that the economy was already in bad shape at the end of the First World War. This is how they developed the Investment Fund for Economic and Social Development (FIDES). To achieve this goal, Sarraut asked the French government to grant loans to the colonies. After 1944, the French created (FIDES). The first FIDES plan consisted of developing Cameroon's infrastructure. This meant improving the lines of communication and building social structures. However, this program was aimed more at facilitating exports than at modernizing the territory. FIDES then devoted 85% of its allocations to the port of Douala and to the railway.

The second plan took up a number of unfulfilled objectives and extended to the development of the rural economy (Richard: 125). In total, from 1947 to 1959, 96 billion FCFA were invested in Eastern Cameroon, including 65 billion French public aid, 10 billion local funds and 21 billion private investments. It allowed the expansion of tropical agriculture in Cameroon through the creation of large plantations (Ndongko, 1987: 25). Along with the building industries which had to flourish, the exploitation of wood and natural resources occupied an important place. The French success in Cameroon was that of the construction of a hydroelectric complex (ENELCAM) on the Sanaga river at Edéa (Nwaha, 2005: 20) and ALUCAM (Laparra: 155).

Independent Cameroon and the ways of non-alignment

The policy of non-alignment is indeed the "cornerstone" of Cameroonian diplomacy. In Cairo, in October 1964, President Ahidjo will define it as a "state of permanent vigilance in front of all the powers, organized, present or to come, without bias against any a priori, but while remaining the outstretched hand for a loyal cooperation as long as there is no sacrifice of any vital interests". Hand extended towards industrialized countries, and above all towards Europe. "Without that," declares the head of state, "this can in any way alienate his independence." This double necessity will dictate the attitude towards France. On November 13, 1960, Yaoundé signed cooperation agreements with Paris, but after having given up joining the Community.

In March 1970, Yaoundé adopted the convention establishing the Agency for Cultural and Technical Cooperation, but in 1973, 1975 and 1976, President Ahidjo refused to participate in the French-speaking "summits". In February 1972, Georges Pompidou was received on an official visit to Yaoundé, but his leaders demanded the revision of the cooperation agreements. The philosophy of this policy, President Ahidjo expressed it in 1970: "I have never hidden that, Cameroon being largely

French-speaking, we were ready to participate in any cultural action with the French-speaking countries of Africa. But, on the other hand, we will not associate with anything that can resemble a war machine against the English-speaking world" (Decraene, 1970: 25). And, in fact, Cameroon maintains fruitful relations with Great Britain, the United States of America and Canada. Relations are also of good quality with Federal Germany, Italy and the Netherlands. There is therefore no reason to be surprised at the signing by Cameroon of the Yaoundé Convention of July 20, 1963, associating the countries of the Common Market with the African and Madagascan States. Nor of participation in "Yaoundé II". Nor because Cameroon is one of the forty-six African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) states which, on February 28, 1975, concluded an association agreement with the EEC in Lome. That a significant part of Cameroon's exports be directed to France (27.6% in 1971) and to the countries of the Common Market (70%) (Imbert, 1973: 113).

However, the strong relations established with many socialist countries could lead to a change in these trade flows. As early as 1962, Mr. Kanga had been in charge of goodwill missions in several popular democracies. This was to follow the establishment of diplomatic relations with the USSR. March 20, 1964. The Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Algeria and Cuba have also established relations with Yaoundé. The rapprochement with the People's Republic of China was undoubtedly more laborious. In September 1962, Mr. A. Ahidjo said: "If we had proof that Communist China ceased to integrate into our internal affairs, we could recognize it and vote for its admission to the United Nations. The successes in the fight against the U.P.C. will create a situation conducive to this normalization. The establishment of diplomatic relations will take place on March 26, 1971 (Beijing Information, 1971: 2). With, as consequences, the conclusion of an agreement on economic and technical cooperation and a trade agreement, both signed in Beijing on August 17, 1972, and, crowning it all, a trip to China by President A. Ahidjo , from March 25 to April 2, 1973. Stay marked by the signing of a new agreement under the terms of which will be granted an aid of 18 billion CFA francs

Thus, anxious to maintain relations as close as possible with many industrialized countries and an ever-increasing number of socialist states, Cameroon also intends to affirm its solidarity with the other countries of the Third World. He is one of the members (with Ghana, Nigeria, Ivory Coast, Brazil and Togo) of the Alliance of Cocoa Producing Countries (APPC) founded in May 1962. He marked his identity of view with the "brother countries" by severing its diplomatic relations with Israel, in spite of a fruitful cooperation established with Tel Aviv, especially after the visit of Mr. Ahidjo in 1963. To explain this turnaround, the head of the State insisted that the UN showed "an inability to enforce its own resolutions". But Cameroon does not limit itself to joining forces with others to denounce certain situations. He also intends to make a contribution to the construction of peace: thus he participated in the major conferences of the non-aligned (with the exception of the first): in Cairo, from October 5 to 10, 1964; in Lusaka, from September 8 to 10, 1970; finally, in Algiers from 5 to 8

The socialist republic of Romania and Cameroon in economic exchanges (1970-1990)

The dimension of the extension of trade

African actors wanted to innovate, to follow the African path. It was in this sense that they had thought that the achievement of economic and social development went through the choice of models that were proposed without adopting them. African socialism was, according to Julius Nyerere, the ideological expression of the traditional principle of solidarity. For Sédar Senghor, the African way of socialism, 'is equal opportunities in a society whose foundation is already constituted by the solidarity of its members. It is Africanness, negritude, authenticity (Senghor, 1963: 96). Ahidjo in 1962 presented the specificity of African socialism. He wanted this socialism to be substantially humanitarian; because, he borrowed from outside to graft on our heritage defined by his sense of community, his respect for spiritual values and the place he attributed to man (Anonymous, 1962: 26). The aim of this new philosophy was: a balanced development in the necessary stability and social justice to be obtained by modern technical means through the conjunction of internal efforts and the contribution of foreign aid. For Cameroon, African socialism implied human investment, or the use of the available labor potential of the masses of the people. Ahidjo stressed: It is about making up for the lack of capital in certain areas: men constitute the most precious capital of a nation, but on condition that they produce. It is the productivity of each man that ultimately determines everyone's standard of living.

It was therefore a question of provoking the transition from a civilization of gratuity to a civilization of work, of effort. This state intervention of Cameroon was to be the basis of economic exchanges between Romania and Cameroon. Promoting cooperation with developing countries is one of the important aspects of the foreign policy of the Romanian state and party; they fought and still fight to consolidate their active collaboration and solidarity with the countries and peoples who are struggling against imperialist domination and support the efforts undertaken by these peoples to safeguard their national independence, to ensure their economic and social progress and for their sake assert in the international arena. International economic cooperation is a form of superior action which allows States to join their efforts within the framework of a rapid expansion of the international division of labor, in conjunction with the current technical and scientific revolution. It helps to intensify the development of the natural resources specific to each country, to promote technical progress, to increase the quality level of production, to achieve assortments and products of a higher level through the adoption of licenses, patents and new manufacturing processes, etc. According to Gheorghe Râdulescu (Gheorghe Marcu, 1972: 53), vice-president of the Council of Ministers and head of the Romanian delegation to the Second United Nations Conference for trade and development, cooperation in production or in the scientific field and technology stimulates the development of trade between countries; compared to the classic forms of foreign trade, where the partners exchange products obtained separately, modern forms of cooperation deepen the bonds of solidarity between the partners, even in the field of production and create solid foundations for

the duration and continuity trade in goods. Besides the agreements which represents an essential factor of development planning (Gheorghe Marcu, 1972: 54).

The positive results obtained by Romania; as part of its policy of collaboration, have enabled it to conclude to date 14 economic and technical cooperation agreements, a large part of which at government level (with Algeria, the Central African Republic, Egypt, Guinea , Kenya, Morocco, Somalia, Tunisia, Tanzania, Zambia, Madagascar, Zaire Republic, etc.). The current development of the Romanian industry in the fields, in particular, of chemistry, mechanical constructions, construction equipment and the extractive industry, allows a continuous widening of the relations of cooperation with the African countries and this, of all the more so, as these relations are based on the principles already mentioned, among which that of advantage; reciprocal of the two parties occupies an essential place. In the framework of their economic relations with Romania, African countries enjoy certain advantages and effective assistance. We know how much these states desire

Decree No. 81-110 of March 14, 1981 ratifying the agreement on the reciprocal guarantee of investments between the United Republic of Cameroon and the Socialist Republic of Romania

The basic principles of the agreement: promotion and guarantee of investments, treatment of the most favored nation, expropriation and compensation. With regard to the "promotion and guarantee of investments", each contracting party undertook to encourage the promotion in its territory of investments to be made by the other contracting party. Direct and indirect investments, made in accordance with the laws and regulations in force in the territory of each contracting party, enjoyed the protection and guarantees provided for in the agreement. At the end of the agreement: the investment means any asset invested or reinvested in a company or economic activity and any increase in value and more particularly, but not exclusively: shares, shares or any other form of participation in companies incorporated in the territory of a contracting party; reinvested profits, debt rights or other rights relating to services having a financial value; movable and immovable property as well as all other real rights such as mortgages, privileges, sureties and all other similar rights, as defined by the law of the contracting party in the territory in which the said property is located; industrial property rights, technical processes, know-how, trademarks, copyright and all other similar intangible rights; concessions conferred by law or by virtue of a contract, particularly concessions relating to the prospecting, extraction and exploitation of natural resources, including in maritime areas, in accordance with the laws and regulations of each of the two contracting parties. Profits were defined as the amounts that returned from an investment in the form of dividends, odds and other income. By investors was meant: for the Republic of Cameroon: any individual or any company having legal personality in accordance with the laws in force in the United Republic of Cameroon. For the Socialist Republic of Romania: Romanian economic units having legal personality in accordance with and which in accordance with the law had powers of foreign trade and cooperation with foreigners (JOC, Decree No. 81-110, 1980: 587).

At the level of "most-favored-nation treatment", each contracting party undertook to grant in its territory, to the investments and investors of the other contracting party, treatment no less favorable than that granted to the investments and investors of any State. Third   the provisions of this Agreement concerned most-

favored-nation treatment, which did not apply to the advantages which each of the contracting parties granted to investors of any third State, on the basis of its participation in an economic or customs union, zone free trade or regional economic organization. Each contracting party undertook to comply with any other obligation it had assigned itself with regard to investments made in its territory by investments made in its territory by investors from the other contracting party.

Expropriation and compensation stipulated that: investments made by investors of one contracting party in the territory of the other contracting party could not be expropriated or subject to other measures having a similar effect unless the following conditions were met: exports and other measures having a similar effect were not discriminatory; these measures were adopted in the public interest and through legal process; an adequate procedure was foreseen to determine the amount and the method of payment of the compensation. Compensation had to correspond to the value of the investment on the date of the expropriation, be effectively realized, freely transferable and paid without delay (JOC, Decree No. 81-110: 590). Settlement of disputes relating to the amount of compensation for expropriation, repatriation of capital and profits, subrogation and transfer of currencies

At the request of the party by a court or other competent authority of the country where the investment was made. If a dispute between an investor and the contracting party in whose territory the investment is made, about the amount of compensation continues to exist after the final judgment of the court or other competent authority of the country where the investment has been carried out; each of them is authorized to raise the dispute, within two months from the exhaustion of domestic remedies or the expiration of the period provided for in the following paragraph, at the cen

Conflict of interpretation or application of this agreement, existing investments, entry into force, validity and expiry

Regarding conflicts of interpretation or application of this Agreement, any dispute between the contracting parties relating to the interpretation or application of this Agreement shall be submitted to the examination of a commission composed of representatives of both parties. . This was to meet within two months of the notification from the contracting party. If the committee could not settle the dispute, it was referred to an ad hoc committee for consideration by representatives of both parties. Furthermore, investments made by investors of one of the contracting parties in the territory of the other contracting party before the entry into force of this Agreement were also subject to the provisions of this Agreement. The agreement was subject to ratification following constitutional procedure. For investments made under this Agreement, the provisions of this Agreement remained applicable 10 years after expiration.

Conclusion

Ultimately, it appeared to us to be primordial. Namely that the bilateral relations between Romania and Cameroon were exploited by the consolidation of a certain number of existing instruments and mechanisms in order to give the actors the means of their cooperation policy, while preserving the specific interests of their population. . Romania and Cameroon, faced with immense challenges, could not ignore that they had strong assets thanks to this cooperation. Romania was committed to supporting the various projects and encouraging their realization in Cameroon as well as certain natural resources were going to support Romanian industry. Its policy of promoting foreign economic relations was based on Marxism-Leninism, as experienced by the Romanian Communist Party. Nicolae Ceausescu has often shown that: "The Romanian people follow with great sympathy the efforts of the countries recently freed from the yoke of imperialism, efforts aimed at ensuring their independent economic and social development. He wishes that important cooperation be established with these peoples in all areas of human activity". The expansion of Cameroon as well as the continued growth of the Romanian economy provided an objective basis for the achievement of the aims pursued. The Romanian party and state firmly encouraged the continuation of the efforts devoted to socialist industrialization, the pace of which must be sustained, to the intensive and diversified development of agriculture, construction, transport, etc. On the achievement of these objectives depended the general progress of Romania and the increase in the well-being of the population; it also contributed to widening economic relations between the Socialist Republic of Romania and all the countries of the world, whatever their social and political regime.

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HISTORICAL CONTEXT, STRATA AND UNITY OF MEANING: THE HERMENEUTIC MENTALITY OF ROMAN INGARDEN

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Abstract

We live in a world in which visiting a museum, listening to music or reading a book has become commonplace. Long gone are the times when only a minority was able to read or attend great concerts. We have become accustomed to move in an environment where contact with artistic creations is easy and accessible. However, if we pause to reflect or question the true meaning of art and its intrinsic nature, many would be surprised to find themselves without a clear or concise answer. It may be that if we were truly aware of art's role we would dedicate more time to contemplate and enjoy the artistic works available to us. The question of defining, delimiting or framing the notion of the "artistic" is not a trivial one. Engaging with art brings us into contact with the sublime, with that which we most need but fail to recognise or understand.

However, rapid technical or technological access to works of art does not necessarily translate into a proportional interest in art. Many look forward to their retirement to begin enjoying the pleasures of art while others frequent artistic or cultural milieux merely in order to project an image of sophistication to others, rather than out of any real personal interest; still others simply believe that art is not for them because they are too busy in their daily lives and have no interest in investing time and money in something that requires quietude and repose. Some regard art in purely decorative terms: books, artwork or records are adornments to make walls and shelves more attractive and appealing. Here art is exclusively ornamental. Within this final group are those who take a real interest in these theoretical and practical questions, themselves creators or not, who look to art simply for that which is lacking or can profoundly nourish their own lives.

But what is art? What does it consist of? The question of art is a philosophical and anthropological question. To understand art one must look beyond the merely apparent, the concrete, through a phenomenological approach where what matters is the relation we establish with what confronts us as a subject. To understand the truth of an artistic composition, if it is truly artistic, is to understand ourselves.

In this vein, we will analyse the work of the Polish thinker Roman Ingarden and his specific notion of the literary work of art as the foundation of modern aesthetics. We will thus pursue an understanding of artistic creation by exploring its essence, its ontology and epistemology within literary theory.

Key words*: Truth, Aesthetics, Tempo, Culture, Constitution*

1. ART, CONSTITUTION AND TRUTH

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The phenomenological attitude, so necessary in art, requires an approach to what exists, what is present as an entity. The artistic encompasses truth, beauty, goodness and unity, although this does not mean to suggest it is exclusively the province of a select few nor is it something subjective. As we shall explain, the essence of art, what necessarily corresponds to art, is found in transcendence. Truth, and the understanding of truth by subjects, can be defined in three ways, as three types of truth or three manners of relating to the cosmos, the beyond and ourselves: the truth of correspondence, of relativism, of hermeneutics.

The truth as correspondence is a traditionalist conception, consisting of the adequation between the subject and reality. We admit the existence of a subject and the world, independent of whether the former exists or not. Here the existence of truth is taken for granted, a truth which is beyond the opinions of any particular individual and which can be known, if not entirely then at least partially. Thus, the understanding of the subject of specific reality is correct or erroneous according to whether their judgement adjusts or not to what truly exists. Opinions, when aspiring to truth, must correspond to reality, to that which has its own entity beyond whatever we might wish it to be.

The second type of truth is relativist, proposed by Friedrich Nietzsche in the 19th century, which does not admit the existence of any objective truth as described above but rather affirms that there are as many truths as there are subjects, with all positions being equally valid and acceptable. There is no thermometer that indicates if we are correct or incorrect, only what I consider to be true or untrue in a given situation and within my own personal experience. Relativism, also known as perspectivism, validates subjective opinion, which may be imposed by force, by consensus, by manipulation or by the virtue of having obtained a majority vote. Facts do not exist, only the interpretation of facts. Thus, everything depends on human perception in relation to my physiology, my individuality, my tastes, beliefs, fears, experiences, etc. This is the absolutisation of the individual subject, the individual self.

The third type of truth is interpretive or hermeneutic. This also originated in the 19th century with Friedrich Schleiermacher and Wilhelm Dilthey, which Martin Heidegger would relate to facticity, consisting of the notion that truth is not something closed but rather arises in the encounter between reality and the subject, between the human being and what lies beyond him. In the 20th century, the Constance School, led by Hans-Robert Jauss and Wolfgang Iser, explored the aesthetics of reception in modern literature. For these authors, Ingarden's thought, as the founder of neo-hermeneutics, would serve as a starting point for their own proposals (Hermosillo, 2016: 41-42). Interpretive truth is the link between the universal and the particular, and thus is distinguished from relativism in that it considers not only the perceiving self as the subject but also external reality. Truth is constitutive; a process in which the individual participates but does not produce the facts. Knowledge is the equivalent of the bridge between what is within and without the human being. Joan Pegueroles, following on Hans-Georg Gadamer, affirmed the following: "A hermeneutic truth is only true if it is true "for me", that is, if its interests and impassions me. If it is true for everyone, impersonal, disinterested, then it is a scientific truth" (Pegueroles, 1998: 38).

What is interesting in this third option is that both the subject and what exists externally are important, the principal elements of affirmations either thought or expressed. Subjects are not the creators of the real but the creators of the relation between them, and thus give rise to a form of truth in which the self is both affected and protagonist and, to an extent, the recreator of reality. The result of the relation of each individual with what exists is unique and particular, never foundational, although contributing to the reality of which we form a part. At the moment we discover for ourselves, the known acquires a new significance, suggestive and specific to ourselves.

Hermeneutics admits the existence of truth as correspondence or adequation, something also present in art. This means that when we contemplate a work of art we discover an aspect of reality which helps us to understand ourselves. Art refers us directly back to ourselves, inevitably leading us to question the meaning of our own existence:

> "See thus, hermeneutics allows the possibility of approximation to any text, understood not as a closed or limited text but precisely as a living experience evidenced by the wide-eyed wonder of those living or contemplating it appropriating or integrating it into their understanding, and what's more, their self-understanding" (Prado, 1987: 26).

For the literary work of art, the attempt to identify a work exclusively with the experience of the author is absurd, as this considers only one aspect of the work and ignores the artistic dimensions of the created composition. If, on the contrary, we exclude the experience of the author, we are left with only a series of graphics printed on the page. Another option we must also rule out is to consider the work as the product of the experiences or points of view of its readers. In this way, for example, there would be countless Hamlets with each reading producing a radically new work. In this case, the literary is considered as a means of provoking pleasurable experiences. The work of art requires a rational animal to become materialised; once created it becomes more than a mere physical entity, a text. In the words of Ingarden:

> "If we wish to avoid this absurdity and adhere to our assertion that each literary work is something that in itself is one and identical, it appears that we must consider the stratum of meaningful words and sentences a component part of the literary work" (Ingarden, 1998: 34-36).

Thus, the author rejects two prevalent literary theories of his time; neo-positivism, which reduces the work to its mere physical aspect, to letters on a page; and psychologism, which maintains that a work cannot be subjected to scientific analysis because it resides exclusively in the experience of the reader. As we shall see, Ingarden's phenomenological approach opposes these conceptions as well as the dichotomy between realism and idealism. The phenomenological approach is thus a constitutive attitude, a hermeneutic attitude in which the subject participates in reality, reclaiming its proper place in the state of things. In order to be understood, the world and art need our collaboration, hence the importance of returning to the ideas of this thinker, often

poorly understood and unknown: "(…) the work of Ingarden in its original state has been scarcely studied and confronted with the most elemental principles of Husserl's phenomenology, to which Ingarden himself pays tribute" (Carrillo, 2015: 7).

2. THE VALUE OF HISTORICAL-LITERARY ART IN ROMAN INGARDEN

As we have mentioned, the hermeneutic approach is proposed by, among other authors, the Polish philosopher Roman Witold Ingarden (1893-1970), especially well-known for his studies of art and literature. Ingarden was part of a privileged group of students around Edmund Husserl at the German universities of Göttingen and Freiburg, witness to the development of modern phenomenology on which he would base his concept of the work of art on the basis of the aesthetics of reception (Warning, 1989: 14). Ingarden taught at the Lvov (Łódź, Poland) and the Jagiellonian (Jagiellónski, Krakow) universities, until 1945 when a Stalinist commission accused him of propagating "idealist" doctrines and he was dismissed and his books banned from publication for twelve years. In 1957, the Polish communist authorities permitted the publication of certain previously banned works, including those of Ingarden, and reinstated a number of university professors. Thus, Ingarden returned to the Jagiellonian University where he taught until his retirement a few years later. He died suddenly on June 14th, 1970, of a cerebral haemorrhage.

As mentioned above, Ingarden produced a great deal of work on the importance of art, its ontology and epistemology, from a phenomenological perspective. In literary theory, his most renowned work, *The Literary Work of Art* (Das literarische Kunstwerk), is a radiographical study which offer a different perspective of the literary works: "It's an x-ray vision of a work to identify the essence of its different layers and the function of each one of them" (Mendoza, 2008: 28). Published in German in 1931, the Polish version was not published until almost thirty years later in 1960, the same year a second German edition was produced. *The Literary Work of Art*, as the present study will show, is fundamental to understanding Ingarden's intuitions and initial propositions regarding art and its ontological foundations. According to Nyenhuis, this work is an essential starting point in the study of Ingarden's literary theories, presenting basic concepts on the existence and essential structure of a literary work of art (Nyenhuis, 1998: 17). Ingarden would later write another work on these themes in *The Cognition of the Literary Work of Art* (*Vom Erkennen des Literischen*), expanding on his aesthetic epistemological research and the concepts expressed in the former work.

Attempting to engage in a literary work of art as if it were a mathematical formula is, at the very least, illogical. Art is not limited to personal experience, but rather is immense, inexhaustible and uncertain. Furthermore, there are two different approaches to the study of a work of art: that which refers to artistic creation itself and that which refers to the ontology of the work; following our author we will address this second question of the produced, complete and concluded work of art: "We consider a literary work as completed where the enunciations and individual words, all of those appearing in it, have been unequivocally defined and fixed their meaning in the verbal sounds and in the global structure" (Ingarden, 1998: 41). In the gestation process, the work of art is conditioned by the ideas, sentiments and tastes of the author; this is a necessary and self-evident process dependent on the relation between the psychic life of the author

and the artistic results; here we can differentiate two of the alluded stages or processes, the generative and the ontological.

Art seeks relation, the encounter of a person with themselves through beauty. Hermeneutics thus consists of the relation between the theorical meaning of a subject and the particularities of the text which leads to its contemplation. It is the individual's frame of reference that comes into play when contemplating a work. Art invites us to reflect, helps us to understand ourselves as human beings. Reflection is an act of return to oneself; here the subject recaptures, through intellectual clarity and with moral responsibility, the unifying principles which underlie the actions in which it is normally dispersed and unremembered as a subject. We explore and delve into the hidden depths of ourselves thanks to art, itself inexhaustible, that helps us to continue living. Artistic greatness resides in connecting the work with lived experience and to advance, to carry on.

Awareness of a literary text and the awareness of ourselves is a difficult task in the world of today where we are subjected to constant and fleeting stimuli. We seem to be led towards a banal and vacuous existence, carrying out innumerable tasks empty of purpose or meaning. In our experience, it seems more important to buy and view rather than observe and contemplate. Through social media, for example, we expose ourselves constantly to a numberless audience, most often unknown to us, eager to know what we eat, buy or the exact location of our hairdresser. We take our pictures and tell our stories but we do not relate. Reality is something more than mere appearances, and this something, although often dissipated in our daily tasks and routines, accompanies us as a silent, diffuse and mysterious necessity. This something is part of our human nature to which we can connect, although momentarily or even partially, and savour through the experience of art which itself is transcendental.

3. STRATA OF THE LITERARY WORK OF ART

In analysing the nature of a literary work of art, Roman Ingarden affirms that a work of literature is a purely intentional object having within itself a basic structure. Both are characteristic of all works of art, which allows us to make a general ontological analysis based on these fundamental qualities. Regarding intentionality, and, to truly capture Ingarden's meaning, we must dismiss the consideration of a work of literature as either a real or as an ideal object. In the first case, we would thus affirm its independent and isolated existence, beyond individual consciousness and, in the second case, the existence of the work depends on this consciousness to exist. That Ingarden raises both of these notions indicated his interest in the concrete mode of being and dynamic of art; for Ingarden art's importance lies in its hermeneutic structure, its intentional meaning. That the artistic is a purely intentional object is presented as a solution to the realist and idealist question; it is not a choice between these two theories but rather to understand and reinstate the constitutive element as the ontological basis. The work of art is always in reference to something, neither existing independently from me nor depending exclusively on my individual consciousness for its existence; art and the subject who contemplates it are completely interrelated, and it is precisely in this phenomenological approach that the internal and external of the subject are joined: "The object transcends consciousness and at the same time is intentionally in the

consciousness intentionally, not really" (Tornero, 2007: 454). This does not mean that we cannot differentiate between the object and the act of knowing it: "This consists in considering all act of knowledge is strictly different from the corresponding object of knowledge or, in other words, that to gain knowledge, a completely new act of knowledge is necessary" (Crespo, 2006: 7).

With regards to its essential and common structure, the literary work is a formation constructed by a number of heterogenous strata in which are found the aesthetic values that make a literary piece a work of art. Specifically, there are four strata present and necessary in every creation: 1. The stratum of "verbal sounds", related to phonic material. 2. The stratum of "meaning units", elements of meaning in words or sentences. 3. The stratum of "represented objects", which refers to the relations between orational phrases, many indeterminate. 4. The stratum of "multiple schematised aspects" or the objects represented in the works, where the reader incorporates what is written into their experience. Over the course of the work, Ingarden always places the first two strata in the same order while the third and fourth are occasionally in reverse order, indicating that the disposition of the final two attributes is less important. The present work will also analyse the metaphysical qualities of a work which, far from being an additional stratum which Ingarden himself occasionally situates in a fifth position, is a value that affects the composition as a whole; thus, we have considered it fundamental to address this aspect separately. Each stratum is evident within this totality of the work, providing a specific element to the general composition and so contributing to the relational unity of the work. In the words of the author:

> "The diversity of the material and the roles or functions of the individual strata makes the whole work, not a monotonic formation, but one that by its nature has a polyphonic character. (...) n particular, each of the strata has its own set of attributes which contribute to the constitution of the qualities of aesthetic value" (Ingarden, 1998: 52).

The literary work of art is thus a multi-stratified composition, indivisible, in which remains a single unity. The interrelation between its compositional elements is fundamental as it is the interplay between them and the heterogeneity of its dialogues that make it subject to different concretisations and thus forming a whole, polyphonic harmony containing indeterminate spaces. The work therefore requires a reader with artistic sensibility, a reader who approaches the work with an understanding of its aesthetic rather than psychological, economic or historical value. It is the human being who actualises and gives meaning to art: "It is the aesthete who reads a literary work as a work of art" (Nyenhuis, 1939: 18). We will now define each of these strata to identify their specific scope and meaning.

3.1. Stratum of the linguistic formation of sound

Linguistic formations are the material substrate of a literary work of art, fixing the ideas and the work of an author. This is the frame, the fixed, external structure which, as we shall see, is indispensable in making the other strata possible and where

they find their support (Ingarden, 1939: 79 and 82). The phonetic is not a means but is rather the foundation and constitutive part of literature.

In every linguistic formation, from a literary work to a dialogue, we distinguish the phonic material and word sounds, where a single word is the most basic and original linguistic formation. Roman Ingarden distinguishes between specific phonic material, new and different in each case depending on distinct aspects such as intonation, volume or timbre, and the verbal sound whose function consists in determining the sound of a word. As the author affirms: "Although a single word may be spoken many times, and the specific phonic material is always new, the *verbal sound* remains the same" (Ingarden, 1998: 58).

That is, the verbal sound provides the intentional meaning of the phonic material, requiring exclusive attention to capture its meaning and to achieve its assigned function. The link between both terms is accidental and arbitrary, thus, any sound could be associated with any meaning. The meaning of a word requires the existence of an external frame of reference within which it can be expressed and understood. The following graphic shows how we are able to go beyond phonic material:

Phonic material with meaning = isolated word (phoneme)
Verbal sound = determines the meaning of a word

Graphic 1. Authors: Romero, C., Lozano, V.

Both in living language and in literary works the word is never, or almost never, isolated or solitary as an independent linguistic unit; in a grammatical oration words are linked together to produce what the author calls an "orational melody" (Ingarden, 1998: 65-66). The phonic formation of oration now constitutes an ensemble of meaning that cannot be evoked in the same way as particular sounds. The isolated word, known in linguistics as the phenome, is the same as the phonic material which, placed in an orderly manner with other words (oration), produces a verbal sound that includes rhythm, meter, phonic patterns, physiognomy and feeling to the words (Wellek, 1981: 58).

Grammatical oration = union of words
Verbal sounds = determine the meaning of grammatical orations

Graphic 2. Authors: Romero, C., Lozano, V.

With regards to the rhythm of a literary work, it is important to underscore its importance and relation to the phenomenon of *tempo*. It is also important to distinguish between regular rhythm, producing a succession of equal accents, a free rhythm, which rests on the repetition of certain sequences of sounds, accentuated or not accentuated: "A rhythm imposed on a text can deform, change or disguise the immanent rhythm" (Ingarden, 1939: 69). This rhythm is new every time, given the many and varied readers of a work, also affecting the emotional qualities of the sound and the artistic meaning;

it is not the same to approach a work with sadness than with melancholy or with joy. The latent artistic emotion explains, for example, how a poem read aloud can often transmit something even if we do not understand the language. Thus, the phonic qualities of the language of a literary work are not neutral but are subject to the affectivity of the reader. Here we see the union between the phonic and the semantic. As human beings, none of our acts are neutral; we take different actions or have thoughts to make what surrounds us our own. We are those who grant the status of art to artistic works.

Words, orations and verbal sounds have always had a historical development in close relation with the life of communities and peoples; there are words which over the course of time acquire diverse connotations or fall out of use. It is the subject who, at all times, makes phonic material what it is and imbues it with meaning. In this way, we are able to identify the meaning of an oration, although the words which make it up have diverse meanings.

3.2. Stratum of meaning units

The stratum of meaning units is the semantic stratum. Its importance lies in making possible the understanding of the other strata, beginning here at the level of the hidden, the interpretive. Meaning units not only determine the elements represented as characters, actions or time but also the way in which these are represented in schematised aspects, thus having their own voice in the polyphony of the work, influencing in its specific design and of singular importance in the construction of other strata although these meaning units normally go unnoticed. When an author gives life to a work or the readers engage with it, they are not aware of the existence of this construction of orations which establishes bridges and connections; in fact, the invisibility or transparency of this stratum is the best indication that a work is well structured.

The aesthetic is thus the union of two artistic poles, the work and the audience; every work has material content and formal content in which artistic value requires a physical structure. As a reader, I reconfigure the work based on the decision of the author. The most sublime aesthetic perception rests on understanding and the rational aspect of the work of literary art is essential; that is, the presence of *logos* as an essential element of the configuration which gives a specific ontic which distinguishes the literary work of art from other art forms (Ruíz, 2006: 43). In this way, Ingarden affirms that in the literary sphere, the formation of a work may never be entirely irrational; a work must be intellectually comprehensible. The rational is the starting point to reach the irrational, something which, in other artistic manifestations such as music or painting is not the case. The enjoyment we experience then is not extasy, although it is a state of pleasurable calm, a feeling of satisfaction with the beautiful and the positive, which is not the case with negative values. (Ingarden, 1998: 251, 256 and 257). The stratus of meaning commands the polyphony of the work, giving rise to beauty and ugliness. There are mediocre works which do not move the reader because they lack the substratum crafted by the author. There are also disharmonious works where there is a discordance between the aspects represented and the style of the work.

No literary work is entirely and precisely structured and circumscribed nor is it required to be so. In fact, literary works contain indeterminant elements which require *concretisation* by the reader, their rational imagination and perception. This fact or stratum would explain why we consider literary places and characters as real, as well as their personal histories or experiences. The dependence of a literary work on its readers is evident. The potential aesthetic value of a work of literature is revealed when we read it, providing the reading leads us to *concretisation* and not the contrary, since in this way we are performing another type of activity. The artistic object, if not experienced and *concretised*, cannot be catalogued as an aesthetic object; consequently, only the intentional expropriation by the interpreter by means of *concretisation* can provide access to this aesthetic transformation (Argüelles, 2015: 74). Part of the charm of a work of literary art, it's aesthetic delight, rests in the ambiguities it presents both in individual words and in complete orations. If one wished to improve or retouch a work, or even add new ambiguities, we would be speaking of a work of art that is now different from the original.

It is important to recall Roman Ingarden's direct relation with the phenomenology of Edmund Husserl, which oriented his thought and work. Ingarden maintains that the literary work of art is a purely intentional object, always referring to something, to subjects or readers. We can distinguish between individual and intentional objects, the latter being themselves transcendent while the former are independent of conscious actions. The intentional is ontically heteronymous, finding its ontic basis not in the real but rather in the imagination of the subject which makes it possible and projects its essence. For example, on an individual level there is no such thing as a square circle, something which on an intentional level would be possible although it cannot be intuitively imagined. The intentional in art, as opposed to ontic and autonomous objectivities, individual, may contain elements which contradict the real world. Objects in the real world self-present themselves, they are exhibited. Our relation to objects represented in literary art is intuitive, imaginative, and thus schematised aspects are necessary.

Orations produce what Ingarden calls *intentional correlation*, which is opalescent and polysemic, since each oration corresponds to a single correlation and no more; thus the meaning assigned by the receptor may be invalid and not do justice to all the possible readings of a specific work of literature. The *intentional correlation* is neither object nor behaviour but rather a set of non-objective circumstances. Each oration, without exception, also has its *derived correlation*, arising from the *intentional* and without being completely ambiguous since it is only through the determinate that the indeterminate can be evoked.

3.3. Stratum of represented objects

The third stratum is that of represented objects, normally associated with the literary work of art, the characters and events they are involved in, referring to things, and characters, occurrences and actions. Evidently, a work of literary art is something more than the objects represented therein, although when we read it the first thing we perceive is precisely these. We may even think that, if someone were to ask what we were reading we would refer to what is represented in the work, that which situates us

in the story and allows us to visualise and understand the plot. We must take into account that, in literature, the actions or course of events are essentially related to the ontology of the work; it is in what is represented that we discover metaphysical qualities.

The represented objects, characters and structure of the work are intentional, the specific content may be real or ideal. That is, invites us to relate and intervene as constitutive subjects, rather than creators, of the unfolding of the story where what is most fundamental are the elements that appear and those that do not, thus producing its true identity. As receptors we access and make our own the worlds represented by the creators, thus making possible a hermeneutic literary relation or access. According to Ingarden: With regards to represented characters, these are derived objects, purely intentional and projected by the meaning units (Ingarden, 1998: 260). It is important to revisit the idea, commented and defended on many occasions by the author, that the work is also a representation produced by its readers. In reading, we actualise what we read, incorporating it into our space, time and circumstances: "The act of understanding is a dynamic structure and the engine of this dynamism is in the text" (Lledó, 1991: 31). The reader fits what they read into their world, their history and their reality. This third stratum is connected to the previous two and, as we shall see, also with the following stratum. Representation is produced by meaning units, made possible through phonic material, and by assigning, as we shall see, schematised aspects to the represented objects.

But what is represented cannot by directly identified with the real. Consider, for example, the literary representation of the city of Madrid and the real Madrid. These are two different spaces that never intersect physically; one being representation space while the other is imaginational space. In this case, if there is a reference to Madrid in a text, and I am familiar with Madrid, I am able to visualise it thanks to my intuitive imagination. But what if I imagine something which does not and has never existed? Imagining the non-existent is possible, something Ingarden calls imagined space, just as I can imagine a unicorn or a siren. What determines the space and our means of accessing it is the type of object referenced: represented, imaginational and imagined. Thus, the three types of space Ingarden refers to combine in a certain manner the philosophical doctrines of phenomenology, realism and idealism. Ingarden brings together in literature the real, the ideal and the imagined. For him, represented space is properly literary, taking as its point of departure and origin that what exists beyond the specific individual, who integrates it into their own experience and particularity and thus forming a hermeneutic phenomenological unity. Regarding realism, the existence of the real world does not depend on the individual consciousness, integrated by the author in what he calls the imaginational space. Finally, idealism maintains that reality depends exclusively on the subject, finding its parallels in the imagined space. The following graph outlines the relation between spaces and knowledge:

SPACES	**REFERENCED OBJECTS AND KNOWLEDGE**

Represented space: • Present in the literary work	Represented object: • Its existence depends on the human being • Phenomenology
Imaginational space: • Exists independent of the subject	Imaginational object: • May or may not be known by the reader • Realism
Imagined space: • Constructed individually (does not exist imaginationally)	Imagined object: • Its existence depends on the subject • Idealism

Graphic 3. Authors: Romero, C., Lozano, V.

The graph does not represent a work exactly and should be regarded in the broadest sense. The literary work is never exhaustive, does not express or communicate everything indicated or suggested within, there are always indeterminate elements which in fact form a part of its ontology. Reading is not a passive act; in reading we reconstruct and connect with a reality in which we participate, patches which remain undefined or indeterminate are defined by the reader, who "fills in" these gaps. The greatest literary works fire our creativity, giving insight into ourselves and it is precisely in these indeterminate patches which make this possible, since just as in life, literature is not precisely defined and circumscribed, there is always a fog of indeterminacy surrounding it. We see this, for example how Albert Camus, awarded the Nobel Prize for Literature in 1957, describes the city of Oran at the opening of his novel *The Plague*. Although here we offer merely a brief fragment, as readers we cannot help but imagine the way of life of the workers in the city, the climate they 'endure' every day, their loves and hates, their manner of doing things, etc. We cannot avoid taking what is written and going beyond what is represented:

> "Perhaps the easiest way of making a town's acquaintance is to ascertain how the people in it work, how they love, and how they die. In our little town, perhaps an effect of the climate, all three are done on much the same lines, with the same feverish yet casual air. The truth is that everyone is bored and devotes himself to cultivating habits. Our citizens work hard, but solely with the object of getting rich" (Camus, 1996: 297-298).

A reality is represented in literature which cannot be reflected in its fluid continuity, can never be fully represented. The representation of time in literature is usually analogous to real time, although it may have special particularities or be order differently for the way time is experienced in the real world. The represented is not merely a copy of the real, hence its artistry, its beauty.

3.4. Stratum of schematised aspects

It may be helpful to begin this section corresponding to the final literary stratum, schematised aspects, referring again to the unity and interrelation of all the strata. Schematised aspects are neither physical nor concrete; they belong to the structure of the work and at the same time are isolated, playing a special and signifying role as we are dealing with a work of literary art (Ingarden, 1998: 311). Hence, this fourth stratum is not properly a part of the work because its purpose is to actualise the potentiality of the contents of the work.

The existence of schematised aspects is determined by a set of projected circumstances, meaning that all schematised aspects belong to the represented objects where both strata are coordinated. In some works, or even in parts of some works, schematised aspects are prepared, *kept ready* for actualisation on the part of the reader. Hence it is necessary to view the work in its own terms and nature, not confusing it with specific or individual concretisations. For a work to be considered artistic, and to meet its aesthetic function, schematised aspects must be at the disposition of the work, otherwise these would depend on the numerous readers actualising them individually. The following graph outlines the relation between represented objects and schematised aspects:

Schematised aspects = necessarily present in the represented objects
Actualisation of schematised aspects = readers

Graphic 4. Authors: Romero, C., Lozano, V.

Although schematised aspects apport aesthetic value to the polyphonic harmony of the literary work, the correct reading of the work will depend on the aesthetic sensibilities of the reader, essential to set the literary work in motion. There are two functions which Ingarden assigns to schematised aspects. The first consists in constructing represented objects and the second, in making possible the realisation of inherent metaphysical qualities, essential for the aesthetic perception of the work. Schematised aspects reveal the represented objects in the work and the reader, in actualising them, completes them, incorporates them and integrates them into their own personal experience. The reader schematises within the scope of their own personal experience which is made possible because the text never reflects everything, it contains indeterminate spaces which must be concretised. Reading implies reconstructing, filling the indeterminate gaps within the literary work: "Reading great works of literature helps to construct our own world in that these works, thanks to their descriptive power, requires us to reconstruct our vision of the world and respond to their pretensions to truth from a defined position" (Valdés, 1955: 61).

4. METAPHYSICAL QUALITIES AS A UNION OF TEMPOS

The metaphysical qualities of a literary work of art are manifested in the objects represented, a quality which reveals the metaphysical reality which surrounds us in an indescribable atmosphere far from grey and opaque daily life. The artistic and the metaphysical, of different a nature, form an inseparable unity, where the metaphysical

is the aim of the artistic and the artistic is an instrument of the aesthetic. Here the terms metaphysical and aesthetic are used interchangeably, since metaphysical qualities are manifested in the aesthetic values present in art. This is something lacking in scientific writings as these are not called upon to be works of art and normally do not have metaphysical qualities and, in the remote case they do, this is merely by chance as the aim of scientific texts is to disseminate or communicate the results of scientific research.

The metaphysical is not the property of objects but depends on the psychic state of the subject. The metaphysical is the sublime, the impacting or the sad which breaks into ordinary life; it is a discordant note in the daily routines of life, illuminating our existence due to something which stands out beyond all else. The origin of the metaphysical is found in the different, in that which contrasts and differs from the ordinary, which breaks into quotidian reality. Whether this is an enchanting or a frightful experience is irrelevant; the key lies in the significant and extraordinary. In its specific form, the metaphysical cannot be circumscribed within the purely rational; it surrounds us to reveal the profundity of existence which normally goes unperceived and to which we are normally blind. In the metaphysical mysterious and hidden meaning is revealed as the height of existence. According to Ingarden:

> "These 'metaphysical' qualities, as we like to call them, revealed from time to time, are what makes life worth living, and, whether we wish it or not, a secret longing for their concrete revelation lives in us and drives us in all our affairs and days. Their revelation constitutes the summit and the depths of existence" (Ingarden, 1998: 342).

It is existence, being and eternity which is revealed to us in these concrete aesthetic moments, placing us at the centre of what is manifested. It is as if we live in constant wait, longing, desiring that from time to time, even for a fleeting moment, life is revealed resplendent before us; it does not matter if this frightens us, if it makes us feel small and insignificant, if we see ourselves contingent. We want life to surprise us, we want a moment of plenitude that reminds us that life is worth living (Ruíz, 2006: 159). Metaphysical qualities are resplendent moments of life which banish our routine and meaningless existence although there are degrees of intensity, and a work of art cannot be understood in its entirety.

As we have mentioned, it is difficult to define the metaphysical and its effects with any precision or exactitude, difficult to understand and experience this quality which, in a certain way, makes us treasure it all the more. Aesthetic impact consists in being entirely in the world and at the same time beyond it. It is neither purely rational nor passional. Pedragosa defines it so: "In the aesthetic experience we do not perceive a world different from the world of perceived objects, but this same world is perceived differently: with an intensity of the *here and now* where perception takes place" (Pedragosa, 2013: 271). There is no magistral formula nor is it the same for every person. The metaphysical is a mystery which affects us entirely, overwhelming and helping us understand ourselves: "To understand oneself is to understand oneself in terms of the text and receive from it the conditions of a self different from the self reading the text" (Ricoeur, 2000: 204).

The realisation of the metaphysical in ourselves is, as proposed by Ingarden, a special grace which is granted at some moments in our lives. Unfortunately, the desire for the metaphysical does not necessarily lead us to it and may even be an impediment to experiencing it. During the course of our lives there are situation in which the metaphysical becomes apparent in strange and varied ways, affecting us even when we do not experience it entirely. Hence the longing for the infinite of the aesthetic, the engine of many of our actions, especially the drive for philosophical understanding and artistic creativity.

Ingarden suggests that the truth of a work of art is not a condition of the possibility of its existence. A work is not considered art if it lacks metaphysical qualities, which also inhibits the possibilities of polyphonic harmony (Ingarden, 1998: 355 and 432). Literature connects to our existence, permitting a pleasurable and serene contemplation summoning our feelings and emotions. It is precisely in today's world, in which we are overwhelmed with information, that works of art which connect us with mystery and quietude are more necessary than ever: "Art, in particular, can give us, at least in microcosms and as a reflection, what we can never achieve in real life: the calm contemplation of metaphysical qualities" (Ingarden, 1998: 344).

The work of art should make space for the world, open towards it. In art, the effort to articulate an explanation and understanding is permanently ongoing, where interpretation is a dialectic of understanding and explanation which goes beyond the immanent meaning of the text itself. Art consists of expressing being. Being supposes the union of time and memory. Being implies the actualisation of potential, making what we read, see or hear have meaning in first person. To do our thing. This is the hermeneutic attitude. If we delve into the concept of the metaphysical as a branch of philosophy dedicated to the study of nature and the causes or origins of any aspect of the real, we understand that metaphysics is the basis or origin of all else, the foundation of all the other sciences or fields of knowledge throughout history.

But the metaphysical would not exist unless the literary did not connect in some way to the human, having within the text a manifest anthropology in which my being is recognised and transcended. In this sense, Ricoeur affirms that emotional experience can only be expressed through language, and how we pass from desire to expression. In a certain sense, what we desire or want takes form in expression. There is no emotional experience, no matter how disguised, dissimulated or distorted it may be, which cannot be revealed in the light of language and thus express its meaning and so permit desire to enter the sphere of language (Ricoeur, 2000: 203).

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THE FORMATTING OF SPACE AND TIME IN TOTALITARIAN HISTORICAL DISCOURSE
(ON THE EXAMPLE OF SOVIET HISTORIOGRAPHY)

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Abstract

The subject of this article is the influence of socio-political engagement in non-democratic societies on the formation of scientific and historical discourse and on its further functioning and use for non-historical – political and educational purposes. It is analyzed not only from the point of view of the unique features inherent exclusively to totalitarianism, but rather as a derivative of socio-political requests for history that arise and are realized in any society, constantly becoming more complex over time. For Soviet totalitarianism, a characteristic feature of such requests was the absolutization of revolutions, which were interpreted as pivotal, milestone events that signified the main content of the progress of social development at literally all its stages. Because of this, Soviet historiography and the historiography of countries dependent on the USSR was characterized by attempts to "conceptually update the status" of a number of historical events, even those that preceded revolutions in their generally accepted meaning. In addition, an in-depth study of revolutions was characterized by the introduction of new terminology into scientific circulation and the identification of new elements of the division of historical time and space within revolutions. The article examines this side of the problem, in particular, on the examples of formatting the chronological framework of the Eighty Years War for the Independence of the Netherlands ("Dutch bourgeois revolution" in Soviet terminology), as well as on the example of the officially accepted periodization of the 1917 revolution in Russia and the called "Triumphal march of Soviet power". Since reformatting the historical time of revolutions was not the only purpose of processing the past, the article focuses on other examples of such formatting. First of all, this concerns military operations on the Eastern Front of World War II, which turned into the Great Patriotic War under the pen of Soviet scientists by analogy with the Patriotic War of 1812, which laid the foundation for its subsequent absolutization and sacralization.

Key words: *Historiography, revolution, space and time structures, scientific research, totalitarianism.*

Introduction

Scientific historiography evolves to the extent of its ability to develop new perspectives on the historical past. What seemed to contemporaries to be "the exploits of Alexander the Great", subsequent generations consider as the "Military campaigns.", and later it is no longer reduced to the actions and motivations of the Macedonian king alone – it highlights components that refer historians to categories and processes at other levels: socio-economic, civilisational, and so on. A powerful multi-level background is added to the history of the "Military campaigns": "Hellenism", "pre-Hellenism", "The Crisis of the Athenian Polis". The campaign of Alexander the Great, it turns out, opens a whole new era of antiquity – the era of Hellenism. Thus, the development of new perspectives is, in fact, the development of

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new meanings. The statement of their identity reveals a hitherto undisclosed problem in the history of historical science – the issue of considering changes in the parametric characteristics of scientific research of the past. However, it is impossible to say that this issue was previously formulated and covered in this way. For a more detailed study of the topic, the method of analysis was used, particularly the works of the outstanding German historian R. Koselleck and other scientists. Romantic historiography of the 19th century began to actively draw attention to the events that led to radical changes in society, leaving no one indifferent. Accordingly, social revolutions become the subject of scientific interest. Revolutionary changes met with resistance from reactionary forces and led to the polarisation of society, which often resulted in external and civil wars. Therefore, the standard of perception in Modern period is the consideration of peculiar pairs "revolution-war". The most striking example here is the standard of consideration of the French Revolution of the late 18th century, in which the presentation of revolutionary changes within the country is organically combined with the story of the intervention of European monarchies. The Napoleonic wars are also considered in an indissoluble connection with the revolution (later this will lead to a discussion in French historiography about the chronological boundaries of the French Revolution since it will no longer be possible to determine them without taking into account the revolutionary component in the Napoleonic Wars). Later the introduction of such objects was often motivated by non-historical goals (justification of pro-government ideologues) and was driven by the social order. In a 2018 article, we proposed a definition of such actions as a conceptual status update. An example of this is the attempt of Soviet Marxist historiography to introduce revolutions as objects in the study of the periods that actually preceded the first revolutions in the history of mankind.

The use of new angles of observation in historiography has brought to life the processes that formed its essential feature in Modern and Contemporary history. Previously, historians chose and studied the objects of research in the form in which they were presented in the sources (that is, they processed them, giving their consideration a scientific character in accordance with the dominant standard of science), feeling that they had no power to change them. Now there is an idea to format research objects depending on their goals and even introduce new objects. Historical science ceases to recognise the structural integrity of objects, and, consequently, the inviolability of their chronological and geographical boundaries (Chekanov, 2018: 75). Spatial and temporal coordinates of objects are actively changed and redefined by the authors of research depending on their research programs. But it's not just about new ways to divide historical space and time. The Modern History historiography also actively introduces completely new objects, unknown to the authors of sources: a classic example of such an experimental strategy is the "Hundred Years ' War" (a concept unknown to its contemporaries) (Basovskaya, 2007: 128-129).

First of all, the application of new research strategies concerned interstate conflicts and wars, which by definition were not considered equally by the parties involved in them. But even in relation to wars in which the "friend-foe" opposition has long lost its emotional colouring, which would make their perception "alive" and relevant for us, new trends are also becoming an effective factor. Such objects as

interstate wars of the ancient world are actively reformatted; this is facilitated by the fact that the emotional attitude to events, for example, the Punic Wars, cannot be preserved if there are no direct indications of sources (Korabliov, 1981: 205). This is impossible due to the extinction of society and public consciousness – non-historical factors that determined the attitude of witnesses to events, partly reflected in the sources. As for the parts that have not been preserved, we cannot reproduce, say, the reaction to Hannibal's invasion of Italy during the Second Punic war, since we can no longer imagine a society that obeys its Council of Elders (the Senate) and is motley in terms of the civil status of ethnic groups in its composition (Roman citizens, allies, Italic peoples) (Chekanov, 2018: 75). Accordingly, the perception of events reported by the authors of sources in a format that has lost its relevance for us is distorted: we perceive the Third Punic War (149-146 BCE) a priori as liberation and patriotic resistance to Roman aggression (Korabliov, 1981: 198) not only because of this definition in the narrative but because we see it through the prism of our historical experience. Nevertheless, we do not realise that the experience was formed in a positive way by the liberation and patriotic resistance of the French Republic to the coalition of European monarchies at the end of the 18th century. The historian and the history he describes have a different past (Chekanov, 2018: 76).

If we return to the Hundred Years 'War already mentioned above, then on its example we can understand the reasons for the introduction of innovations: unlike witnesses of events who experienced them directly, subsequent generations have a need to determine their vector in relation to them: there is a necessity to establish the significance of the Hundred Years' War for history. The fact that for contemporaries it broke up into a series of chaotic conflicts and reconciliations, among which it was necessary to survive and the engines of which remained hidden, did not provide satisfaction for this very need. Therefore, later historians introduced the name-identifier, under the auspices of which the events of 1337-1453 were first considered holistically. In addition, historians should take into account the difference between the conscious and unconscious (but realistic) nature of war and their mutual influence. In its identification, levels are distinguished that can be characterised from a "long-term perspective" or "human scale". The perception of war becomes more complicated depending on who considers it: a witness or a historian, a participant or a victim, from what time and spatial distance (Favier, 2012: 257). Wars and revolutions in historiography have become the objects to which their re-identification is being actively applied in Modern history: what contemporaries saw as a chaos of events that were not united by an inner meaning changes its character under the influence of seeing history as a process.

Formation of Objects of Scientific and Historical Research

In relation to the events of ancient history and the Middle Ages, the use of the term "revolution" can only be applied by analogy inspired by comparison with later events. However, this application is absolutely inherent in totalitarian thinking (Camus, 2017: 153). In Soviet historiography of the mid-20th century, the concept of "slave revolution" was common and used to describe the destructive changes in the late Roman Empire, which accompanied its collapse (Zhukov, 1956: 463-465). The

speculative, artificial nature of this construction was obvious, it never managed to displace the key concept of "the Great Migration of Peoples" from the description of events, and after the collapse of the USSR, it was gradually withdrawn from use. Modern science considers the destruction of the Roman Empire as a result of barbarian invasions, and this corresponds to the emotional perception of contemporaries of events, as far as the authors can reconstruct it according to sources (Musset, 2006: 305). Marxist historiography has also introduced the concept of "Dutch bourgeois revolution (1566-1609)", which was used to address the wars of the second half of the 16th–early 17th centuries in and around the Spanish Netherlands, related to the acquisition of independence of the Republic of the Seven United Provinces (Zhukov, 1956: 503). This definition uses the already mentioned "revolution-war" pair. Here it is outlined more clearly than in the example of the "Great Migration of peoples". Soviet science widely applied the concept of "revolutions", since it allowed to consider the period of Early modern period as the time of the emergence of the trend of bourgeois revolutions, the sequence of which (and their rise to bourgeois-democratic) naturally and in accordance with the Marxist-Leninist schemes of dialectics of historical development led to the socialist revolution of 1917 in Russia. At the same time, both Dutch and world historiography do not single out the revolutionary component of these events, considering them as the "Eighty Years ' War (1568-1648)", where military, diplomatic and religious factors played no less a role than the socio-economic factors that Soviet historians emphasised (Chekanov, 2010: 519). The terms "revolution" and "civil war" are also used (Koenigsberger, 2006: 143), but serve a different purpose: they program the emotional perception of the events described, but do not fit into the trend. The definition of trends in western and Soviet historical science is completely different.

It is worth mentioning that the chronological boundaries of both objects do not coincide, but depend on their tendentious definition. Thus, formatting objects of scientific and historical research can change their chronological and geographical framework. The concept of "Eighty Years 'War" is located in a broader geographical context: if the revolution was considered as purely "Dutch" because in neighbouring countries there were no socio-economic prerequisites (these relate to domestic life), the war involves broader territorial contexts (interstate conflict, intervention) and layers of various external influences (Reformation, spread of Calvinism). The participants and factors of the war are located within it, while from the point of view of the revolution, a significant part of the factors is located outside, their consideration in the context of events seemed arbitrary, and therefore they are taken out of this context, no longer "noticed" by historians who consider the events in the Netherlands of the late 16th – early 17th centuries as a revolution. So, the prerequisites for the "Dutch revolution" and the "Eighty Years' War" are also different, and this difference is again a consequence of the different formatting of the same object of research by historians. Thus, the introduction of new research objects served, on the one hand, to modernise historical knowledge, and on the other – contributed to the introduction of subjective approaches. The origins of this subjectivism can be different. These sometimes include the direct application of propaganda clichés, which may be the result of the political position of the historian. However, it is also an effective means

of placing objects in historical space and time. Such objects are not disputed in society and acquire the status of indisputable scientific and historical facts, because they are protected by law. Examples of such functioning can be prohibitions on non-recognition of certain historical facts (Kapinus & Dodonov, 2007: 77). The use of such cliches contributes to the formatting of space-time structures and fixes them in the mass consciousness as self-evident.

For example, the "Great Patriotic War" of Soviet and Russian historiography is located in a different territorial context than the "Eastern Front of World War II" of Western historiography, because it stands out as a separate historical event, and not as a component of a larger whole, with which it must be constantly correlated. On the contrary, the comparison of the "Great Patriotic War" with the "Second Front" (the actions of the Anglo-American troops in 1944-1945) gives this latter the significance of a subordinate event and introduces a gradation of historical material (the "second" front is perceived as secondary) (Zhukov, 1956: 602), that is probably inconsistent with the real situation. Depending on the terminology, there are now other concepts used to describe the situation: "allies" (the concept is applied only in relation to Anglo-American troops on the Second Front), "allied assistance" (the concept emphasises the auxiliary, additional nature of allied actions in relation to actions on the "main", Eastern Front).

At the same time, for ideological reasons, the notion of "loyalty to the allied duty" is introduced, which describes the military actions of the Red Army (applied to the conscientious performance of this duty and emphasises that the USSR owes nothing to its allies after the end of the war). Therefore, the term "allies" had derivatives that successfully served as an ideological justification for the foreign policy actions of the USSR in relation to former allies at the end of World War II and during the Cold War. However, we note that there was no unified logic for applying the concepts of "allies" and "allied duty" in Soviet historiography. It is important to understand the role of ideology in formatting wartime space-time structures to compare these structures of World War II with similar structures of World War I. Since the concept of "allies" in the form promoted by Soviet historiography was used for non-historical, ideological purposes due to the realities of the bipolar world after World War II, it can be assumed that in Soviet historiography the concept of "allies" was not specifically applied to the troops of the Western Front of World War I. This is indeed true - the term is still used in Russian historiography as a synonym for the Entente in the plural, although some of the "allies" were not members of the Entente (Japan, Belgium, Serbia, Romania, etc.).

Methodological Introduction of Historical Research Objects

The spread of new trends in historiography predictably resulted in the use of modified spatio-temporal structures relative to periods of long duration. After the Middle Ages, writing historical chronicles in the genre of "world history" temporarily fell out of use, but the spread in Modern History of considering history as a process drew attention to the possibility of building updated schemes of world history. We have seen how important inversions of political concepts that form socially binding concepts of the past are for the process of historiography. Especially noticeable is

their role in totalitarian societies, where they are introduced in a directive manner and can fundamentally change the identification of historical events ("elements of civil war" instead of "aggression" in the Ukrainian-Russian war (since 2014) or introduce new identifications for a number of historical events, and in the process of introducing such identification, its spatial and temporal structures are also developed. From a historical point of view, the concepts of "war" and "revolution" are the most controversial: they are associated with conflict segments of the past and, accordingly, cause conflicts of identification. If we remain in a purely scientific position, the answer to the question "What Is War?" depends on the location and the year of the war to which it is attached, on the social status of the witness through whose eyes the historian tries to see the event in order to understand it.

Examples of this can be such identifications as the "Triumphal Procession of Soviet Power" and the above-mentioned "Great Patriotic War". In the first case, Soviet historiography singled out in a separate series of significant events the sequence of acts of recognition and unarmed establishment of Soviet power in the regions of the Russian Empire from the end of 1917 to May 1918 (Golub et al., 1987: 367). Notably, V. I. Lenin, at that time the head of the Bolshevik government, did not use such a term himself, but in March 1918 defined this process as a "civil war" (Golub et al., 1987: 375), since, after all, not everywhere it took place without conflict. The logic of the Bolshevik leader is clear here: not knowing in advance about the uprising of the Czechoslovak Legion in May 1918, which would lead to the separation of almost the entire east and south of the former empire from Bolshevik Moscow, he considered the civil war as a companion of the Bolshevik revolution already over. Therefore, he reduced it to events that later became considered only the first manifestations of the conflict, and this conflict will last until the end of 1920, in the Russian Far East – until the end of 1922. As we can see, there was a reformatting of historical time and a re-interpretation of historical events: the term "civil war" was significantly expanded, but its early manifestations were allocated into a separate sub-period, which in historiography was later called the "triumphal march of Soviet power". Soviet science included this term in the history of the October Revolution of 1917 as its final part, and in the history of the civil war as the initial one (Khromov, 1987: 429). Early Soviet periodisation of the civil war defined its chronological framework as 1918-1920, while later periodisation was complicated: Soviet historians began to consider the first counter-revolutionary actions as early as the fall of 1917, which chronologically coincided with the "triumphal march of Soviet power", and the upper chronological limit was pushed back to 1922 (Khromov, 1987: 431). At the same time, it was noted separately that the "sovietisation" of certain regions of the Far East continued until 1923, and the struggle against the Basmachi movement in Central Asia – until 1929.

The identification of the "triumphal procession of Soviet power" as a separate historical process was accompanied by the definition not only of its content but also of its chronological and geographical framework. The biggest problem was the latter, since the very identification of the object revealed its mobile nature. In the historical maps which began to accompany the description of events in the history books on the Revolution and the Civil War, the general vector of the process was usually shown by the change in the density of red from the centre of the country to the east (Golub et

al., 1987: 401). In some regions, the dates of establishing the power of the Bolsheviks were indicated. They illustrated the peaceful victory of the Soviet government in this region. The events after May 1918, which were accompanied by the fall of a number of regions where the Soviet government had already allegedly won, were not included either in the cartographic display of the events of the "triumphal procession" or in its chronological framework. But at the same time, those regions where Soviet power was established almost from the very beginning were not excluded from the geographical framework. It is obvious that the introduction of the described object of historical research served not a scientific, but a political purpose, and showed the recognition of the regions of the former Russian Empire (including the "national outskirts") as a mostly peaceful, absolutely natural process. Resistance seemed to be limited to the position of only those social classes that did not accept the revolution at all, and not ethnic groups within the Russian Empire. In the context of the "triumphal march", this resistance was levelled regardless of whether it took place on the "national outskirts" or in other regions. Its participants were identified as "counter-revolutionaries" even if they were simply trying to separate their regions from Russia, whether revolutionary or Imperial. This is where artificial identifications such as "White Czechs", "White Estonians", "White Kalmyks", which are difficult to understand for both foreigners and post-Soviet people, come from.

At the same time, the repeated fall of many of the regions was shown as forced, which occurred as a result of either the "Revolt of the Czechoslovak Legion" or "intervention" – a synthetic concept in which Soviet historiography began to include events related to the intervention in the civil conflict first by the Central Powers, and since 1919 – by the Entente Powers (Golub et al., 1987: 411). The goals of their intervention were always different (let's take into account at least the fact that the intervention of the Central Powers occurred during the First World War, while the intervention of the Entente occurred at the time it ended), but Soviet historiography began to unite them into one complex of events of an anti-Soviet orientation; the reasons for the intervention were defined stereotypically as "fear of capitalists" (Zhukov, 1956: 713-714). Thus, anti-Soviet speeches were shown as "unnatural", they were associated with an external factor whereby to which the "anti-Soviet elements" dared to "raise their heads". The methodological introduction of the "triumphal march of Soviet power" was an interesting example of how a new object of historical research appears as a result of reformatting the historical past for political purposes (the so-called "politics of memory"). In addition, we can see in this process manifestations of the use of methodological approaches, in particular, those derived from Thucydides: a separate consideration of internal and external events, presented as motivationally dissimilar and incomparable with each other.

The most commonly used concept of Soviet propaganda and historiography was the "Great Patriotic War". The concept was introduced by J. V. Stalin in a propaganda pamphlet. It separated the events of 1941-1945 on the Eastern front of World War II into a separate complex of events, seemingly unrelated to the military-political actions of the USSR in 1939-1941, as a result of which Nazi Germany received military-economic assistance in the war with Poland and Western states, and the USSR received new territories as a result of unpunished pressure and direct

aggression against Poland, Finland, Romania and the Baltic states. At the same time was "formed" a historical event with its own chronological and geographical framework (the Soviet-Japanese war of 1945 was not included in the "Great Patriotic War") (Zhukov, 1956: 720).

A characteristic feature of such an "event" was that it was not recognised (at most, taken into account) by the international scientific community. The reason for this is obvious: its introduction was not for scientific, but for propaganda purposes. It did not contribute to the creation of a systematic view of the Second World War, but rather overshadowed it by introducing cliches that were understandable only to those who were under the ideological influence of Soviet propaganda. So, the propaganda component was a condition for the "correct" understanding of the "Great Patriotic War". Rejection of it automatically raised a number of questions to the new object of research, which were supposed to determine the meaning of its introduction. The concept of "Great Patriotic War" was introduced into the scientific circulation of Soviet historiography clearly by analogy with the Patriotic War of 1812 against Napoleon. A notable analogy that brought both events closer together was Russia's resistance to external aggression aimed at destroying the vital centres of the state, abandoned to the mercy of its potential allies in the West (for this, for example, the Crimean War of 1853-1856 was never considered "patriotic", and the First World War, despite attempts by official propaganda to proclaim it such, received the opposite emotional status of "imperialist"). A less noticeable analogy was the lost status of "ally" of the aggressor by Russia (and the USSR), acquired by Russia at Tilsit in 1807, and by the USSR as a result of the Molotov–Ribbentrop Pact in 1939. Accordingly, both wars (if viewed objectively) looked like the result of internal contradictions within the "aggressive" camp. It was only after about six months of fighting did Russia converge as a victim in both wars, with its potential allies in the fight against aggression, leading to the formation of the Sixth Coalition against France in the first case and to the formation of the anti-Hitler coalition in the second. As we see in both cases, the basis for recognising wars as "patriotic" was "treason" within the aggressive camp, to which Russia and the USSR joined forcibly (in 1807, as a result of the loss of the war and the signing of the Treaties of Tilsit, in 1939, as a result of the choice of Germany as a strategic ally in a pre-war situation, when neither Great Britain nor France showed interest in acquiring such a dubious ally as the Soviet Union).

Changes in the Perception of the Object "Revolution"

The object "revolution" is also an example of how non-historical factors influenced the presentation of events by historians. Until the end of the 18th century, "revolutions" were considered not the processes of radical changes in society, but on the contrary (as in the case of the "Glorious Revolution" of 1688 in England), the return of the course of events to traditional ("evolutionary") rails, that is, "re-evolution". The Glorious Revolution was conservative, focused on the past. It was accompanied primarily by the restoration of the rights of subjects despised by the ruling regime (Koenigsberger, 2006: 294), its consequences were indeed new as a result of the institutional change, but the revolution and this change were spaced in

time (begins in 1689, after which "the Parliament zealously passed laws that supported economic development") (Ferguson, 2020: 88); contemporaries of the events did not perceive the revolution itself as an engine of innovation. The term "revolution" itself was well-known (it was used, in particular, by A. Smith), but it was only used as an event identifier, not a process the impact of which contributed to redefining the event vector and recognising its progress. The English Revolution of 1640-1660 was defined by contemporaries as a "Great Rebellion" (Yurovskaya et al., 1983: 141). The change in attitude to such events falls on the French Revolution of 1789. It is connected with the ideology of the Enlightenment, under the influence of which revolutions as a means of destroying the outdated traditional system began to be attributed a positive meaning.

The awareness of the epochal and global significance of the French Revolution contributed to a change in the perception of "revolutions" as such: they are beginning to be considered not so much manifestations of chaos that require further "re-evolutions", but rather modernisation processes of destroying outdated social structures that resist and make reforms impossible. If the concept of "re-evolutions" provided for the restoration of the pre-revolutionary state of affairs, then from now on this state is considered negative, and the post-revolutionary situation is ideally considered as a renewal of society and the introduction of more progressive foundations for its functioning. It is no coincidence that new concepts of "industrial" and "scientific" revolutions are being established in the European consciousness, which by definition provided for the modernisation of revolutionised objects. Revolutionary changes are becoming synonymous with progressive ones. Neither in industry nor in science, "re-evolutions" are impossible. The very intellectual progress of humanity led to the spread of a new concept of "revolution" and to the positivisation of its image in mass perception, which reached its peak already in the 20th century. The most noticeable in this regard was the absolutisation of revolutions in the Marxist paradigm, which during the 20th century became dominant and binding for scientific and paradigmatic application in the USSR and other countries of the socialist camp. The apogee was the creation of a holistic concept of civilisational progress of mankind, according to which the importance of its drivers was given to the revolutions. Moreover, in eras that did not meet the Marxist criteria of "prerequisites for revolution" and "revolutionary situation", the function of "revolutions" was given to other processes – this is how the mentioned above concept of "slave revolution" appeared (Zhukov, 1956: 759). At the same time, the identification of the "revolution" was attributed to historical events that had not previously been considered such, in particular, the struggle by the Netherlands for independence from Spain. Above we could see that an important sign of the consideration of revolutions by totalitarian historiography was the creation of connected pairs "revolution–war", which corresponded to the concept of aggravation of the class struggle (Werth, 1992: 314; Ogarkov, 1976: 536).

Conclusions

Soviet historiography was also characterised by a failure to recognise the revolutionary nature of transformations in the humanitarian sphere that were not directly linked to the socio-economic context: for example, the concept of "technological revolution" was not used in the USSR, although the concept of "industrial revolution" was used as such, which accompanied the transition from feudalism to capitalism, revolutionary in content according to the theoretical foundations of Soviet historiography. At the same time, the USSR actively introduced new objects of research that helped to characterise historical situations in different countries in accordance with these theoretical foundations: in the official versions of the stories of capitalist countries, the headings were distinguished by plot separations from the general context: "class struggle", "strike movement". In the history of the USSR, there are attempts to attach importance to historical periods to power initiatives: "the first Five-Year Plans", "The Virgin Lands campaign", "Perestroika", etc. In that version of the history of the USSR, which has passed the test of time, only those that are connected with the contexts of broader social transformations remain: for example, the "first Five-Year Plans" lost chronological boundaries and were preserved only in the contexts of industrialisation and, especially, collectivisation associated with it (given the significant social consequences in terms of the number of victims, including in national regions); "perestroika" began to be considered in conjunction with the geopolitically significant disintegration of the "socialist camp", and then the USSR.

The fall of the USSR and the final collapse of the totalitarian system at the end of the 20th century had the following impact on the situation in historical science: the concept of "revolution" will continue to be used only in the humanitarian sense ("Green Revolution", "Revolution of Consciousness", "Sexual Revolution"), as an emotional description of liberalising processes ("Gorbachev revolution") or in relation to the next breakthroughs in the technological sphere. Former "social revolutions" have lost and changed their identity. The totalitarian historical discourse with all its works, which have since remained on the periphery of scientific and historical research, has also come to an end, as relapses of totalitarian consciousness that survive only where the re-identification of historical events is not caused by the current demands of a renewed society.

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IDENTITY TRANSFORMATION OF THE UKRAINIAN DONBAS: FROM THE "WILD FIELD" TO RUSSIAN OCCUPATION

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Abstract

The population of the Ukrainian Donbas before the beginning of Russian war aggression had a particular regional identity that, apart from boundary characteristics, has a significant "Soviet" component. Russian aggression has led to the mass exodus of at least 1.5 million citizens with a dominant Ukrainian identity to Ukrainian-controlled territory. At the same time, the Ukrainian mnemonic space is being completely cleansed in the temporarily occupied territories. The Russian model of historical memory bizarrely combines imperial, Soviet, and occupation components. Today, the identity of the sub-occupation population is undergoing a significant transformation, which creates an increasing distance from other Ukrainian citizens, even in the liberated territories of Donbas.

However, the hybrid nature of this identity makes it ambivalent, unstable. Moreover, in a state of crisis, the population has suffered several waves of cultural trauma. Divided political loyalties are maintained and strengthened. The article has analysed the functioning of historical consciousness as a key identity marker of different groups, both before the occupation of these territories and today.

Key words: *border / hybrid identity, Ukrainian Donbas, historical memory, Russian military aggression*

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Introduction

Donbas as a border region and the identity of its population have traditionally been in the field of attention of both Ukrainian (Pashina, 2005; Korzhov, 2006; Khobta, 2010; Nikolayets, 2012; Kotyhorenko & Rafalsky 2013a; Kotyhorenko & Rafalsky 2013b; Pasko, Pasko & Korzhov 2013) and foreign researchers (Wilson, 1995; Kuromiya, 2002a; Kuromiya, 2002b; Studenna-Skrukwa, 2014). The 2007 special issue of the magazine "Modern Ukraine", devoted to a comparative analysis of social identities in Donetsk and Lviv (Modern Ukraine, 2007) is of particular interest. With the beginning of the open phase of Russian aggression, the study of this issue became significantly more active and, in addition to being purely scientific, acquired extremely important social significance (Vermenych, 2018; Kulchytsky & Yakubova, 2016; Karmazina, 2016; Kryvytska, 2017; Benchuk & Trofimovich, 2020; Pakhomenko, 2015; Kuromia, 2015b). A separate group of texts consists of analytical studies of sociological and security centres. The report "War in Donbas: Realities and Prospects for Adjustment" prepared by an authoritative team of authors, including historians, sociologists, and political scientists, deserves special mention. Also important are the analytical materials of the Razumkov Center "Formation of a common identity of Ukrainian citizens in new conditions: features, prospects and challenges", "Ukraine 2017-2018: new realities, old problems (analytical assessments)", which also considers the situation with the transformation of identity to occupied territories (National security and defence, 2019). This issue has been comprehensively covered in monographs prepared by the staff of the National Institute for Strategic Studies (Donbas and Crimea, 2015; Ukraine and Russia, 2015).

The assessments and conceptual positions of modern researchers are often hypothetical and encourage careful analysis and appropriate scientific discussion. Therefore, **the purpose** of the proposed article is to verify its own analysis of various factors in the transformation of the identity of Ukrainian citizens – residents of temporarily occupied territories of Ukraine in the conditions of Russian occupation.

Main definitions

At the beginning of the article, it is necessary to define the basic concepts: "border identity" and "hybrid identity". The "border identity" means the type of population identity that positions itself as the inhabitants of the border space between different civilisations, cultures, countries and states. It is logical to assume that self-identification in the border area usually does not coincide with the models declared by their metropolitan / state centres. Moreover, the identity can blend different components that come from different centres of adjacent spaces.

The proposed approach also considers the semantic relationship between mental images of the "border" and the corresponding level of collective self-identification of communities. In particular, an integral part of the European mentality of Europeans includes the sacralisation of state borders as a necessary attribute of modern national discourse. These tendencies are likely preserved in modern times, especially among those communities that underwent modernisation differently.

As Y. Vermenych rightly points out, a significant part of the population in the border areas has either a "hybrid" or a rival identity (Vermenych, 2018: 79). Such

cultural hybridity penetrates all spheres of life, although the border residents themselves do not realise (or do not want to acknowledge) that they underwent hybridisation or double stereotyping and are convinced that their identity is entirely self-sufficient and even more important than the dominant one in the national space. Therefore, such a hybrid identity can be simply defined as a multifaceted identity that combines different, sometimes non-complementary components. The fundamental contradiction is the denial of the inner nature of identity as an inertial system, the construction of which requires a specific temporal duration. Because hybrid identities are quite unstable, they can only function for a limited time. Moreover, in the timeline, we can observe a bizarre sequence of several hybrid identities that are "layered / strung" on top of each other.

The concept of "political loyalty" should also be used as a working tool for the correct study of the topic. In this case, loyalty determines the level of social "trust" in a particular political system, government, government, official ideology and other power intentions. Political loyalty can be seen as an objectification of political identification at several levels (beliefs, attributions, behaviour). There are indivisible and disjointed (double) political loyalties depending on different factors (tangible and intangible).

It is also pertinent to note that the scope of the proposed exploration is broader in time and space than articulated in the title. In order to understand the current situation, it is important to consider a specific historical context, and for the current state of affairs, we must also consider the identification situation in both the occupied and liberated territories of Donbas.

Historical factors of population identification

The region of Ukraine, now known as Donbas, has a complicated historical destiny. Contradictory interpretations of its past still have a significant impact on the current identification situation. It is important to note that this area has different zoning in terms of ethnology, economic geography, historical cartography and more. Thus, ethnologists attribute the entire Luhansk and northern Donetsk regions to the historical and ethnographic district of Slobozhanshchyna, and the south of Donetsk to the Ukrainian steppe.

Historically, the region also looks quite diverse, as it was formed from the lands of Sloboda Ukraine (part of the Sloboda Cossack regiments) and partly from the territory of the liberties of the Zaporozhians and the Don Army. Therefore, we can fully agree with the opinion of Y. Vermenych that Donbas is not a historical region because territorially, it originated from different parts of the former Cossack formations (Vermenych, 2018: 254). Their unification was due to the specifics of economic development, namely the accelerated industrialisation in the second half of the XIX – early XX centuries, which led to the concentration of metallurgical and machine-building production in the area of coal mining. This specificity always gives rise to numerous attempts to overcome common stereotypes and deconstruct the "Donbas myth" about the integrity and uniqueness of the region.

Some modern Ukrainian politicians and government officials generally propose to abandon the use of the term "Donbas" in Ukraine as part of the Russian occupation discourse. In particular, the current Secretary of the National Security and Defense Council of Ukraine Oleksiy Danilov believes: "There isn't the word "Donbas" in any

normative legal document of our state. This definition which is imposed on us by the Russian Federation – "the people of Donbas", "the choice of Donbas", "Donbas will not be brought to its knees". We need to strictly adhere to our legal documents… There are clear names of the territory of Donetsk and Luhansk regions, there is no Donbas, it is very dangerous when we start saying such things" (Danilov, 2021). A unique factor in the formation and development of the regional identity of Donbas was the "border" – nobody's land, free land, the former "Wild Field", which for many centuries provided shelter to those seeking refuge from persecution and enslavement or seeking physical survival (Donbas in the ethno-political dimension, 2014: 425). Therefore, we can fully agree with the concept of H. Kuromiya that Donbas is not the border of any two civilisational subjects but a blurred line between settled and not settled territories, between civilisation and uninhabited steppe, between power and freedom, bordering on brutal mayhem and often chaos (Kuromiya, 2002b: 29-31, 33).

Returning to the subejct of "Cossack heritage", we should recall that all these Cossack formations had a borderline character, and the population, respectively, border identity. Interestingly, the mental orientation of the border in different Cossack communities was quite specific: Sloboda Cossacks perceived it along the line "north-south", Zaporozhian and Don – "in a circle" (comprehensive border). Some researchers believe that the permanent border conflicts between the Zaporozhian and Don Cossacks had an institutional and a more profound ethnic nature and affected their mental geography – delineating the border between Ukrainians and Russians.

In the post-reform period, marked by the accelerated formation of the coal industrial complex, capitalist agriculture and a massive influx of migrants from other provinces, the basis of the modern ethnic structure of the Donbas population was established (Pashina, 2005: 27).

The industrialisation of the second half of the XIX – early XX centuries brought significant transformations, which consisted of changing the composition of the region's population due to labour migration and the erosion and disappearance of border status. The elements of border identity were preserved in the local population – the descendants of the Cossacks, and the new workers no longer retained this identity.

The beginning of the Soviet period (1920s) seemed quite traumatic for the inhabitants of the region. Significant instability in the ethno-political landscape was due to political fluctuations of the party-state line of the Kremlin leadership: from the model of "struggle of two cultures" (with explicit patronage of "proletarian" Russian culture) to the course of indigenisation / Ukrainization followed by a return to the "fierce struggle nationalism". Although too short, the "era of Ukrainization" still had a positive impact on the process of de-Russification of the urban working environment and the growth of social mobility of Ukrainians in the region. Interestingly, the local Soviet elite and population reacted rather painfully to the separation in 1924 from the Ukrainian Donbas of Taganrog and the Shakhtinsk district (Sergiychuk, 2000: 274-275). Despite the external, mostly economic motivation, this situation was a very indicative marker of self-identification of the local population and testified to the presence of at least two important identities – a sense of internal regional unity and strengthening of borderline identity. As we can see, even the nominal sovereignty of the early Ukrainian Soviet

Socialist Republic contained as an essential component the concept of "borders" and, accordingly, generated a border identity.

In the following period of the 1930s and 1940s, there was an even greater mixing of the population – a decrease of the Ukrainian population (due to repression and the Holodomor) and an increase of Russian presence (labour, the criminals). There were also more local phenomena, such as the relocation of certain groups of residents of the Lemko region during the "transfer of 1944". Thus, the foundations of modern Donetsk identity were laid within the framework of the Soviet modernisation project, beginning in the 1930s, but its formation took place in the 1960s and 1970s.

It was then that the image of Donbas as a showcase of socialism with household symbols of the so-called "Socialist paradise" – cheap vodka and sausage, enough jobs, rapid queuing for housing was set up (Vermenych, 2018: 250-251). At the same time, it is pertinent to admit that behind this Soviet exemplariness, there were significant contradictions rooted in the sphere of identification. In fact, during the late Soviet period, the hybrid identity of the inhabitants of the "miner's land" intensified, which was most evident in the contradiction between ethnic self-determination and the native language and devotion to the Soviet version of modernity. The region was a mental space where the categories "one's own – another's" and "loyal – disloyal" were intricately intertwined. According to Y. Vermenych, Donbas, as an essentially artificially created frontier with a significant conflict-generating potential embedded in its foundation, was doomed to constant "clarification of relations", friction, manifestations of separatism (Vermenych, 2018: 277).

Regional identity in independent Ukraine

With Ukraine's independence, in the 1990s there was a significant strengthening of regional identity in Donbas, which, according to G. Korzhov, was due to a compensatory function – identification with the region filled the vacuum of identification with the state (Korzhov, 2006: 40).

According to many researchers, the actual Ukrainian-Russian bi-ethnicity has formed in the region. M. Gaukhman believes that the Ukrainians and Russians of Donbas did not perceive each other as "others". Close proximity and joint work led to the mestization of the Donbas population (Gauchman, 2016). Sociologist I. Kononov called this state of interethnic relations, characterised by the erosion of ethnic boundaries and the spread of Ukrainian-Russian marriages, "the Ukrainian-Russian dominant ethnic coalition" (Kononov, Khobta, & Shchudlo, 2014: 57-58). In the social dimension, it was based on miners and factory workers.

S. Pakhomenko also believes that the components of the regional identity of Donbas are Ukrainian-Russian bi-ethnicity (dual identity, blurred border between Ukrainian and Russian identity), the dominance of the Russian language, industrial type of culture, sincere respect for the Soviet past and its symbols, complementarity to the Russian state (Pakhomenko, 2015: 383).

Thus, the above-mentioned ethno-national features of the regional community play an important role in the formation of signs of regional self-identification of Donbas residents. It is, first of all, about the high share of Russians in the ethnic composition of the population. However, it should be noted that between 1989 and 2001, the relative

rate of Ukrainians increased and that of Russians decreased. If the share of Ukrainians in the total population of the region for the period 1989 – 2001 increased by 6.1% (from 51.1% to 57.2%), the share of Russians over the same period decreased by 5.5% (from 44, 0% to 38.5%) (National composition, 2003: 130, 137). As the Ukrainian-Russian bi-ethnicity of Donbas was largely shaped by Soviet political rhetoric within the framework of the Soviet modernisation project, nostalgia for the Soviet Union remained a specific component of the regional hybrid identity.

The Soviet component of the identity has several features. In particular, it is about the dominance of paternalistic guidelines. Thus, I. Todorov noted that Donbas unequivocally inherited the fundamentally paternalistic value system that existed in the USSR. The vast majority of residents believe that the government is responsible for education, health care, stable work, salaries, pensions, and social benefits. Hence the dominance of collectivist values, historical memory mainly focused on the Soviet heritage. Today, the inertia of a kind of "regional paternalism" under the slogan "seniors know better" persists in the region (Todorov, 2014: 328). Thus, present in Ukrainian society, including Donbas, nostalgia for the Soviet past has a different character than in Russia, where the main aspect was longing for the lost empire. In Ukraine, nostalgia for the USSR is provoked by paternalistic sentiments and the desire to have, albeit minimal, but still available in the Soviet Union social guarantees (Kornienko, 2011: 217). We should not forget about the psychological aspect of memory selectivity – the tendency to focus on positive memories.

The presence of Russian-Soviet identity in large part of the population of Donbas is evidenced by sociological data. As of the end of the 1990s, the leader among the bearers of Soviet culture was the Donetsk region – 37.1%, while the bearers of Ukrainian and Russian culture were divided almost equally – 25.8% and 21.9%, respectively. The vast majority of representatives of the Luhansk region referred to the Ukrainian cultural tradition (44.3%), Soviet and Russian – 24.5% and 21.9%, respectively. At the same time, sociologists noted a gradual decrease in the share of Soviet identity. Thus, among the residents of Donetsk in 1994, 40.1% identified themselves as "Soviet people", in 1999 – there were already 21.5%, and in 2004 – only 9.9% (Susak, 2007: 303). Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts together: in 2001 – 22.0%, in 2009 – 15.0%, in 2014 – 13.9%, in 2015 – 5.4% (the last indicator concerns residents of unoccupied part of Donbas – Author) (Rafalsky, Kotygorenko, & Panchuk 2015: 159-160).

Another manifestation of "Sovietness" is the "proletarian" component of regional identity. It intensified significantly during industrialisation and further levelled the unsettled ethnic identity. The cult of strong industry overshadowed all other values. The microworld of the mine or factory, which produced material values, "grinded" religious myths, folk legends and ideals (Korzhov, 2006: 42). According to M. Stepyko, the territorial identity of the residents of Donbas is closely "tied" to the mining and metallurgical industries and is qualified by them as a "relic of industrial society" (Stepyko, 2015: 136). Thus, it is not surprising that in such a regional identity the masculine component is clearly manifested, which can be traced from the household level.

A characteristic feature of modern Donbas is a high degree of loyalty to local elites. In this region, patron-client forms of social interaction have become most widespread. These are unequal relations and dependence of the majority of the local population on a small circle of a regional elite that hoarded unprecedented financial and material resources. According to Y. Sytnyk's observations, a conglomerate of criminals with the authorities and law enforcement bodies under their control was formed in the Donetsk region. Using the capabilities of an independent Ukrainian state, this "conglomerate" was hostile to everything Ukrainian (Sytnyk, 2021: 14). Local elites have long stimulated the strengthening of regional identity in their political interests, using it as an argument in the election campaign in favour of, in particular, the Party of Regions.

It is quite natural that the hybrid nature of the regional identity contained many contradictions, which were significantly exacerbated during the crisis of 2013-2014 and Russian aggression. An interesting aspect of the basic worldview controversy was outlined by V. Golovko: "Donetsk identity is characterised by a contradiction between great opportunities ("steppe freedom") and restrictions ("galley work")" (Holovko, 2014: 106). Significant contradictions also concern the modern socio-cultural environment of Donbas. According to L. Yakubova, it is a prolific opportunity for the processes of cultural marginalisation because whole generations grew up with uncertain and even non-national self-identification (Yakubova, 2015: 185). This situation contributes to the rapid spread of traumatic cultural experiences.

It is also worth noting the peculiarity of the historical memory of the region's inhabitants and its impact on their identity. Here it is quite possible to agree with I. Kononov's opinion: "It is incorrect to explain group national and cultural self-consciousness of inhabitants of Donbas by any flowing political processes. It is an expression of the content of deep historical memory" (Kononov, 2000: 105-106). It is also worth noting that the collapse of the Soviet Union led to a crisis of identities ingrained in it, and the search for a way out of it went through the search for fulcrums in existing material. These characteristics suggest that mild decommunisation (or even hints of it) can cause "first-wave" cultural trauma. It is noteworthy that in those regions, many are carriers of "Soviet values", and Russian aggression unfolded in 2014 (Rafalsky, Kotygorenko, & Panchuk, 2015: 156).

As for the border nature of the identity of the region's inhabitants, in our opinion, until 2014, it did not have proper social articulation. In particular, a sociological study within the research project "Eastern Ukraine: Transformation of Identity in the Border" conducted in October 2009 among residents of Luhansk region found that the identity of "border resident" occupies a relatively weak position in the structure of self-identification, being in the last ten possible ranks (in the region in general only 4% of respondents referred to this category). This gave reason to sociologist S. Hobti stating that in the 2000s, the eastern Russian-Ukrainian border was not characterised by a developed "sense of the border". Ukraine's eastern border is not perceived as a border between "foreigners", so the "border" status was not felt here at that time (Khobta, 2010: 220).

Moreover, the vast majority of residents still felt in the "deep Soviet rear". Crossing the state border between Ukraine and Russia was extremely simplified, with internal passports and without visas. The increased imposition of the ideology of the

"Russian world" did not cover the distance from Russia, so most Ukrainian citizens in Donetsk and Luhansk regions did not perceive it as a "foreign" concept. This was facilitated by the official discourse of the Ukrainian central government regarding Russia as a fraternal country of the "near abroad", "strategic partner". Even more "anti-frontier" was the position of local elites, who used economic and financial ties with Russia as a means of distancing themselves from official Kyiv. Perhaps only some local groups felt some inconvenience. For example, fishers from Azov villages (Sedove, etc.) who were terrorised by the Federal Security Service border service in 2012-2013. However, this dissatisfaction was mostly "channelled" not in the direction of the brutality of the Russian border guards, but to the "unnecessary" and even "harmful" to the border fishery.

Transformation of identity in the conditions of Russian aggression and occupation

Russian aggression in the Donbas led to the restoration of its former frontline status in its old form. G. Kuromiya spoke quite aptly about this: "By destroying the Ukrainian-Russian border in Donbas, Moscow finally revived the legendary disorderly "wild field"" (Kuromiya, 2015a). And this in turn had significant geopolitical consequences. Thus, for a productive analysis of the transformation of the identity of Ukrainian citizens in the conditions of Russian aggression, it is important to determine the preconditions for the strengthening and progression of Russian military expansion into Ukraine. Philosopher M. Stepyko draws attention to the identification nature of this phenomenon, to the "incompatibility and conflict of two opposite identities: the "Soviet" Asian-pro-Russian and pro-European Ukrainian" (Stepyko, 2015: 135).

According to Stepyko's observations, there are several front lines of the war between Russian and Ukrainian identities. The first line includes the occupied territories of Donbas, as well as villages and towns that were recently liberated from the occupiers. This line includes large cities of Donbas, such as Slovyansk, Kramatorsk and Mariupol. Here, the efforts of the adherents of the "Russian world" formed a myth of a common identity with Russia, incompatible with Ukrainian values, which became the ideological basis for the spread of pro-Russian sentiment and the formation of quasi-republics. The Donetsk criminal-oligarchic clan during Yanukovych's presidency also contributed to the formation of a separate Donetsk "regional identity" (Stepyko, 2016: 166).

Sociological data testify to the identification markers of the local population in the conditions of the political crisis of 2013-2014 and at the beginning of the Russian aggression. In particular, the results of a survey conducted by the Donetsk Institute for Social Research and Political Analysis (headed by V. Kipen) on March 26-29, 2014, a sample of 500 respondents from the city of Donetsk. The thesis about the predominant orientation of Donetsk residents to Russia was not confirmed. More than a third of residents expressed consistent patriotic feelings: 37% of them identified themselves as "citizens of Ukraine". Close to them is a large group (21%) of Donetsk residents who identified themselves as "Russian-speaking residents of Ukraine". In total, it was 58% of Donetsk's residents. About a third of respondents focused on Russia (18.2% – for the Donetsk region's entry into an interstate union with Russia, 8.7% – for joining the

latter) and only 4.7% – for the proclamation of the so-called Donetsk People's Republic (DPR) (Almost 66% of Donetsk residents, 2014).

According to Kyiv International Institute of Sociology research (April 8-16, 2014) "Opinions and views of residents of the south-eastern regions of Ukraine: April 2014", among residents of Donetsk region, the separation of their region from Ukraine and accession to Russia supported 27.5% of respondents, did not support – 52.2%, it was difficult to determine – 17.3% (Thoughts and views, 2014).

According to a nationwide survey of public opinion of the population of Ukraine, conducted by the Foundation "Democratic Initiatives of Ilka Kucheriva" together with the Center named after Razumkov on May 14–18, 2014, Donbas was the only region where the majority of the population supported Ukraine's membership in the Customs Union (73% – for, 14% – against, 13% – undecided). At the same time, 75% of the region's residents were against Ukraine's accession to the EU (Foreign policy orientations, 2014).

The onset of open Russian aggression has led to the mass exodus of at least 1.5 million citizens with a dominant Ukrainian identity to Ukrainian-controlled territory. At the same time, the Ukrainian mnemonic space is being completely cleansed in the temporarily occupied territories of Temporarily occupied territories of Ukraine. Instead, the Russian model of historical memory is being introduced, which bizarrely combines imperial, Soviet, and occupation components. Accordingly, the consciousness of the sub-occupation population is undergoing a significant transformation, which increases the identification distance from other Ukrainian citizens, even in the liberated territories of Donbas. Y. Abibok quite rightly believes we currently observe the formation of different identities (occupation administrations use various commemorative practices aimed at forming a separate "Donbas" identity), which threatens the integrity of Donbas as a separate region (Abibok, 2018; Abibok, 2020).

With the beginning of the active phase of Russian aggression, according to Y. Vermenych, in Ukrainian-Russian relations there was a reorientation from the conditional paradigm of the border to the border identity: "The polarisation of public sentiment has reached its apogee – those who identify themselves as "Ukrainians" categorically reject the value-normative system of the "Russian world", and vice versa, adherents of the "Russian world" view everything Ukrainian in terms of "falsehood" and zombifying. Hence, it is not so much the concept of the frontier as the new "frontier philosophy" that has acquired the significance of an ontological explanatory concept" (Vermenych, 2018: 90).

As a result, the transformation of political loyalties of the region's residents has intensified. Citizens with a consistent Ukrainian identity, especially those who were forced to move to the free territory of Ukraine, have significantly strengthened their indivisible political loyalty. Adherents of the "Russian world" and especially the separatist part of the population adhere to the divided (double) loyalty caused by the uncertain fate of the occupied territories. As it turned out, these categories of the population are ready to "serve" any government (the one that turns out to be stronger will win the confrontation) – central Russia, local accomplices (quasi-republics of "Donetsk People's Republic / Luhansk People's Republic"), and even – Ukrainian, in its restoration.

Crisis of regional identity

General crisis strengthened the borderline nature of identity. In the region, which was at the epicentre of the hybrid war, a new phenomenon, called "Luhansk syndrome", emerged. According to I. Kononov, the syndrome was the result of cognitive dissonance, which was formed not in the individual consciousness, but in the mass consciousness of the regional community. It is the stereotypes and phobias that have accumulated over decades that pushed people in search of existential security towards the aggressor (Kononov, 2016). This was reflected in a fairly large turnout of Donbas residents for the so-called "referendum" on May 11, 2014.

It should also be added that the cognitive dissonance of Donbas residents has been formed for decades. That is why in the spring of 2014, most of them did not have mental support points for resistance. Not only the dominant historical discourse in the region, but also the created mass media background (e.g "Russia is a super state"), asserted the idea that to resist is pointless. Moreover, locals did not identify Russia as an aggressor, but rather a "saviour" from the long-running socio-economic depression to it. I. Kononov noted that in the territories that remained part of Ukraine, "Luhansk syndrome" is gradually disappearing. And vice versa – in the territories controlled by pro-Russian militants, it is progressing. The maintenance of this syndrome is one of the components of Russia's hybrid war against Ukraine (Kononov, 2016).

The regional Donbas consciousness is in a phase of crisis and active transformation – as a reflection of the proletarian consciousness, which degrades and marginalises under the influence of deindustrialisation of the Donbas and its inconsistency with the trends of the post-industrial world. Self-isolation at the level of ideological existence of regional communities, self-suspension in historical progress, and the desire to live by the laws of the free market and the desire to enjoy all its benefits are fundamental contradictions of the internal existence of this region. This situation can be described as a cultural trauma of the "second wave". Given the social dangers arising from the crisis of identity of the residents of Donbas, some journalists and scholars suggest using the term of the French writer of Algerian origin Amin Maalouf – "deadly identities" (Perekhoda, 2014: 5, 7, 170).

We agree with S. Pakhomenko's opinion that there is no ethnic or linguistic basis in the conflict in Donbas (Pakhomenko, 2015: 381-382). Instead, the researcher connects the formation of another non-Ukrainian identity in a significant number of region residents with the escalation of confrontation during hostilities and based on an exceptional territorial patriotism or regional identity already formed before the war. It becomes even more pronounced in the process of conflict, acquiring an antagonistic orientation of Ukraine. At the same time, this confrontation is mostly passive. According to Russian terrorist leaders, most locals did not fight against Ukraine (Kazanskyi, 2021).

Sociological research in the conditions of occupation a priori may not be relevant, but they still contain some information about the modern identity of the inhabitants of Temporarily occupied territories of Ukraine. Thus, the public organisation Ukrainian Institute of the Future, "Mirror of the Week. Ukraine", and New Image Marketing Group on October 7–31, 2019, conducted a sociological survey in the occupied territory. 1606 respondents were interviewed: 800 – in the uncontrolled part of Luhansk

and 806 – in the uncontrolled part of Donetsk regions. For the sample calculations, the official statistics of 2014 were used, adjusted to consider the available demographic data of internally displaced persons who left uncontrolled territories. The survey revealed that 57.8% of the so-called Donetsk People's Republic / Luhansk People's Republic called themselves citizens of Ukraine. Obviously, they need to keep Ukrainian IDs. However, 41.6% said goodbye to Ukraine not only in their hearts but also officially. They have "IDs" of Donetsk People's Republic / Luhansk People's Republic – 34.8%, and Russia – 6.8% (Compatibility test, 2019).

The number of holders of Russian IDs has increased significantly in recent years. According to Deputy Chairman of the State Duma Committee on Commonwealth of Independent States Affairs, Eurasian Integration and Relations with Compatriots Viktor Vodolatsky in Donbas, 538,000 people have already received Russian ID. "According to the forecasts that exist today, and from the statements that exist today, by the end of this year, up to 1 million residents of Donbas will become citizens of the Russian Federation", – said the Russian official (It was declared, 2021).

Conclusions

Enhanced formation of border identity has become a reality since 2014, but in the minds of the local population, the "mental border" runs along the line of demarcation between Ukraine and Temporarily occupied territories of Ukraine. However, the perception of the actual state border remains undefined (a significant part of the Ukrainian-Russian border within the Donetsk and partly Luhansk regions is controlled only by the Russian side).

At the same time, there was an increase in hybridity in the population's self-determination on occupied territories. We can observe the "layering" of several hybrid identities: post-Soviet until 2014 and modern sub-occupation. However, the hybrid nature of such an identity makes it ambivalent, unstable. Moreover, it is in a state of crisis the population have suffered several waves of cultural trauma. Divided political loyalties are maintained and strengthened, which, in addition to the declared allegiance to the terrorist "power" of the Donetsk People's Republic / Luhansk People's Republic, contain potential opportunities to return to the perception of the Ukrainian government as legitimate.

Ways to further construct the identity of the Temporarily occupied territories of Ukraine's population remain uncertain. There are several possible scenarios, which in turn depend on the characteristics of the de-occupation process. The best-case scenario envisages abandoning the principle of a rigid regional identity tied to the mental space of Donbas instead of "growing" into an all-Ukrainian identity with a focus on the prospects of Ukraine as a competitive political and economic entity. The intermediate scenario is to preserve the regional identity while enriching it with Ukrainian state components. An unfavourable scenario may lead to a long-term fixation of the hybrid nature of self-identification, which threatens to perpetuate permanent conflict in the region.

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THE HISTORIC FOOTPRINT OF THE LAW IN LEGAL SYSTEMS: FROM ITS EDUCATIONAL VALUE TO SOCIAL ENGINEERING - SOME EXAMPLES

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Abstract

"The people must fight for its law as for its (city) walls". These are the words of Heraclitus who, in the 5th century BC, was already perfectly aware of the immense influence that the law has on shaping the identity of the people. Because not only do laws have an effect on institutions, but indeed they also transform the minds and even the hearts of individuals. In this article, we will try to understand what the law is and what its purpose is. We will ask ourselves if it is legitimate, and if it is possible, to leave the educational value of the law aside in order to use it as a tool for social change. This is why we must resort to the concept of law throughout history in order to understand its value and its virtuosity.

Key words: *law - social change - social engineering – legal history*

From the Educational Value to the Transformative Power of the Law

"What is the law?" may seem like an easy question to answer, however, we will soon find out that this is not the case. The term has been defined in many ways throughout history, arriving at the most diverse meanings. And not only because each school of thought understands it differently, but because, as indicated by Millán-Puelles, it is not a univocal term, rather it is an analogous term (Millán-Puelles, 2002, 381), as it can be applied to various realities that bear a certain connection and coherence between them.

We begin with the Thomist definition of law as *"… an ordinance of reason for the common good, made by him who has care of the community, and promulgated."* (Aquinas, 1993). Thomas Aquinas started by addressing the subject of law in general, and from a theological point of view, going on to raise the issue from the perspective of social harmony, in other words, of the human positive law. In general terms, he began by stating that: *"The law is a rule and measure of our acts whereby man is induced to act or is restrained from acting; for law is derived from binding because it binds one to act."* (Aquinas, 1993).

We therefore see that this presents us with three common characteristics of the different types of law, particularly relating to the positive human law:

1. The law as a prescribed act of reason. In this respect, according to Thomas Aquinas, the law cannot be explained without its rational significance. He only justifies it by its means of rationality, embodying a prudential ruling imposed on free men who aim to achieve a certain degree of social good. The law is also a rational principle, but of a practical nature. It possesses its own *imperium*, not

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for the external coercion that it may exert, but because, rather than being an authoritarian order that was imposed as a blindly-guided superior will, it was an adjusted demand of the regulations for the social purpose fostered. It is important to remember that, with the words *ordinatio rationis*, will is not excluded because all law is wished by the lawmaker (as well as wished, it must also be known by the aforementioned) (Millán-Puelles, 2002, 384), but emphasis is placed on right reason.

2. The common good as the purpose of the law. The purpose of the law shall be the common good, as a true element of social life. In addition, it affirms that there are as many types of law as types of existing human associations. This is why laws are distinguished and classified in accordance with the various orders of human harmony, in response to the purposes of each one of the associations. The common good being precisely "common" does not call for all members of the community to be the same or to fulfil an identical role, but quite the opposite; difference will allow this common good to prosper.

3. Authority as an efficient cause of the law. The law as a precept directed towards the social common good is a product of anyone who possesses *auctoritas*. The purpose and role of the human leader shall be to look after/ protect this common good. He must do and impose everything within his reach in order for the laws to be necessary and appropriate with regard to this purpose. He himself shall state, be ordained by and subject to these laws. Furthermore, he shall be under an obligation to notify these laws, in other words, enact them.

According to Thomas Aquinas, the law is, above all, an external direction of man towards moral good. It does not hinder the freedom of man, rather the opposite; it is the mechanism required to achieve plenitude in social life, thus contradicting some subsequent interpretations, particularly those which emerged after the Enlightenment.

In this respect, Thomas Aquinas understood the law as a rule of social conduct which is, strictly speaking, human, and which possesses the empire that consents to complying with it in a mandatory nature, for the pursuit of the common good.

In Question 92, when he studies the effects of laws, he states: *"The aim of every law is to be obeyed by those who are subject to it. Thus, the proper effect of the law is to lead its subjects to their own virtue... therefore, the effect of the law itself is to make those subject to it good, whether in an absolute sense or in a merely relative sense."* (Aquinas, 1993). The law is above all a mandate, a mandate to those who are subject to it. The law is not just any mandate, because it has a purpose, because it pursues certain effects. The purpose of the law is no other than the pursuit of the common good: *"Because if the lawmaker intends to achieve real good, which is the common good governed in accordance with divine justice, the law will make men good..."* (Aquinas, 1993).

Thomas Aquinas recognises that the law has a certain educational effect. What makes men good is virtue, not the law. But the law may contribute to men being good because the mandates that are laid down in it order virtue: *"When one is accustomed to avoiding bad actions and practising good actions due to fear of punishment, at times one does so with pleasure and on one's own accord. Thus, through punishment the law also contributes to making men good."* (Aquinas, 1993).

We can perceive that in the law, Thomas Aquinas discovers the educational role of the will of man in his search for achieving the moral good. It is true that the purpose of human actions is none other than virtue, but it cannot be forgotten that man needs the law in order to "train himself" and head towards the good of the political society in which he lives and of which he is part. *"Such is the discipline itself of laws, its educational condition which promotes conduct while seeking justice and peace... thus it was necessary to ordain laws in order to realise peace among men and achieve virtue."* (Osuna, 1993, 693).

In all of these ideas, Thomas Aquinas summarises a tradition dating back many years. In his thinking, we find repeated references to the Holy Scriptures (particularly the Pentateuch and the Pauline Epistles) and the domain of the Roman legal world. The latter confirms to us that Aquinas was an expert in the Code of Justinian in the *Corpus Iuris Civilis*. Furthermore, it would be impossible to deny the extent to which he was influenced by Augustine of Hippo, Isidore of Seville and, closer to his time, Albertus Magnus. (Osuna, 1993, 696 and 697). Nonetheless, one influence par excellence was the discovery and the "Christianisation" of the Greeks, particularly of Aristotle, which is reflected in the development of his entire thinking. He was aware that in the Greek experience, there was a connection between Law and Ethics, which therefore revealed the educational and pedagogical nature of Law.

The law was conceived in this way for a long time (as a result of the Greek-Latin and Judeo-Christian tradition, in addition to the contribution by Thomas Aquinas) until political thinking began to change.

Change in political thinking was supported and strengthened by a widespread change in mentality at the start of the Early Modern Period: an anthropotheocentric world view turned into an anthropocentric world view. In basic terms, this led to a radical split with the Greek-Latin world and with the Christian worldview. Modernity came to break with the ontological humility of the human being, typical of the Middle Ages, in an aim to appoint man as the lord and the unconditioned possessor of nature: *"For by them I perceived it to be possible to arrive at knowledge highly useful in life; and in room of the speculative philosophy usually taught in the schools, to discover a practical, by means of which, knowing the force and action of fire, water, air, the stars, the heavens, and all the other bodies that surround us, as distinctly as we know the various crafts of our artisans, we might also apply them in the same way to all the uses to which they are adapted, and thus render ourselves the lords and possessors of Nature."* (Descartes, 1996, 127).

The start of the Early Modern Period gave rise to philosophical and legal tendencies, which brought about reductionism in the concept, in the meaning and in the purpose of laws.

The first of them (of theological origin at the hands of William of Ockham), on a legal plane, came to disregard the rationality of the law, considering it to be on a second plane in relation to will (Gallego, 2005, 102) and mysticism (or sentimentality), basic attitudes of the Franciscan mysticism. It burst in with the notion of subjective law to which the idea of *potestas* or *facultas* is connected. (Gallego, 2005, 102).

The contractarians of the 16th century and beyond also had something to say in relation to laws. On the one hand, in his philosophical theory, Hobbes warns us that man, in his natural state, is a wolf to man as he is a slave to his own passions (mainly due to his self-conservation instinct he will see a constant threat in the "other man",

which will put him in a permanent state of alert and distrust): *"... if any two men desire the same thing, which nevertheless they cannot both enjoy, they become enemies; and in the way to their end (which is principally their own conservation, and sometimes their delectation only) endeavour to destroy or subdue one another. "* (Hobbes, 1980, 223). This means that a "pact" must be formed in order to guarantee social harmony. However, for this pact to exist, human beings must accept a change to their rights, which entails renouncing the aforementioned, in order to combine all wills into one, in other words, to choose a representative which shall be the holder of all the rights which have been renounced, thus implying the creation of an artificial or fictitious party: "Leviathan", which, as it holds all of the rights, may not be subject to any restriction: *"...for by art is created that great Leviathan called a Commonwealth, or State (in Latin, Civitas), which is but an artificial man, though of greater stature and strength than the natural, for whose protection and defence it was intended."* (Hobbes, 1980, 117). According to Hobbes, the law shall be that laid down by the "sovereign power": *"It is the will of the sovereign that artificially creates the law without the aforementioned committing the sovereign to the just and unjust. Refusing any possibility of disturbance of the subjects, thus implies the pride of judging the good and the bad, which is the sole responsibility of the sovereign."* (Lozano, 2008, 161). Compliance with the law shall be based on fear and shall have no element which is in any way volitive or much less rational.

Rousseau proposes something similar with his "Social Contract" theory, starting from the premise that man is good by nature (this is the nuance that differentiates Rousseau from Hobbes). The "noble salvage" is socially represented based on a contract signed by free and equal citizens under the authority of the laws which are self-imposed: *"Through the social agreement we have given existence and life to the political body; it is now important to set it in motion and provide it with will by means of legislation."* (Rousseau, 1995, 36). These laws are given by the people to the people themselves, expressed as "popular will". Laws, in this respect, may not be unjust, as set forth, because no man is unjust with himself. Thus, laws are merely a series of necessary conditions of civil society, and the people subject to them are their author, their sovereign: *"In accordance with this idea, we are not allowed to ask to whom the legislative power belongs; laws are only expressions of the public will; it may not be asked, whether a prince is above the law, for he too is a member of the State."* (Rousseau, 1995, 37).

In light of the wilful, negotiating and contractual doctrines, modern absolutisms are built, whose positivist philosophies are the ideological roots of the totalitarianisms typical of the end of the 19th century and the start of the 20th century. (Gallego, 2005, 114).

On its part, Enlightenment reformism paved the way for extremism of the people as a sovereign under its slogan "liberty, equality and fraternity". The power of the prince was replaced by the sovereign power of the people's will which dictated their own laws and rules for social harmony.

On a legal plane, strictly speaking, the intrusion of the regulatory revolution also negatively contributed to these totalitarianisms. This revolution, which took place at the end of the 19th century, led to a transformation in terminology (Martínez-Sicluna, 2012). A consequence of this change was the law being replaced for the regulation. Thus, the rationality and purpose of the common good, typical of the classic notion of the law, yielded their space to the will (of the State or lawmaker) and

coerciveness which are, according to positivists, truly important in a regulation: *"Almost all jurists of the 19th century agreed to consider the legal regulation as a coercive regulation, which prescribes or permits the use of coercion, and to admit that coercion is the distinctive character of the legal regulation. In this regard, the Pure Theory of Law continues the positivist tradition of the last century."* (Kelsen, 2009, 57).

The legal theories at the start of the 20th century began to understand the law as an agent of social change in line with American Legal Realism and some schools of Legal Sociology. Along with these movements and schools, the elements of the law (in accordance with the classic and Thomist configuration) gradually disappeared. In other words, the essential elements of the law were replaced by others, thus reason was replaced by will and the purpose of the common good was replaced by the regulation of social conduct.

Among the ideas developed by North American Legal Realism (Campos and Sepúlveda, 2013, 20 and 21), we can briefly highlight the following:

1. An instrumental conception of Law, as a means for social ends. This idea had great pragmatic inspiration which coincided with the political progressivism of that time.

2. A dynamic view of society and institutions (these fluctuate but must maintain a certain degree of balance). This was connected to the acceleration of the social changes revealed, as would be explained, the lack of dogmatic methods that had been developed up until that time because the creation and implementation of Law had to be adapted to the new social conditions and demands.

3. Assessment of the effects of regulations. They insisted on the idea of assessing any part of Law based on its effects. They aimed to make the regulation effective from a utilitarian approach.

4. A focus on Law from the perspective of real cases and problems. The formalist approach to creating the law, with the lawmaker being the only creator of Law, is exceeded by the legal practice itself. This therefore explains the preponderance of the judge and his function to create Law by means of jurisprudence.

In short, of the ideas developed by American Legal Realism the most characteristic consists of its representatives trying to minimise the regulatory and prescriptive element of Law and maximise the empirical and descriptive element of the aforementioned. Law is therefore converted into a set of facts, rather than a set of regulations. Its postulates are not, of course, limited to the ideas expressed here, due to the specific variety of clarifications, theoretical distinctions and marked differences in doctrines which, in all fairness, would have to be specified in the development of the particular theories outlined by each one of the authors belonging to this movement.

It must be stressed that all of these legal theories contributed, in one way or another, to the prevailing totalitarianisms at the beginning of the 20th century with an instrumental conception of Law, with a changing view of the institutions, and an assessment of a utilitarian nature of the regulations in which only their effects are considered, with a legal focus resulting in social problems. A factor common to all of them is to understand the law as a tool to govern the conduct of men and these theories are, therefore, accepted to be focused according to the instructions of the person who has power.

The influence of the authors who we recognise as North American realists and the schools of Legal Sociology is particularly relevant to this thesis, not only due to the great critical contribution to Law in force at that time, but also because of the particular influence that they left as a legacy in the field of Law teaching.

Despite the injustice of not studying all relevant authors of the aforementioned schools in detail, we have chosen Roscoe Pound to further explore his legal approach as the founder of the Sociological Jurisprudence movement. (Braybrooke, 1958, 288-325). We focus on one of his most significant ideas which appears in several of his articles: the consideration of the law in its power to change social reality.

We begin by stating that among the definitions that Pound provides of the law (despite being rather reluctant to do so), we stress that all the meanings that he offers inexorably refer to one idea: that of social control. The law makes social control possible because it is: *"(1) a regime of adjusting relations and ordering conduct by systematic and orderly application of the force of a politically organized society, otherwise called the legal order. (2) a body of authoritative materials of or grounds of or guides to determination, whether judicial or administrative. This body of materials may be described more minutely as made up of authoritative precepts, an authoritative technique of development and application, and a background of received ideals of the social and legal order. (3) the judicial and administrative processes… If the three meanings can be unified, it is by the idea of social control."* (Pound*, 1958, 13). Pound therefore offers a provisional definition of the aforementioned as: *"a highly specialized form of social control, carried on in accordance with a body of authoritative precepts, applied in a judicial and an administrative process."* (Pound, 1921, 195 and 196).

When considering the law as a highly specialised form of social control: What is the purpose of the law? What, therefore, is its aim? Over his forty years of investigative work, Pound answered with complete conviction: its aim is "social engineering". (Pound, 1921).

Social engineering was the basis, the grounds and the purpose of the legal order for Pound and the members of American Legal Realism at the beginning of the 20th century. Furthermore, as is logic, this notion of law and rights has many consequences which are reflected in our society today.

The question should therefore be: how did Pound establish the idea of social engineering? First of all, he started from what he called the five stages of legal development (Pound, 1914), with all of them linked in order to detect the limits of the law in each one. In the fifth stage, referred to as: *socialization of the law*, there is a double task: to maintain order and peace in "civilization" (Braybrooke, 1958, 288-325) and to promote it, in other words, to be a promotion agency for social development, thus social engineering. In response to what civilization is (beyond the definition of Kholer, which is appropriated by Pound) and how the law progresses throughout each of these stages, Pound put forward his five jural postulates of civilized society (Braybrooke, 1958, 288-325).

From several articles published by Pound, Braybrooke deduced that the aforementioned defined "civilization" as "*the social development of human powers toward their highest possible unfolding.*" (Braybrooke, 1958, 288-325). In order to create optimum conditions for the development of "civilization", the five jural postulates of civilized society (which, according to Pound, are the essential preconditions of the Anglo-

American civilization of the 20th century) must be used as a guide. In turn, in order to satisfy the maximum of human claims, wants and desires with the minimum of friction and waste ("engineering value") and generally described by Pound as "interest") (Pound, 1958, 37), the aforementioned must be categorised as individual interest, public interest or social interest (Abhipsa and Pritam, 2010), in accordance with a previously outlined catalogue. Pound proceeds to state that the structure of this catalogue is arbitrary and only responds to the interests of those who hold the power of the administration of justice, of political power.

According to Pound, the force that calls for social engineering to be introduced is only that emanating from conflict of interest. He stated that the only thing that can "balance" these conflicts is the law. In other words, this means that the law must work in order to establish the balance of interests in society in order for it to be more beneficial.

With regard to social control, Pound believed that interest is the only thing that must be considered and the law is the means by which to do so. In relation to possible frictions or contradictions between individual, public or social interests, Pound did not clarify which of them would have supremacy over the rest, although it may in some way be deduced that this theory attaches fundamental importance to social or public interests which is greater than individual interest and if this is strictly interpreted, it may therefore result in the elimination of individual interests, where necessary.

The three contributions of Pound may be summarised as follows:

1. His "definition" of law as an *"instrument of social control is a coercive order, operated through both judicial and administrative processes (each having a special part to play in the overall functioning of law) utilizing precepts of varying degrees and generality and flexibility, applied and developed in accordance with received techniques varying within different legal orders."* (Braybrooke, 1958, 288-325).

2. In the development of the five jural postulates in civilized society, social control is introduced as *social engineering*.

3. The law exercises this social engineering on the basis of conflicts of interest, giving social or public interests priority over individual interests.

All legal philosophies have attempted to clearly show and meet the needs of one specific period and the case of Pound was no exception. The need of the North American society itself at the beginning of the 20th century was, for the Philosophy of Law, to provide a practical legal theory according to the interests valued. We understand that his proposal of "social engineering" (with his jural postulates) offers a judgement which is reductionist, provisional (only applicable to one specific society, such as that of his time) and dangerous because it again leaves aside the true meaning of the law and, in short, rights.

Some Examples in History

Understanding the law as social engineering is not a mere theoretical construction which is simply speculative, rather it has become a reality many times throughout history. Many people have used their knowledge of the law as a transformative power in order to achieve their ideological aims. By means of example, we can mention the change experienced by families in the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

A series of exhaustive and well-prepared efforts was introduced in Bolshevik Russia in order to "reinvent" society. It was therefore necessary to transform certain institutions, starting with the most deeply rooted and with the most natural makeup of all: family. The main figure of these efforts was first the woman and then the family. Criticism of the traditional bourgeois family, questioned in the lucubration regarding the aforementioned in Marx and Engels (Engels, 1972), made "social engineering" in this respect possible. The "social revolution" started with the announcement of the Family Codes of 1918, 1926 and 1936. These ideas were expressed in the aforementioned codes by means of specific measures, such as the abolition of the inferior legal status of women, rendering religious marriage invalid and only legally validating civil marriage once registered, the establishment of divorce at request of either spouse, with no justification required; the extension of the same guaranteed alimony for men and women, recognition of children born to unmarried parents, and legalization of the right to abortion. (Recuero, 2011, 140). The objective of these policies, like that of all policies in the Russian communist regime, was solely to introduce *scientific socialism* where all the authority was assumed by the State (Leviathan). This is who decides what is good and what is bad and it therefore requires a man who is completely weakened (only considered as material and who is only valid if useful), a woman freed from housework (who works the land because her labour is also valuable) and a broken family.

The *Code of Laws on Acts of Marital Status, Law of Marriage, Family and Guardianship* of 1918 regulated:

With respect to marriage: from article 52 to 132, communism condemned marriage, but the Russian lawmaker temporarily regulated marriage in order to avoid completely abolishing registration, which would result in influences of tradition leading the Russians to perform the canonical form of marriage, which was the only way established before. Marriage was thus subject to a register of a secular and civil nature, as a public act which had to be held before the chief of the local Civil Registry, and was only considered to have taken place when it had been registered (Article 62).

With respect to family: from article 133 to 183 it was determined that: *"as marriage is maintained in this Russian Code, despite it being contrary to Russian principles, the family institution is also accepted, even though it is rejected by communism, however, due to temporary political reasons."* The Russian Code did not establish marriage as the basis of family, rather in Article 133 it stipulated: *"Actual descent is the basis of family. There is no difference between children born to unmarried parents and those born to married parents."* Blood ties were therefore established. Thus, complete equality of rights was introduced between children born to married parents and those born to unmarried parents. This principle, stipulated in Article 133, was paramount as regards family Law as all other principles derived from the aforementioned in heading III of the Soviet Code.

In Soviet society, all of these measures, encouraged the relaxation of customs and the social trivialization of the family institution as a vital cell of society, which caused the Russian citizens to recognise the State as a type of "fatherhood" in a situation of such helplessness: *"… all children deprived of family care, without looking to see if they have possessions or not, their wealth or their poverty, are protected under the care of the common institutions of the State."* (Del Olmo, 1930, 23).

Another historical experience of exploitation of the law to transform society in a very particular way was that brought about by the National Party in South Africa with the introduction of the apartheid in 1948, when they had only just come to power. The word itself literally means distancing. The aim of the apartheid was to further increase the racial segregation that had historically existed in South Africa since the age of colonisation. After a century and a half of British rule, descendants of the Dutch and French colonists who were originally from South Africa had regained control of their country. Thus, what they tried to restore, with this entire set of laws, was the supremacy of their traditional social values in order to reassume unequivocal rule over their compatriots to make them inferior in terms of race and culture. In short, the aim of these regulations was none other than the perpetuation of a brutal system of racial inequality. The fact that this was a global legislative project is of great significance.

Therefore, throughout the period of over forty years that they were in power, they developed a series of programmes and infrastructures that contributed to this belief of supremacy, on the one hand, and of submission, on the other hand. The apartheid involved various factors, with very complex interactions which do not cease to show evidence of the supreme role played by legal culture in the social change produced. This is clearly demonstrated by the fact that more and more restrictions and sanctions were legislated each year as a result of the aforementioned being violated. By means of example, of the more than two hundred established over the many years that the apartheid was in force, we quote two: *Population Registration Act* and *Residential Segregation Statutes*. After so many years of racial segregation, what happened in South Africa seemed irreparable. Nonetheless, history has shown us that this was not the case and today South Africa continues very naturally with its racial reconciliation process.

The experiment of South Africa in the manipulation of social processes through the use of legal sanction is one of the clearest examples of the way in which the law may be effective as a social engineering tool.

Laws transform institutions and shape collective consciousness, although at times lawmakers are not fully aware of their effects. In Spain, we may recall that in 1981, the Minister of Justice at the time, Francisco Fernández Ordoñez, assured the whole country that half a million couples were eagerly awaiting the divorce law in order to formalise the break-up of their marriages. However, the total number of married couples who filed for divorce in the two years after the passing of the law was below 7% of what had been predicted. Although thirty years later, in 2011, 103,604 divorces were granted. The technique to exaggerate data of a supposed social "clamour" was once again used to justify the passing of the divorce law. Furthermore, over the years, this law has significantly changed the way in which marriage is perceived.

The same technique has been used more recently to justify the need to put same-sex unions on a level with marriage. When presenting the draft bill passed by the Cabinet, the vice-president of the Government at the time, María Teresa Fernández de la Vega, stated that there were around 4,000,000 homosexual people in Spain waiting for the law to be passed in order to get married. If we look at the data registered in the National Statistics Institute, we can see that of the 168,556 marriages registered throughout Spain in 2012, same-sex marriages only accounted for 2% of this total; in

2014, of the 158,425 marriages registered, same-sex marriages represented 2.1% of the total (in other words, there were 3,300 same-sex marriages).

It seems clear that laws are very often not limited to including the changes demanded by society, but they actively generate these changes.

Conclusions and Critical Evaluation

We have made use of the social engineering model of Pound because we consider it to be the most accessible and the least visited in order to theoretically show how the exploitation of laws may give rise to real social change. We are aware that the thinking of Pound alone does not exhaust the idea of social engineering which is present in many other authors, not even with the clarifications that the emergence of American Legal Realism caused him to raise, or the theory developed, in this respect, by the schools of Legal Sociology.

In modern times, laws have been considered from other points of view, which are completely different to those considered by Thomas Aquinas. One of the most common points of view until now has been that of social order. Therefore, laws have been understood as orders of human conduct for the purpose of society, the definition of areas of freedom, the resolution of possible conflicts of interest, the control and order of social relations, social engineering, etc. All of the aforementioned undoubtedly present some observations which contain a certain degree of truth, but in our opinion, none of them seems to be as accurate as that put forward by Thomas Aquinas: in short, the law is a prescription of reason, in view of the common good, promulgated by the person whom has care of the community.

The stripping of its content and the process of manipulation to which the concept of law has been subject, from Thomas Aquinas to the present day, involves altering the same essence of the law, leaving it in the service of an ideological programme which, in all cases, confers excessive power to the State, which inexorably leads to totalitarianism.

The sense of law is not the coerciveness of the aforementioned or the sovereign will of the lawmaker, of the people or of the State, but the rational will ordered for the common good (which may be summarised as the harmony that this must keep between the objective reality of man and of things).

We agree with Thomas Aquinas in the respect that the essential purpose of law is not social change, but to achieve the common good. It is sometimes the case that in order to achieve the common good, a social change takes place. This is logical and even necessary, however it would pose a problem in the event that this social change gave rise to an ideological purpose of greater importance than the common good. What makes men good is virtue, not the law. This does not mean that laws may contribute to this task, due to their educational value.

The exploited law may cause negative, unexpected and unwanted effects in society, rendering it "senseless" which causes the development and fulfilment of both the people and the institutions (family and State) to become non-viable.

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GENDER BARRIERS AND ACADEMIC MANAGEMENT OF „AL. I. CUZA" UNIVERSITY OF IAŞI

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Abstract

Discriminating experiences of women in the academic world discourage them to take part in contests to occupy higher academic positions. People tend to evaluate academic management based on what they consider to be normal behaviour for women and men, respectively. Because of this, women are perceived as more inappropriate to occupy an academic managerial position than men, especially in fields (such as the academic field) where male stereotypes are regarded as more efficient. Focusing on the obstacles women met in their attempt to reach a scientific/ academic management position, we have noticed that one of the major difficulties women in the academic world are confronted with when they have to decide in relation with their participation in the academic management refers to creating a balance between family life and their career, as domestic activities are normally time-consuming, limiting the period which could be dedicated to professional activities.

Key-words: *personal satisfaction, academic performance, mentors, management position, male stereotypes*

Introduction

The semi-structured interview also used in the present paper aims at underlining fragments of the speeches of the participating women that represent their attitudes towards some aspects related to motivation and professional and personal satisfaction.

The interview investigation relies on the semi-structured interview, and the compiled interview guidelines included only the large themes the study focused on, as it was adapted throughout the interviewing stage (Piercy, 2004: 2). The research results are not representative for the population the interviewed persons belong to.

The study sample comprises 13 women belonging to the academic and scientific world of Iasi and they were divided into two categories: seniors and juniors. The division was made following the criterion of the research and teaching experience of the women who were part of the research. Thus, the category of inexperienced women included women with up to seven years' experience and the other category obviously included women with more than seven years' experience. The non-random "snow ball"-type sampling was used for the research, the interviewed women being recommended by persons belonging to the STAGES (Structural Transformation to Achieve Gender Equality in Science), project coordinated by Professor Doina Balahur.

We have decided on this division between senior and junior women because the professional satisfaction of the women in the academic world varies depending on the position they have and the advance from one position to the other implies a certain productivity and takes time (Marston & Brunetti, 2009).

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1. Aspirations on academic and scientific management

One way for an activity to become sex discriminating is the gender composition of the persons in charge of the respective institution/ organisation. In other words, the activity takes after the characteristics of the above mentioned persons (Wharton, 2012: 107).

The management positions in the academic world are occupied by men and this has to do, in the unanimous opinion of the senior women (no mentioning of this aspect is to be found in the interviews with the junior women), with the traditionalist fundament operating within universities: *"There is also history with the academic world. It is difficult for me to believe that Faculty X will have a woman chancellor, for example. But the issue is that we are dealing with certain patterns, with institutionally accredited models."*

One of the major difficulties women in the academic world are confronted with when they have to decide in relation with their participation in the academic management refers to creating a balance between family life (especially when they have dependent children in their care) and their career, as domestic activities are normally time-consuming, limiting the period which could be dedicated to professional activities (Tomas, Lavie, del mar Duran & Guillamon, 2010: 488; Gardiner, Tiggemann, Kearns & Marshall, 2007: 427). Although this reason is apparently more likely to be found with most interviewed women, it actually appears, against all expectations, predominantly in the speeches of senior women: *"If they have no facilities to solve their family problems easily, they normally do not give up their family for a position."* Gardiner *et al.* (2007: 429) state that the moment a child is born many of the women in the academic world "access" one of the benefits granted by the state (parental leave) in order to take care of the child, thus creating an unbalance between them and their male colleagues. Such an explanation appears both in the case of some of the senior women and with junior women: *"But if I had chosen not to have a family life and not to get involved with my children's lives, I would have definitely succeeded in getting involved to a greater extent! Definitely!"; "For example, to have a child is a step back, unfortunately, physiologically is a step back, one year to finish nursing the child and to recover is a lost year."* Also, the women's decisions to get involved with the management positions of the academic world appear mostly when their children reach an age when they can take care of themselves or when they move out (Tessens, White & Web, 2011: 658-659). The statement is not fully covered by the study because among the persons wanting to occupy such an academic management position there are women whose children are still in their care: *"I'd run for (a management position) … Let's say that from an organisational point of view I like it, I like organising things."* In spite of this, there are also senior women who consider that they could manage the requirements implied by an academic management position due to a decrease of their family chores: *"Yes, why not, because family problems are now much fewer."*

In one of his articles, Pyke (2013: 445) states that the discriminating experiences of women in the academic world discourage them to take part in contests to occupy higher academic positions. This aspect was also mentioned in one of the interviews with the senior women: *"It made me not want to run for office in these conditions. It I were to be elected by the community I think I'd go for it, but to relive the same experience, to run for office and to lose again … no!"* Chandler (2011: 7) notices that people tend to evaluate academic management based on what they consider to be normal behaviour for women and men,

respectively. Because of this, women are perceived as more inappropriate to occupy an academic managerial position than men, especially in fields (such as the academic field) where male stereotypes are regarded as more efficient. Thus there appears the question whether women could bring something new to academic management. Most women agreed that women can have the same qualities as men, and the other way around: *"… both women and men can have the same management qualities"*. Besides these aspects, the interviewed persons also mentioned that there could be differences in skills, underlining the fact that women may have some managerial skills that most men lack, such as: organising skills *("… I think that many women know how to organise their time and do more things at the same time"*) because women need to know how to "joggle" domestic and professional activities *("… they can manage both domestic and work tasks at the same time, even if they are quite demanding"*); they are more practical due to their maternal instinct *("A woman is more connected to reality and the pragmatism of day-to-day existence because a woman understands better because she is a mother"*); intuition (*"generally a woman is more empathic to some of the problems that may arise with the workers, they understand things differently"*); they adopt a collaborative management style *("when there are difficult decisions to make, I always prefer to consult more people before I make a decision"*).

One of the studies belonging to Cristina Gonzales (2010: 4) underlines the fact that persons in the academic field do not have any chances to occupy a management position without the support of authority persons. This aspect was found only in the speeches of the senior women and we can draw the conclusion that their years of institutional experience have helped them notice the mechanisms allowing people to occupy such positions: *"The problem is that you need to be voted. You need to have a backing image capital and a managerial capital. You can't succeed without any help."* The same author underlines the fact that each academic community has their leaders "who does not have any power, but they have influence" (Gonzales, 2010: 6). They can influence the decisions of the community very much in the direction they desire. We were able to place such a leader in the discussion we had with Irina, whose opinion draws attention to the ability of such a leader to decide the real "importance" of a person in the academic world, regardless of the gender: *"Our hierarchies are also informal, not only formal. In the end, this is it. The informal hierarchies, mark my word, are much sharper and more correct. People normally know where you belong. You may have hundreds of researches, if they are not good, if they have no quality, it's the same."*

2. Academic managerial positions in women's views

From the women's interviews, regardless of the category they belong to, we could not draw one clear conclusion on the causes of why women do not occupy academic management positions, but we could identify some of the reasons why they have met obstacles in their professional development in the academic/ scientific field.

The fact that the academic management does not get involved in supporting academic staff development in situations requiring support leads to dissatisfactions regarding the balance between family life and work: *"The University hasn't helped me at all since I gave birth to D. … Being alone, they could have helped me because of my work"*. Marston & Brunetti (2009: 337) consider that universities should examine the problems of academic staff regarding the balance between the two life spheres in

more detail because this can generate positive or negative results regarding academic performance. One of the participants, sensing this gap between the academic staff and academic management, states: *"…I think that the University may do much better regarding mothers and the after birth period"*.

The study of Fox, Fonseca & Bao (2011: 717) brings into discussion the fact that women are a lot more inclined to face conflicts regarding the balance between family life and work. This statement is closely connected to the study results due, on the one hand, to the role of women in the family, an aspect more obvious in the junior women's speeches *("My mother told me: your place is in the kitchen, you're married now"*), and on the other hand, to the traditional education they received in their birth family which incubated the idea that one of the roles of women is to take care of the domestic chores (Balahur & Balahur, 2010: 183), an aspect more obvious in the senior women's interviews *("I say this again, I really wanted to stay at home for the first two years because I'm a mother"*).

One of the differences between senior and junior women is the fact that, in the case of the seniors, the feeling of guilt is more present when they do not succeed in accomplishing the domestic tasks, which they consider belong to them: *"From the family point of view, I say that there are more things that I could have done. I mean, to have more time with them, I don't spent enough time with them, to communicate more with them."*

Restraints related to child care activities make many women, such as the seniors in our study case, postpone the desire to occupy a position at the academic management level until the children are old enough not to be dependent on the mother's care (Baumgartner & Schneider, 2010: 561): *"…the worries about family life are not as present any more. G. is older now, so I am not needed at home, things are already following a trend where I can manage my affairs and I think I can deal with them."* (Corina)

Although, as shown above, senior women appear to have higher productivity, there are cases when junior women underline this aspect to express their professional qualities. But their speeches regarding this aspect are closely linked to situations when they felt they had been treated unfairly: *"I want to have twenty papers. I have more than one hundred quotes, close to two hundred. I'm unbeatable with projects. I just need a course and a few more published articles. This is all I need. And then I go with no problem. And then I can let A. pass with minimum"*; *"… among the ones that have it (a PhD), nobody has a better file than mine"* Larisa – junior. The situation of the juniors is also mentioned by Valian (1998: 38) when he states that a woman's publication level is high at the beginning of her career and then it slowly decreases.

As regards the satisfaction level regarding the salary, most women said they were not satisfied: *"The money is very, very little for the effort that we are putting into it."* (Luiza – junior). In spite of this, although still dissatisfied, the seniors admit that the difficulties of a person at the beginning of their career are much higher than their own: *"I don't know how these young girls manage. I think I would look for employment elsewhere, instead of staying here for this money."* (Claudia). In the academic field, the salary is in close connection to the position occupied. Thus, as Valian (1998: 42) stated, even the smallest differences in treatment can lead to huge discrepancies in promotion and salary, implicitly. The women's interviews have brought these dissatisfactions to the surface only in the case of the juniors: "… I didn't feel discouraged … because at one point, in two years Mr

M. leaves his job … then, if M. doesn't do it himself, nobody else will ever do it." The same author states that women must reach a productivity level higher than men in order to get promoted in their career (Valian, 1998: 45), as many of the juniors in this study have shown. They underlined the fact that their professional success is higher than their fellow men's: *"I have more than one hundred quotes, close to two hundred. I'm unbeatable with projects. I just need a course and a few more published articles. This is all I need. And then I go with no problem. And then I can let A. pass with minimum"* Luiza - junior.

Also, another aspect long debated in the field literature is the fact that the mentors' presence was not very often invoked in the conclusions of the interviews analysis. Although seldom mentioned, when the seniors refer to their mentors in the past or in the present they normally mention men, rather than women, unlike the juniors: *"I discovered professor A., I discovered professor S., professor of logic".* This can be caused by the fact that, as one of the women says, there were no women to fulfil this position during the time when they needed such persons in their professional and personal lives. On the contrary, we can notice that more and more women appear as mentors when we refer to the juniors' speeches: *"I am part of a group where Mrs T. did something, not that I praise her, but she really puts a lot of soul into it and managed to make this extraordinary group. She supports me a lot … she is my role model".*

Conclusions

Focusing on the obstacles women met in their attempt to reach a scientific/ academic management position, we have noticed that one of the major difficulties women in the academic world are confronted with when they have to decide in relation with their participation in the academic management refers to creating a balance between family life (especially when they have dependent children in their care) and their career, as domestic activities are normally time-consuming, limiting the period which could be dedicated to professional activities (Tomas *et al.*, 2010: 492; Gardiner *et al.*, 2007: 435). Although this reason is apparently more likely to be found with most interviewed women, it actually appears, against all expectations, predominantly in the speeches of senior women: *"If they have no facilities to solve their family problems easily, they normally do not give up their family for a position"* Florentina – senior. Gardiner *et al.* (2007: 436) state that the moment a child is born many of the women in the academic world "access" one of the benefits granted by the state (parental leave) in order to take care of the child, thus creating an unbalance between them and their male colleagues. Such an explanation appears both in the case of some of the senior women and with junior women: *"But if I had chosen not to have a family life and not to get involved with my children's lives, I would have definitely succeeded in getting involved to a greater extent! Definitely!"* Claudia - senior; *"For example, to have a child is a step back, unfortunately, physiologically is a step back, one year to finish nursing the child and to recover is a lost year"* Dana – junior. Also, Tessens *et al.* (2011) state that women's decisions to get involved with the management positions of the academic world appear mostly when their children reach an age when they can take care of themselves or when they move out. The statement is not fully covered by the study because among the persons wanting to occupy such an academic management position there are women whose children are still in their care: *"I'd run for (a management position)*

… Let's say that from an organisational point of view I like it, I like organising things." (Ioana – junior, mother of a four-year-old child)

Finally, we may remind that Doina Balahur (2015: 48) says that people tend to evaluate academic management based on what they consider to be normal behaviour for women and men, respectively. Because of this, women are perceived as more inappropriate to occupy an academic managerial position than men, especially in fields (such as the academic field) where male stereotypes are regarded as more efficient. Thus there appears the question whether women could bring something new to academic management. Most women agreed that women can have the same qualities as men, and the other way around: *"… both women and men can have the same management qualities"* Irina - senior. Besides these aspects, the interviewed persons also mentioned that there could be differences in skills, underlining the fact that women may have some managerial skills that most men lack, such as: organising skills *("… I think that many women know how to organise their time and do more things at the same time")* because women need to know how to "joggle" domestic and professional activities *("… they can manage both domestic and work tasks at the same time, even if they are quite demanding")*; they are more practical due to their maternal instinct *("A woman is more connected to reality and the pragmatism of day-to-day existence because a woman understands better because she is a mother", Corina)*; intuition (*"generally a woman is more empathic to some of the problems that may arise with the workers, they understand things differently", Florentina*); they adopt a collaborative management style *("when there are difficult decisions to make, I always prefer to consult more people before I make a decision")*.

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A.U.C.H. Manuscript Submission

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Reference citations
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a. An Article in a Journal with continuous paging
Harrison, R.L., & Westwood, M.J. (2009). Preventing vicarious traumtization of mental health therapists: Identifying protective practices. *Psychoterapy: Theory, Research, Practice, Training*, 46, 203-219.
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b. An Article in a Journal with separate paging
Damean, S.L. (2013). The Royal Family of Romania and the National Reunification War. *Analele Universităţii din Craiova. Istorie*, 23(1), 43-50.
In-text citation (Damean, 2013: 50)
c. An article in a monthly magazine
Madu, C. (2010, March-April). A cure for crime. *Psychology Today*, 43(2), 12.
In-text citation (Madu, 2010: 12)
II. Reference-list entries for books and other separately published materials
a. A book by one author
Damean, S.L. (2004). *România şi Congresul de Pace de la Berlin (1878)*. Bucureşti: Mica Valahie.
In-text citation (Damean, 2004: 49)
b. A book by two or more authors
Rosenthal, R., Rosnow, R.L., & Rubin, D.B. (2000). *Contrasts and effect sizes in behavioral research: A correlational approach*. Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press.

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In-text citation

The 1990 book: (Sternberg, 1990: 45)

The first 2003 book: (Sternberg, 2003a: 23)

The second 2003 book: (Sternberg, 2003b: 25)

The 2007 book: (Sternberg, 2007: 139)

All four works in the same citation: (Sternberg, 1990, 2003a, 2003b, 2007)

Damean, S.L. (2004). *România şi Congresul de Pace de la Berlin (1878)*. Bucureşti: Mica Valahie.

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III. Archival Documents and Collections

a. Collection of letters from an archive

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IV. Reference to a web source

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In-text citation (http://www.history.com/news/history-lists)